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Introduction
The field of political-economy dates back at least
as far as Adam Smith over 200 years ago. The early
political-economists made the first systematic attempts
to examine the interconnections between the emergence
of the new industrial system -- which changed the way
in which resources were produced and consumed -- and
the advent of bourgeois democratic states -- which made
critical decisions as to how those resources were to be
distributed. Although the study of political-economy
throughout the 19th century implied no particular
political ideology, by the 20th century it came to be
associated with radical critiques of society, especially by Marxists. And it is largely true that, until
recently, only left-leaning social scientists and social workers in the U.S. discussed economics and
politics as two inextricably related spheres of human
activity.
Now, once again, political-economy is fashionable
among the Gilders and the Galbraiths, as well as the
Gordons. Spurred by an "ideological" presidency, for
the first time in recent memory the debate over our
social priorities is taking place within a broader examination of the nature of the U. S. political economy,
its assumptions and goals, its intended and unintended
consequences.
The events of the last three years have shaken many
social workers from the reverie of technique and forced
them to face the harsh dawn of government cutbacks in
programs for human welfare, accompanied by increasingly
sharp attacks on the premises and goals of the unfinished U.S. welfare state. Whereas radicals and
reformers within social work have long made the connection between political-economic developments and social
policies explicit in their practice, for many in the
human services political and economic events were simply a distant backdrop whose impact on the structure
and delivery of services was indirect, unclear and
often abstract. This is no longer so. Social workers
in clinical practice now attend workshops on the impact
of unemployment; income maintenance services have established closer ties with labor unions to help the
"new poor"; administrators are renewing coalitions with
other service providers and their allies within
economically besieged communities. Finally, social
workers are becoming increasingly involved in electoral
politics: as candidates, campaign staff and as directors of voter registration projects.
It is impossible, therefore, for a discussion of
the current and future state of social work and social
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the relationship of both to the broader political
economy.
This special issue of the Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare is designed to begin that discussion by identifying several key aspects of this
relatiorship ard by stimulating further debate on these
and other questions.
The opening essay by Dr. Harold Lewis, Dean of
Hunter College School of Social Work, provides an analysis of the relationship between the economic issues
which will dominate the 1980's and their impact on the
definition of social work services.
Lewis argues that
these services have attributes as commodities just as
He
any product of work in a political-economic system.
explores the meaning of the commodity attribute for
services in such areas as quality of service, utilization of service, and evaluation and proposes some directions for policy makers and service providers in the
decade ahead.
The essays by Abramowitz and Kingsor examine the
impact of political-economic factors in the area of
social policy formulation.
Abramowitz critiques the
assumptions and contradictions of "supply-side
economics" specifically in terms of their relationship
to and impact upon social welfare program outlays.
Although most social workers "know" that Reaganomics has
hurt those in society least able to bear the pain, her
article will provide the corceptual ammunition needed
to refute those who claim the current Administration's
policies are "working".
Yes, Abramowitz argues, they
are working precisely as intended -- now, let's examine
what those intentions are, especially in regard to
their impact on the people with whom we work.
Kingson, who recently served as staff to the Bipartisan Commission on Social Security Reform, contributes
an excellent "case study" of the application of different economic assumptions to the creation of social
policy in the political arena.
His analysis of different approaches (coercive and voluntary) to retirement policy not only illustrates the impact of economic
decisions on a specific, vulnerable population, it also
serves as a model for future policy analysis efforts.
The essays by Rose, Perlman and Haggstrom explore
various aspects of the development and delivery of social work services within the U.S. political economy.
Each author assumes one influence of the U.S. political
economy on social services is the "commoditization" of
the service recipient.
Rose examines how this affects
policies and programs in mental health aftercare.
He
critiques existing policies and practices and the
underlying philosophy behind the "deinstitutionalization movement." Rose points to the theories of Paulo
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Freire as a guide for an alternate form of service
provision.
Like ex-mental patients, members of citizen action
groups have often been forced to adopt prescribed
roles and have often developed a self-identity imposed
upon them by more powerful economic and political forces.
Perlman presents mini-portraits of such individuals and reveals the diverse motivations behind
their participation. In the second half of her essay,
Perlman looks for the "meaning" behind this diversity
and evaluates the relevance of existing theories to the
experiences of the citizen action groups she observed.
She concludes by describing those characteristics of
action organizatiors which produce the greatest change
in participants' consciousness and, like Rose, looks to
the work of Freire (and others) as a possible model for
organizers.
Haggstrom's controversial essay also demands that
we reexamine certain fundamental assumptions about our
practice, assumptions which have been shaped by the
structure of the political economy (via funding patterns) and by the ideology generated by the U.S. pattern of political-economic development (via our corceptions of science and the helping process).
He asks us
to look at the possibility that some of our programs
and practices not only do not achieve their stated outcome goals, but that they exacerbate the problems they
are intended to solve or produce new, unforeseen problems.
His concluding suggestions about education,
research and service delivery are sure to stimulate
further discussion of the issues he raises.
The final two articles focus on how politicaleconomic factors influence the individual and group
behavior of social workers themselves.
Longres analyzes those factors which heighten or diminish the
degree of alienation experienced by service providers.
His essay is significart for several reasons:
(a) it reinforces our examination of the work aspect of
social work, including the negative features of
work in a profit-motivated economy;
(b) it reformulates the problem of so-called "worker
burnout" -- with its emphasis or "internal" factors
-- to ore which addresses how the features of the
external environment (agency, community, politicaleconomic system) affect practice in the human
services;
(c) it reawakens our awareness that the concept of
alienation originated with an analysis of how the
political-economy of capitalist nations shaped social relationships and behavior.
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While Longres' article looks at how individual social workers respond to pressures fro;n the politicaleconomic environment, this issue's concluding essay
examines how social workers collectively have been influenced by the structural and ideological constraints
of our political-economic system in their creation of
an organized profession . Instead of answering the
oft-stated query "Is social work a profession?" Wenocur
and Reisch question the assumptions and motivations
behind the professionalizing impulse itself. The essay
critiques existing explanations for the phenomenon of
professionalization and develops a political-economic
model to analyze the emergence of a professional enterprise in social work.
It is the authors' intentions to
provide a perspective from which the current situation
of social work can be assessed and, thereby, to "enhance the capacity of social workers to find socially
progressive alternatives, and in concert with other
progressive groups, eventually to create a different
social reality."
We hope that all the essays which follow will inspire debate and serve as a prologue to such action.
Michael Reisch, Ph.D. and Stanley Wenocur, DSW
School of Social Work and Commurity Planning
University of Maryland
at Baltimore
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THE SOCIAL WORK SERVICE* COMMODITY IN THE INFLATIONARY 80'S**
Harold Lewis
The decade ahead is going to be dominated by economic issues.
All signs point to continued Inflation, continued high levels of
unemployment, cyclical troughs and declining peaks in the overall
economy, energy shortages and Increasing financial pressures, particularly on those families living on minimal or below-poverty level
budgets. Stresses In management of basic requirements for maintenance of health, housing, education and transportation %III burden
middle income, blue collar and the working poor family. In this
context, funding of social services will be tight, relative to
need.
It seems useful, for these reasons, to place our discussion
within an economic framework, to view social work services as a
commodity, and to consider hdw the anticipated market conditions
of the 80's will affect this commodity, including how these
conditions will Impact on the producers, the consumers and the
distributors of these services. 1
2
Social work services have distinctive attributes as commodities.
In the past they have rarely been available on a competitive basis.
Usually, particular services are to be had from one or at most a
few sources in the community. Even when associated %ith tangible
services, such as day care, homemaker or foster care, social
work services are labor-intensive. The average consumer finds it
difficult to evaluate their quality and to appreciate vshat constitutes an appropriate quantity to meet a specific need. Most
social work services are provided by tax-supported sources. Rarely
are the costs for producing a service covered by consumer payments.
Social work services materialize In the act of being rendered.
There is no "service" In the resources allocated for their provision.
Nor Is there a "service" In the consumer's experienced needs. Only
when provider resources and consumer needs come together in an actual
transaction, does a "social work service" as commodity, evolve. Thus,

,

Social work services are those generated by social work interventions,
constituting one of the broad range of social services.
**Originally presented at the Annual Conference of Large Agency
Supervisors and Associate Directors,Family Service Association
of America in Toronto, Canada, Fall, 1980.
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unlike most commodities in our economy, social work services exist
only in the process of their formation. They have no existence
apart from it. For this reason, one cannot inventory social work
services in the traditional sense. One cannot go to a bin and
count how many of these and how many of those services are on hand
to be used to meet current demand. Counting available resources may
suggest the potential available for providing a service, but hardly
constitutes a count of the "service." The availability of a resource
Is no assurance of its use In a transaction that produces a service.
Unhappily, the transient nature of this service allows it to disappear
without too much notice of its absence by persons other than those
drrectly involved In its production and consumption. Inventories of
unsold cars convey a far more dramatic message of uneconomic productive policies and practice than do the absences of transactions that
produce social work services.
This commodity is short lived. Not only does the transaction
create it, it also absorbs it dn-toto. The only evidence after the
fact that the commodity was created and used is in a depletion of
resource and a change in consumer condition. Thus, If the quality of
the commodity is to be evaluated directly, what transacts in the
need-provision exchange must be observed in process. Ex-post-facto
evaluations Inevitably face the complex problem of isolating particular effects in situations involving matrices of causal influences.
The implications that flow from this attribute will be considered
further. Suffice it to note that in an Inflationary situation
with resources shrinking relative to need, protecting the quality
of this service is difficult. Unlike the faulty brake or slipping
automatic shift, there is no recall possible to correct for manufacturer's error. Since there is no clear product that can be
demonstrated to be at fault, it is more convenient to fault a
program that provides the service than the particular methods that
are used to create it.
Like all commodities, social work services have use value as
well as exchange value. As Is true of any human service, the use
value is largely determined by consumers' judgments of costs relative to satisfactions obtained as a result of participating in its
creation. The exchange value, on the other hand, relies more
heavily on judgments of providers. What alternate uses can be
made of an equal investment of resources, largely determine its
exchange value. From the consumer's perspective, the better quality
for equal cost, the more use value one can assign to the commodity.
From the provder's perspective, the less costly the resource, other
things being equal, the more economic the exchange value. Given
these considerations, it is Important to note that the persons
creating the social work service -- the worker and the consumer -are most often dependent on relatively disinterested parties for
the crucial decisions as to the quality and quantity of service
to be subsidized.
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Finally, it is also important to recognize the logic that
applies to the analysis and understanding of this commodity's
relationship to the satisfaction of specified needs. The intention
of service, in all but a few instances, Is to enhance the potential
for constructive choices on the part of the consumer of the service.
The major sought-after outcome for the consumer is the meeting of a
need In such a way as to diminish as far as possible the consumer's
dependency on the service when confronted with a similar need In the
future. Thus, the service Is not only expected to have a fixed,
it is also expected to change
determined effect as an outcome.
probabilities in the consumer's capacities for coping, in a wide
range of social functioning areas. We readily admit that none of our
evaluative procedures based on statistical aggregates of Individual
units can tell us what will hapen In a particular case served, or
But beyond this probability issue
In the next case to be served.
which our literature has'discussed In detail, there is another, more
fundamental probability issue. When seeking help consumers bring with
them to the service creating transaction a variety of potentials in
relation to behavior, reasoning, valuing, etc., all interdependent.
As a result of the service, changes In the distribution of these
potentials should provide some measure of the nature and scope of
the service impact. The most demanding aspects of a service transaction, for which professional social work skills are required, are
located in this problematic area, the influencing of potential.
Nevertheless, "before and after" degrees of potentials are hardly
susceptible to measurement by available procedures. We have yet to
adequately describe these potentials, let alone agree on a procedure
for counting them. For example, when does self-awareness, which may
be an important indicator of a person's potential for constructive
Interpersonal relationships become ex essive self-preoccupation, an
To arrive at an acceptable
Indicator for an opposite potential?
definition of self-awareness, self-preoccupation, and excessive narcissism, we need to know much more than we now do about these qualities.
Moreover, given the bio-psycho-social-Influences on their development,
counting such quixotic qualities can prove as futile as counting
melting Ice cubes. The results, Inevitably are watered-down statistics.
Complicating the neasurement task is the Intentional nature of
social work service. Service normally is shaped by the efforts of
Its creators to achieve particular effects. it would be necessary to
determine what was to be altered, In relation to what were non-targeted
potentials and to understand their Interactions, before concluding
whether a particular Intervention produced a particular change in
potential for acceptable social functioning. This fundamental
expectation denies the possibility of simple causal explanations.
There are additional ways in which social work services differ
from other commodities. For our purposes, the attributes identified
provide a sufficient basis for exploring the central focus of this
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discussion: How will the Inflationary resource squeeze of the
Issues
80's Impact on the profession and our service programs?
affecting access to social work services, the quality of these
services, their utilization and their evaluation will be considered
using the framework provided by the definitions of the social work
commodity.
Access to Social Work Services
During the past two decades the monopolistic character of
social work service programs was breached. Private entrepreneurto be made In the delivery of health and
ship detected prol-t
welfare services. Large corporate Interests contracted to manage
and provide social work services otherwise only available from
public or not-for-profit voluntary agencies. Labor unions and
management moved to provide a range of protective and supportive
social work services to employees at their work site or in their
communities. Private practice, self-help and mutual aid concurrently expanded to offer alternative access to resources. For
persons with means, and for those organized to exercise political
and economic power, these developments opened up additional
choices; for the most deprived, those who could not pay for social
work service nor exercise Influence through organizational pcwer,
little changed. An example may illustrate how the combinatian of
limitations In knowledge, conflict In values and lack of control
over access to social work services combine to further disadvantage the most disadvantaged, despite the expanded availability
of sources for this particular commodity.
During the past two decades our society has been deeply
Involved in policy and practice debates on questions of life and
death. With the availability of legal abortions, a major concern
has been the determination of when life begins. With the development of artificial support systems that can sustain otherwise
non-functioning vital organs, a major concern has been uncertainty
as to when death has occurred. With respect to both Issues, we
are lacking in essential knowledge. But in these debates the most
contentious issues have concern "moral rights." Differences as to
what constitutes the right to life and the right to separate from
life have highlighted deepseated, conflicting Ideologies not readily
reconcilable. In both Instances, we are confronted with ethical
dilemmas stemming from ambiguous situations in which choices must
be made, when know.ledge on which to base these choices is limited,
and values are in conflict.
In this example, contending religious, political and professional groups have sought to define standards for allocating legal
rIights, each hoping to establish what are necessary obligations
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that further their different views of the common good. As Is usual
in conflicts Involving the allocation of legal rights, those more
fortunately situated tend to focus the debate on Issues affecting
freedom-of-cholce as the central value. For the disadvantaged,
whose choices are restricted In any circumstance, distributive
Justice is the crucial value. Now, In relation to both issues
the service sought and its associated social work Intervention Is
available from a variety of sources, some public, some private,
some profit oriented, some philanthropic, and some from informal
self-help associations. Despite the high moral tone of the debates,
the nitty-gritty problems of service delivery provide evidence of
the Impact of unemployment, racism, sexism, ethnocentrism and
poverty on who will have access to the available resources. Each
of the contending groups in the debate have to face up to the caste
and class inequities that are inherent in the application of their
proposed standards. In the final analysis, for those who can
afford It, the non-monopolistic character of service availability
represents choices and opportunities to exercise rights in a
conflct-ridden area of social work service. For those who cannot
afford It, or have no organizational clout, access hardly increases
when a subsidized or fee-for-service profit-sector has been added
to the group of social work service providers.
In the decade ahead, we should anticipate pressure to further
breach the monopolistic control of social work services, largely
Increasing the choices available for those who can purchase the
services they seek. For the most disadvantaged, it will take
militant advocacy in the form of organized political pressure to
obtain changes that will Improve the amount and quality of social
work services to which they can gain access.
The Quality of Social Work Service
When a product exists only in its use; when it is created in
an exchange and has no material content apart from the processes
through which it is realized, quality control is often synonimous with
the control of the quality of those who participate in its creation
-- the workers and the consumers.
In the sixties and seventies,
personnel recruited to work In the human service field expanded to
include persons with various levels and kinds of educational preparation, and various attributes associated with life-styles and
personal experience. The expectation was to improve on the quality
of services, provide wider coverage to reach previously underserved
populations, and concurrently make possible employment opportunities
in the social services for persons whose inter-personal skills and
systems sophistication were among their work-related, marketable
talents. Increasing the pool of social work service personnel to
include a wider range of competencies, however, has different
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implications for quality of services in a period of expanding
resources, as was anticipated In the sixties, and contracting
It does
resources as was actually experienced In the seventies.
not require detailed explanation to appreciate the potential
for reducing costs that exist when the quality of a commodity
Is not determined by an analysis of the product Itself. In
place of expanding coverage by employing lesser skills to service
less complicated need as is possible In a period of resource
growth, In a period of contracting resources the skilled worker
is replaced with a worker having a lesser competence to deal
with the more complicated needs. There was much evidence of
this latter replacement process during the last decade.
Despite the political rhet~ric about who can help with what
0
one can assume the prevalence of
problems most effectively.
traditional criteria for choosing one's helper when opportunity
for choice is present. For those who can afford to pay for
services, or can press for special considerations, self-selection
of service providers is normally reflected In these consumer's
choices of the usual educational reputational and credential
evidences of competence. For the economically or situationally
disadvantaged, who must accept the worker assigned to help them
or be denied access to services, there are few choices. If
the criteria usually used by those free to choose have merit in
the case of those not free to choose, the change of service
providers does not result in an exapansion of service, but
different quality of social work service or no service at all.
In the inflationary 80's we should expect pressure for
reduced costs to continue. The difficulty in evaluating the
product, rather than the persons who help create it and who use
it, will be used to obfuscate the reduction in quality of services
It will require more, not less,
that tight funding will demand.
organized effort to protect standards that offer safeguards
against the dilution of service quality.
While we may welcome all efforts to open up the "black box"
of practice to more thorough scrutiny, in times of contracting
resources we can anticipate that funding for such studies will
also be curtailed. Lack of knowkedge does not Inhibit those
who attack social work services in order to reduce their costs
and availability. It ought not inhibit those who would defend
these same services when their experience and belief indicate
these services to be necessary and helpful to people in need.
Utilization of Social Work Service
There is no assurance that a product that meets the highest
standards for judging quality will necessarily be used and used
effectively by a consumer. The fact that social work services
are In part created by the consumer, and that this creation is
totally absorbed In the process that brings It into being, tends

-555-

to becloud the utilization issue. There is nothing unique to
social work services that can protect them from being abused,
misdirected, Insufficient for their Intended purpose, or
dysfunctional In certain contexts and at certain times. For
this reason, the distinction between the quality of service
and Its utilization should be respected much more than is
usually evidenced in discussions of "quality" in the literature.
This distinction is of considerable importance when one considers
the problems of accountability associated with this commodity.
Accountability in social work services concerns not only the
quality of the product, and Its utilization, but also the process of its
production. As noted earlier, ability to observe and measure the
process of its production is limited. Since the product Itself is
short-lived, and is totally absorbed in the process of its creation,
its quality tends to be judged Inferentially from the qualities of
those who produce It. Utilization, similarly, is inferred from
secondary evidence, gleaned from ex-post facto analyses of the
Understandably, to be
behaviors and attitudes of Its consumers.
fully accountable for the provision of social work services Is an
achievement that defies the prowess of ordinary mortals.
Inferring use from ex-post facto data runs the risk of equating
utilization with success. It is misleading to conclude that a
client failed to make appropriate use of marital counseling if the
marriage is not made a happy one as a result. We all can cite
instances of persons who used appropriately the services of able
physicians but did not get well. While utilization and successful
outcome are related, analogous to objectives and goals in organizational work, they are not the same. Yet this distinction Is hard
to maintain in the social work services, where the consumer helps
In the creation of the product.
The seventies was mistakenly dubbed the decade of accountability.
It turned out to be the decade of count-ability. What could not be
qualified and counted was discounted. Since those Imprecise personal
forms of knowledge, feelings and emotions, could not be satisfactorily
described and enumerated, changes in sorrow, pain, fear, joy, trust,
self-confidence, compassion, happiness, etc., rarely were Identified
as Indications of success, compared to such hard-data as Is evidenced
in improved skills and appropriate behaviors, the subjective soft-data
In this way, we replicated those educational
did not count at all.
evaluations which measure success by what the student knows and can
do while ignoring or downplaying what kind of person he will be. What
7
Polyani calls personal knowledge, while not readily amenable to
quantitative manipulations so essential for measurement, is central
to the intention of the social work service transaction, particularly
If we are to focus on utilization as distinct from success.
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in the typical helping situation, whatever the mode of interventlon, the helper seeks to exercise personal influence through a
meaningful relationship. If one could visualize a completely
dehumanized social work service transaction, It might conceivably be
argued that feelings and emotions need not be considered. But in
the transactions that depend on human Interactions, what ts utilized
most are the gained knowledge and values which are absorbed and
understood because their digestability was facilitated by the
lubricating effects of deep, lasting feelings. To know with
conviction, to appreciate with affection, to master with delight -these phrases convey the feelings generated by the relationship
which makes the new and different palatable.
One must wonder how
long-lasting are achieved changes in behavior, skills and attitudes
If the accompanying feelings are not constantly present to help
reclaim and sustain changes.
Yet, in the decade of the 1970's, when our nation was blemished
by immorality in high places and gross Insensitivities to the
pressures affecting the lives and welfare of large sectors of the
disadvantaged populations, It was not surprising to find that feelings
were ignored even in the efforts to understand the social work services.
All things considered, the inflationary 1980's will produce more of
the same, unless compelled by those whose feelings are most at
stake, to do otherwise.
Evaluation
During the past decade it appeared that the measure of a program's
success was to be determined by the success of the measure used to
judge It.
In the aftermath of Girls at Vocational High when some
of social work's detractors were wondering out loud if casework was
dead, the profession and many social agencies spent the next ten
years trying to revive it. In the liberated 1960's, fields of practice
responded to the mass protest movements by launching innovative
programs.
In the 1970's, the response to massive doubts about effectiveness of services was to innovate methods.
In contrast to the

relatively few approaches of the 1940's and 1950's -- diagnostic,
functional, problem-solving, Thomistic, the 1970's proliferated so
many approaches most agencies gnd practitioners have come to view
their preferences as eclectic.0 If measurement of the service
commodity was complicated because of Its transient, short-lived
attributes, the eclectic nature of the Intervention did little to
simplify the measurement problem.
Possibly the most Important lessons of the past decade with
reference to efforts to evaluate human service programs are not
to be found in the increased technical competencies of the
evaluators. One need only consider the concerns of powerful
sources that stimulated the press for evaluation, and the success
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they achieved In their major objective, i.e. to contain the
escalating costs of social seryices, to realize that however
well-intentioned the evaluators, their function was not to
reason why. tf one asks why the military, after the catastrophies
in Viet Nam, In the Bay of Pigs and In the deserts of Iran, were
not subject to evaluative efforts that curtailed their funding,
but were used to justify more spending for the military; or one
wonders how our elected officials can justify rescue operations
for Chrysler, Lockheed, Pennsylvania Railroad and more, where
threatened bankruptcies testify to mismanagement or worse in
their planning and operation, the answers given would not help
alter the very different treatment experienced by health, education
and welfare programs. The commodities produced by the former
claimants on our nation's resources, and the political-economic
interests that benefit from their production, simply will not
tolerate doubts that would threaten their Eeneflts. As every
child knows, and as President Eisenhower reminded us in his departIng advice to the nation, it is among those interests that one will
find the current rulers of our nation's destiny.
It may seem more
convincing to argue that commendable utilization occurs when money
allocated to elderly dependent clients of social agencies is used to
provide them with warm mid-day meals and extra heat allowances, than
when monies are spent on multi-million dollar weapon systems which
the last President, as head of the Armed Forces, publically admitted
would be obsolete for defense purposes by the time they are ready
to "fly."
But this logic has not Impressed those allocating resources.
Long ago, in the late 194 0's, Gunn and Platt 9 found in their study of
the health field, that monies do not go where the need is greatest.
The 1970's should have taught us our error In rushing to evaluate,
when the prerequisites for sound evaluation had yet to be established.
But our failure to avoid this error Is understandable, if not excusable:
those who controlled the purse-strings called the tune and, as
suggested, ours was not to reason why.
If In the 1980's, we continue
to dance to this tune, and fail to orchestrate our own approach to
the study of the commodity that we produce, mindful of its peculiar
qualities, we ought not blind ourselves to the possible disservice
that can be the consequence of our best, well-intended efforts at
evaluation.
From this discussion of the impact of the threatening 1980's on
access, quality, utilization and evaluation are there any suggestions
that can help guide our practices, programs and policies so as to
manage more successfully than In the 1970's?
The following is a suggested priority order In which effort
should be invested by the profession and organizations providing
social work services to counter the negative effects one can anticipate, given the scencrio projected for the decade ahead. It is also
proposed that one overriding principle should guide such efforts.

Clearly, issues of access should take precedence over issues
of implementation. There will be risks and benefits involved in
efforts to provide social work services to persons in need. We
all desire that good be done and harm avoided in the provision
of these services. But these ethical intentions hardly assure
that justice will be done. Evidence suggests that a fair
distribution of resources is not likely to occur without
special provision to increase the opportunities to connect with
service for the most disadvantaged, and to compensate in program
design for deficiencies in different persons' capacities that
limit utilization. As indicated, in the pressures to which
fields of service responded during the past decade, justice was
not a major priority, nor will it be so in the 1980's unless
fought for by those most concerned to achieve it. The principle
to be observed might be stated briefly as follows:
A fair distribution of burdens and benefits requires
that unequal opportunities for access be so arranged
as to Increase the availability of services for the
most disadvantaged.
Clearly, study of the service transaction itself, and the
circumstances that influence utilization should take precedence
over accountability efforts that focus primarily on success or
failure measures. It is not possible to separate success measures
from the ideological preferences of those who select them, nor
to establish with scientific precision the causal state of our
ignorance of the social work service creation process itself.
Thus, evaluations that stress success over utilization are
likely to provide very weak justifications for continuing or
terminating different modes of intervention. Focusing on the
service process and its utilization on the other hand, will
provide opportunity for those most closely involved in service
creation to contribute to an understanding of what is done, how
it is done, and what impact it has on those most directly
affected by it.
Finally, quality of service should be of greater concern than
coverage, and for obvious reasons. Given the attributes of the
commodity, in periods of tight budgets, the press for accountability
tends to focus on reduced unit costs for service. Given the nature
of the professional function In relation to the provision of social
work services, under conditions of uncertainty as to success or
failure, the inclination will be to employ the least expensive
provider and maintain the same coverage, accepting a different
quality service as a result. Unless concern for quality is given
precedence, the silent disappearance of major elements that
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determine what the social work services can achieve will be
a costly default, burdening the most disadvantaged more than
the advantaged.
This ordering is not intended to weight the relative
Importance of access, quality, utilization and evaluation as
areas for attention at all times, under-all conditions. This
ordering is Intended to provide an essential counter-balance
to contextual stresses that threaten the existence of necessary
social work services.
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FOOTNOTES

'

1.

This scenario Is based on conservative assumptions. It
projects the current scene across the decade, assuming a
relatively unchanged distribution of influences that
shape national priorities. The analysis, on the other
hand, is intended to contribute to a change in these
priorities. If the purpose of the analysis is achieved,
the scenario will be in error. The scenario anticipates
a future we wish to avoid. For a related scenario see:
S. M. Miller 'Turmoil and/or Acquiescence for the 1980's?"
Social Policy, May-June 1980, pp. Z2-25.

2.

Discussion of social services as commodities usually Is
associated with efforts to understand. the political economy of social services. See, for' example, Stanly Wenockur
and Michael Riesch, Issues In Social Work: A Political
Economic Perspective.
(Unpublished Manuscript) and
David M. Austin, the Political Economy of Social Benefit
Organizations: Merit Goods and Redistributive Services,"
Draft of paper prepared for the Meeting on organizational
theory and research related to human services, March 2-3,
1979, at the Center for Advanced Study on the Behavioral
Sciences, Stanford, California.

3.

Katherine M. .'ood, "Casework Effectiveness: A New Look at
the Research Evidence," Social tiork, November, 1978, pp. 450451. Prof. Wood's review of studies which, in part at least,
were Intended to evaluate social work practice, concludes
with the observation that for a variety of reasons these
studies offered little for social work theories about direct
practice. Prof. Wood further notes, "It is difficult for
the reader to determine specifics about clients, conditions,
interventions and changes since the most essential details
are lacking." This suggests another limitation that may
be Inherent in use of aggregate data -- I.e., It may not be
possible to know what did happen In Individual cases, not
only what will happen.

4.

See Florence Wexler Vigilante, Self-Preoccupation As A
Predictor of Performance in Graduate Social Work Education
(Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Yeshiva University,
School of Social Work, August, 198C) for one example of an
effort to operationalize these concepts.
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5.

The concern of many within the profession, that the delivery
system whereby the commodity was marketed also limited the
access and quality of practice, served to rationalize
proposals to promote an entrepreneurial model for service
delivery. See In early discussion In Irving Plliavin,
"Restructuring the Provision of Social Services," Social
Work, Vol. 13, No. 2. January 1968, pp. 34-41. Also
Alvin Shorr's editorial Social Work, Vol. 13, No. 2,
April 1978, p. 2. For a more recent discussion of the uses
of public monies to create private non-profit alternatives
for service provision through contracting out, see
Paul Terrell, "Private Alternatives to Public Human Services
Administration." Social Service Review, March 1979,
Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 56-74.

6.

NASW News, Vol. 24, No. 10, November, 1979, announcement of H.E.W.
Children's Bureau Grant to NASW to perform research on the
classification and validation of state merit system jobs, notes
reasons for fearing that the widespread declassification of
social
service positions may have an adverse effect on the
quality of service rendered. The separation of social services
from income maintenance program concurrently established
differential requisites for personnel In each function.
Norman L. Wyers, "Whatever Happened to the Income Maintenance
Line Worker?" Social Work, Vol. 25, No. 4, July, 1980, pp. 259-263;
Irving Piliavin and Alan E. Gross, "The Effects of Separation of
Services and income Maintenance on AFDC Recipients," Social
Service Review, 51, (September, 1977), pp. 389-406; and Final
Report, the Task Force on the Future Relationship Between
Publicly Funded Social Services and Income Support Programs,
National Conference Social Welfare (Columbus, Ohio, 1979), will
appear to be In agreement on Important negative impact stemming
from separation on the delivery and utilization of social service
in public assistance agencies. The separation appears to
separate clients from services as well.

7.

Polanyl, Michael, Personal Knowledge, The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1958.

8.

In addition to further development of previous approaches
evidenced in the psycho-social interactional and systems
perspectives, the ecological, life mode, structural, behavioral
and task-oriented perspectives are more recent additions.

9.

Selsker Gunn and Philip Platt, Voluntary Health Agencies:
Interpretative Study, New York, Ronald Press, 1945.
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ABSTRACT

Supply-side tax and spending policies have intensified poverty,
unemployment and inequality, especially for women, minorities
and organized labor. At the same time Reaganomics is shrinking
and weakening the welfare state. To better understand and resist
this conservative assault it is necessary to demystify the "economics" and "politics" of supply-side doctrine.
This paper (a)
defines the basic assumptions of supply-side economics; (b) identifies some of its problems and contradictions; (c) discusses
its impact on the welfare state; and (d) analyzes it as part of
a broader plan for coping with the current economic crisis. It
argues that the supply-side tax cut not only lowers government
revenues, but provides a justification for cutting domestic programs. Domestic cutbacks, in turn, are achieved by new laws that
change program rules and regulations, transfer federal social
welfare responsibility to the states, that weaken the political
support for the programs themselves. This legislated conservative legacy will be more difficult to reverse than if the cuts
were achieved by just lowering appropriations. As a domestic
strategy, Reaganomics is part of a broader response to the current economic crisis that involves redirecting larger amounts of
capital into the private sector and weakening the political
strength of women, minorities and organized labor whose demands
for an adequate standard of living have become to costly for
business and government to absorb.

Supply-side economics is a disaster for the social services. The fiscal 1982
budget based on supply-side tax, spending and regulatory policies is intensifying
poverty, unemployment and inequality, especially for women, minorities and the
working poor. It reduces the availability and accessibility of increasingly
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necessary social services and benefits, and creates job insecurity if not unemployment among social service workers who meanwhile are "battered" by rising caseloads
and troublesome decisions about who can and cannot be served
(Lewis, 1980).
To cope with and resist the devastating effects of this conservative economic
doctrine, we must first
understand it.
This paper hopes to demystify the "economics" and "politics" of supply-side economics by (a)
defining its assumptions,
(b) identifying some of its problems and contradictions, (c) discussing its impact on the welfare state, and (d) analyzing it as part of the Administration's
response to the current economic crisis.
WHAT IS SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS?
Supply-side economics is part of a broad attempt to deal with the economic
crisis facing the United States since the mid-1970's. The attempt is not a new
one. Like Nixon, Ford and Carter before him, Reagan is trying to stimulate investment and production while reducing unemployment and inflation. The failure
of his predecessors to revive the sagging economy merely gave Reagan the opportunity to reject Keynesian economic policies on behalf of conservative economics
and ideology known today as supply-side economics or Reaganomics.
But neither is supply-side economics new. It is a modern day version of a
laissez-faire doctrine known as Say's Law, named for Jean Baptiste Say (17671832), a French follower and popularizer of the work of Adam Smith. In brief,
Say's Law says that "supply creates its own demand" (Editors, 1981).
That is,
in an unrestricted market, production (supply) can generate enough income (demand)
which when spent is just enough to clear the market of all goods and services produced. Moreover, unemployment and idle capacity, can automatically be eliminated
by an increase in production. Therefore policy aimed at stimulating the economy
need only be concerned with increasing production (or removing barriers to such
an increase).
Everything else, including the demand for the resulting output will
take care of itself. Most economists accepted this doctrine until the 1930's when
it was discredited by the Great Depression and the work of British economist,
John Maynard Keynes.
Keynesian economics became the new orthodoxy after World War II.
In contrast
to Say's emphasis on stimulating production, Keynes focused on the problem of insufficient demand. Arguing that demand tends to fall short of potential output or
supply and that business produces only as much as it can sell, Keynes concluded
that a market economy could not sustain itself. Rather it was prone to periodic
crises of low production and high unemployment, such as the Depression of the 1930's.
To prevent this, Keynes recommended that government use its tax and spending powers
to stimulate demand incurring a deficit, if necessary. Indeed Keynes recommended
deficit spending as a good way to bolster demand. Once the economy reached the
point of full employment, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies could be used
to control inflation.
Contemporary supply-siders such as Jack Kemp, Norman Ture, P. Craig Roberts,
Arthur Laffer among others, reject "demand-side" theory. They favor Say's Law as
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the best route out of the current economic crisis. The heart of their supply-side
economics, the tax cut, is viewed as the critical stimulus to production (Roberts,
1981; Davenport, 1978). By lowering production costs and raising after-tax income,
the tax cut is expected to encourage people to work more (overtime, moonlight, employment of additional family members); to save more (due to higher after-tax
wages) and to invest more (due to higher after-tax income and corporate profits).
The supply-siders also maintain that reduced taxes need not increase the defficit nor require budget cuts. This is the message of the Laffer curve, a mathematical model of tax revenues which indicates that lowered tax rates will revitalize
production and employment such that tax revenues will remain constant or even inIn turn, the demand for unemployment insurance, food
crease (Arenson, 1981a).
stamps and AFDC will fall permitting the budget to be balanced without massive
budget cuts.
Finally supply-siders promise to control inflation by increasing supply without stimulating excessive demand. Once investments and greater productivity lower
unit costs of production prices will fall. Any increase in demand caused by higher after-tax income will be less than the increased supply of goods and services
thereby easing inflationary pressures.
Unlike Keynesians, supply-siders see high taxes and government regulations as
part of the problem, not part of the solution. As barriers that raise the costs
of goods, labor and capital and stymie production, government regulations must be
removed.
Problems and Contradictions
Supply-side economics does not seem to be working. Among other things, its
failure has been attributed to weak theoretical assumptions; a lack of correspondence
with economic realities; and the effect of competing economic policy recommendations
within Administration circles.
Supply-side theory predicts that lower taxes will encourage more work, saving
and investment. But standard economic theory and the behavior of consumers and
business indicate otherwise. Economic theory teaches that lower tax rates can
make people work more (if they want a greater income) or less (since the same amount
of money can be earned in less time or by fewer people) (Samuelson, 1970). Studies
also show that changes in taxes cause little or no change in the hours people work,
since institutional requirements more than personal preferences determine the length
Likewise, the portion of income saved
of the workday orworkweek(Tabb, 1981).
overtime has remained fairly steady despite tax fluctuations (Arenson, 1981a).
Businessmen and economists also question the supply-side prediction that lowered corporate taxes will stimulate greater business investment. The demand for a
company's product and/or anticipated profits, not just lowered production costs significantly shape business investment decisions (Arenson, 1981b; Tabb, 1981). As
the chief economist at Chase Econometrics observed, although ."investment incentives
do stimulate investment," they will take many years to improve productivity," and
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,won't slow inflation quickly" (Arenson, 1981b).
At the margin, says William Tabb,
Professor of Economics at Queens College, "some productive investment may be forthcoming, but very little, and at an exceedingly high cost in lost tax revenues"
(Tabb, 1981).
Supply-side failures also stem from the competition within administration
circle between the supply-siders and the monetarists. 1 Monetarists, the traditional fiscal conservatives, worry most about inflation and budget deficits. They
favor restrictive fiscal and monetary policies designed to lower demand and
squeeze inflation out of the economy. These deflationary policies conflict with
the stimulative push of supply-side tax cuts and large military outlays causing
Administration policies to contradict or cancel each other out.
Even the Administration had to acknowledge that a commitment to restrictive
monetary policy imposed limits on its goals for economic growth (Fuebringer, 1981).
More dramatically, plans to cut taxes and expand military budgets forced the Administration to raise its deficit estimates from a low of $42.5 billion to over $100
billion. These figures strain the Laffer-curve promise that tax cuts will revitalize the economy and permit the budget to be balanced. So does the deep recession
(which many argue is due to the Administration's own restrictive monetary policy),
record post-war unemployment rates and falsification of data used by the Administration, which created overly optimistic initial economic recovery forecasts
(Greider, 1981).
As the impact of supply-side tax cuts, increased military spending and the
deregulation of oil, gas and other prices ripples through the economy, prices will
rise, undermining the original supply-side promise to control inflation (Alperovitz
and Faux, 1981; Dollars and Sense, 1981). Although it involved sweeping cuts of
property, not income taxes, California's Proposition 13 may be viewed as a pretest of the supply-side tax cut. Neither a production boom, nor lower inflation rates
resulted (Dollars and Sense, 1981).
Despite its inconsistencies and weaknesses, Reaganomics has already damaged
the welfare state. Although Reagan's 1983 budget is currently stalled in Congress,
the conservative legacy Reagan plans for the welfare state needs to be examined.
IMPLICATIONS OF REAGANOMICS FOR THE WELFARE STATE
Both the supply-side tax cuts and the social spending reductions involve more
than lowered appropriations.
Rather structural changes in the tax code and in the
social welfare system are being legislated to achieve the twin conservative goals of
a smaller federal government and a weaker welfare state. These changes, described
next, may be difficult to reverse.

1. The monetarists include old guard Republicans such as Secretary of Treasury,
Donald T. Regan; Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Paul Volker; and conservative
economists such as Alan Greenspan, Arthur Burns, Herbert Stein and Milton
Friedman.
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Tax Cut
The Congressional Budget Office observed that the 1982 tax cut, "departed
from all other post World War II legislation in its broad scope and the magnitude
of its revenue effect" (CBO, 1982a). As a result, the federal government will
have less money to spend. Between 1982-1987 government revenues are expected to
increase at an annual rate of 6.9%, down from 13.6% for the previous five years.
The share of the GNP claimed by the federal government through the tax system will
drop steadily from 20.6% in 1982 to 17.7% in 1987, the smallest share since 1965
%CBO, 1982a).
In the words of Treasury Secretary Regan, the tax cuts promise "to
change the concept of how fiscal matters will be handled in Washington in decades
ahead" (Newsweek, 1981b). They also promise to restructure the tax system: They
contribute to an upward redistribution of income, make the tax system more regressive and promise to lower government revenues for many years to come.
On the grounds that they are more likely to save and invest, the tax cuts intentionally favor wealthy individuals and large corporations (Quinn, 1981; Wicker,
1982). Although 95% of U.S. families earn less than $50,000 a year, the new federal tax code cuts taxes of families making over $60,000 most sharply (Quinn, 1981).
In 1982 the tax cut will be worth $120 to families earning $10,000 or less, but
$15,000 for those earning $80,000 or more (CBO, 1982b; Pear 1982a). The new law
reduces the maximum tax on unearned income, from 70% to 50% in 1982, eliminates
inheritance taxes on estates worth $600,000 or less (99.6% of all estates) by 1987
(Fessler, 1981) and lowers corporate income taxes (Arenson, 1981b).
These and other tax code changes make the entire tax system more regressive.
Between 1981 and 1987 the proportion of federal revenues raised by the more progressive personal income tax will fall from 47.1% to 44.9%; the corporate share
will drop to 8.1%, down from 17% in 1970 and 24% in 1960 (Arenson, 1981b).
Meanwhile, federal revenues raised from the regressive Social Security payroll tax will
rise from 30.9% to 38.4% (CBO, 1982a).
Ironically these tax changes which reduce
tax burden of the wealthy most of all are justified by the recent middle-class tax
revolts.
Finally, the tax cuts may be difficult to reverse since most politicians fear
tax increases will lose them support at the polls. Lowered revenues mean less
money to spend and havebeen a major justification for shrinking "big government"
especially the unpopular welfare state.
Social Spending Cuts
Social spending cuts historically favored by conservatives as the best way to
balance the budget are not strictly speaking part of supply-side theory as they do
not directly stimulate production (Arenson, 1981a). But by reducing government
revenues and increasing the deficit, the supply-side tax cut provides a powerful
rationale for domestic budget cuts. As Walter Heller, former Kennedy advisor recently said, "for the present and indefinite future," lowered revenues means that
"government's shelves are going to be bare of funds for new programs...and there's
going to be relentless pressure for more and more spending cuts" (Newsweek, 1981b).

-567-

Less government spending, the argument goes, will lower inflation, shrink
the federal deficit, and reduce the need for federal borrowing to finance it. Less
government borrowing it is hoped will bring interest rates down, making more and
cheaper money available for investment by private corporations.
In brief, lowered social spending is seen as essential to cut costs and to limit
the federal government as a competitor with private enterprise for investment capital, believed to be scarce. In the eyes of Wall Street and many politicians, domestic cuts are needed to make room for more private economic activity (Cowan, 1982).
Such reasoning legitimized massive domestic budget cuts in fiscal 1982 and
calls for even more in 1983. As early as October 1981, Stockman explained to the
House Budget Committee that "twenty years of history aren't going to be corrected
in twenty weeks. We're going to have to go at it again and again and again, until
we establish fiscal sanity in this country" (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981b).
Like the tax cuts, domestic budget cuts involved more than reduced funding.
They include a restructuring social welfare programs, if not the welfare state itself.
Indeed, some dub Reaganomics as the end of the New Deal. Nobel Prize winner
James Tobin (1981) calls Reaganomics "a conservative counter-revolution in the
theory, ideology and practice of economic policy" and Treasury Secretary Regan says
it is a "conservative revolution" against fifty years of welfare statesmanship"
(Newsweek, 1981c). David Stockman, spelled out the specifics of the "revolution"
in a March 1981 television interview when he stated:
The idea that's been established over the
last ten years that almost every service
that anyone might need in life ought to
be provided and financed by the government
as a matter of rights is wrong. We reject
that. We reject that notion (Rosenbaum,
1981a).
The Administration's domestic cutback strategies include (a) revising social
welfare program rules and regulations, (b) transferring responsibility for social
welfare from the federal government to the states, and (c) weakening resistance
to such changes by reducing the economic security and reversing political gains
fought for and won by women, minorities and labor since the 1930's. If successful,
these strategies not only promise to shrink the social welfare system and make it
more vulnerable to future cuts, but like the tax cuts they will be difficult to
reverse.
Social Welfare Program Revisions. Cuts in social welfare programs involve
more than spending reductions because the Administration wants to restructure the
social welfare system and Congress cannot limit the costs of entitlement programs
through the annual appropriation process. By law, everyone who is eligible for
entitlement benefits is legally "entitled" to them, so the government must provide
funds sufficient to cover the costs. The large middle class constituencies of many
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of these so-called "uncontrollable" expenditures, makes them even more difficult
for politicians to cut (Donnelly, 1982a). Only by restricting eligibility requirements and lowering benefits levels by law, can entitlement expenditures be "controlled."
This is exactly what the 1982 and 1983 budgets do. For example, in fiscal
1982, the administration saved $1.2 million in AFDC expenditures by denying eligibility to 408,000 families and leaving 279,000 with less aid (Donnelly, 1981;
Weinraub, 1981). By lowering the Food Stamp income limit for a family of four,
one million people lost their benefits. Another 145,000 people living in boarding
houses and some 25,000 households with a member on strike also became ineligible
for the food stamp subsidy (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981a). Other programs
were similarly restructured. Even the popular Social Security program lost its
$122 minimum benefit plan for new beneficiaries.
The 1983 budget contains still other proposals for structural changes such as
reducing if not eliminating the Social Security cost of living adjustment (Donnelly,
1982a) and the replacing some Medicare and housing aid subsidies with vouchers which
assist recipients to purchase private health care and housing in the open market
(Pear, 1982e; Reinhold, 1982).
Non-entitlement programs such as day care centers, CETA jobs, training programs,
and many community services were also cut, but in different ways. They were defunded or transferred from the federal government to the states (see below).
The restructuring of the social welfare system, like the tax code changes
furthers the upward redistribution of income by taking more from the poor than from
the well-to-do. Implemented, in part, to make more and cheaper capital available for
private corporate investment, the social program cuts are aimed sharply at the poorest of the poor and disproportionately penalize them. The CBO reports that twothirds of the total saving from lowered benefits in fiscal year 1983 will come from
reductions affecting households with incomes under $20,000 a year; and 60% of all
savings in federal grants to state and local governments come from programs designed
to aid low-income families. Overall, families earning less than $10,000 will lose
an average of $360 in federal benefits compared to $120 for those with income over
$80,000 (CBO, 1982b).
The domestic budget cuts both shrink and weaken the welfare state. Instituting
budget savings through statutory program changes rather than reduced appropriations,
makes the changes more secure. Cuts secured through spending reductions alone can
be reversed with additional funding at a later date, but new laws are more likely to
persist (Pear, 1981; 1982b).
The cuts also weaken the political support for social programs by further isolat
ing the poor from the working poor and the middle class. Tighter eligibility rules
deny AFDC, Food Stamps, Public Housing and Medicaid benefits primarily to the working
poor leaving only the poorest of the poor in Reagan's "safety net" (Pear 1982c;
Donnelly, 1982b).
In contrast, the budget spares middle class recipients from the
deepest benefit cuts and the programs they use continue to grow while those for the
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poor do not. Between 1981-1983, programs benefitting the middle class will grow
2.3% a year down from an annual real growth rate of 6.0% a year between 1973-1981.
But programs for the poor will decline by 9.3% a year, compared to a real growth
rate of 9.3% in the earlier period (Nordhaus, 1982).
Poorer, smaller in number, and with even fewer ties to the non-poor, social
welfare program recipients and the programs on which they rely risk greater stigma,
and even less popular support in budget battles yet to come.
Transfer of Federal Social Welfare Responsibility to the States. Block grant
funding, first popularized by President Nixon, restructures the social welfare system by transferring responsibility for social welfare from the federal government to
the states. Known as "New Federalism" by supporters and a return to "states rights"
by critics, block grants give the states more control of and greater flexibility in
the use of federal funds. As such, they are compatible with conservative opposition
to big government.
Although Reagan got less than he sought, the fiscal 1982 budget consolidated
almost 60 federal grant programs into nine block grants (Herbers, 1982). Funding
was then cut more than 25% across the board. The fiscal 1983 budget proposes to
"turnback" 43 more social programs worth $30.2 billion to the states and to convert
AFDC and Food Stamps into block grants in exchange for federal responsibility for
Medicaid (Reagan 1982). The "turnback" will be supported by a "trust fund" which
transfers 28 billion dollars of federal excise taxes to the states.
The increased state autonomy these plans provide pleases state governors.
Indeed, Reagan's block grants do not earmark funds, do not require states to match
federal contributions or to use them to supplement rather than supplant local funds
(Herbers, 1982).
The 1983 "trust fund," Reagan explained can be used by the states
to "preserve, lower or raise taxes." The states, he added, "can manage these programs as they see fit."
If they want to continue receiving federal grants in such
areas as transportation, education, and social services,
they can use the trust fund money to pay for the grants,
or to the extent they choose to forgo the federal grant
programs, they can use their trust fund money on their
own, for those or other purposes (Reagan, 1982).
But this autonomy is not well financed. The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental
Relations, an independent federal agency, reported that in 1982, state and local
governments will receive about 24% of their funds from Washington, down from a2 1980
high of 31.7%. In one year the states fell back to 1971 levels of federal aid
(Herbers, 1982).

2. Federal grants to states and local government was 11.5% of their own sources of
revenues in 1955, 16.8% in 1960, 31.7% in 1980 and 29.8% in 1981 (Herbers, 1982).
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Increased state autonomy over social welfare funding combined with less federal
aid does not bode well for social welfare programs. It forces already ailing state
treasuries to choose between economic development plans attractive to business and
unpopular social programs, making the latter more vulnerable to present and future
cuts. Following the fiscal 1982 cuts, a New York Times survey of 50 states found
"no state is planning to increase spending to make up for all the federal cuts and
most are making few moves to offset the effect on the poor" (Pear, 1982a). They
simply cannot afford to.
Secondly, block grants combine previously separate programs into large single
ones, causing each program to loose its visibility. But they still must compete
with the others for declining state revenues (NASW, 1981a).
Finally, block grants and the 1983 "turnback" and "swap" proposals place administrative and fiscal responsibility for social welfare in the hands of state and
local officials who historically have been less responsive than the federal government to the needs of minorities, women and the poor. And yet, the programs Reagan
is decentralizing are some of the very ones that state officials indicate had been
established as federal responsibilities because the states were not meeting needs
perceived by Congress (Ayres, 1981; Mott, 1981).
The record on block grants introduced in the seventies suggest a continuation
of this longstanding pattern.
In April 1981 NASW reported that substate allocations
for funds under Title XX social service block grants gave rural areas, blacks and
poverty populations less than their proportionate share of these service dollars (NASW
1981b).
This is not surprising.
It is no secret that during the post-war period, labor
unions, civil rights, women's liberation, consumer advocacy and liberal reform groups
received a better reception at the White House than at the State House.
Neither is
it surprising then that Reaganomics limits their ability to make and secure demands
costly to business and government, and makes it more difficult for them to mobilize
opposition to proposals for new and deeper social welfare cuts.
Weakening the Economic Security and Political Power of Women, minorities and
Organized Labor. Reaganomics involves domestic spending cuts, but also deregulation
of business, the workplace and the environment.
The Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (EEOC), the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), Consumer and Environmental Protection and other agencies are losing funds, staff and
enforcement powers.
Major civil rights laws are being challenged.
The combined impact of the domestic budget cuts and this "deregulation" is to weaken programs and
protections fought for and won by organized labor, civil rights, womenis liberation
and liberal reform groups since the 1930's.
Social welfare programs and government regulations protect workers and the poor
against the risks, danger and inequities of living and working in a capitalist economy and provide a minimal level of economic security. Perhaps more significantly,
the fight for these protections over the years was empowering. It strengthened a
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sense of entitlement, increased the resolve to secure a growing share of what seemed
to be an ever expanding pie, and contributed to the formation of trade unions, civil
rights and women's liberation organizations. The groups pressured for a larger share
of available resources and politicized the process of income distribution carried out
through government tax and spending program and trade union collective bargaining.
As long as the economy grew and prospered, it was not difficult to accommodate
the claims of all classes, and the social welfare programs helped assure social peace.
But since the economic crisis surfaced in the mid-1970's, demands for a rising stand4
ard of living by empowered groups 1ave become too costly to both business and government. Today social welfare programs, government regulations and their politicized
constituencies are all under attack (Weisskopf, 1981).
The victims are disproportionately female and minorities.
The assault on the
social welfare programs, the majority of whose beneficiaries are women, furthers the
"feminization of poverty," already identified by the National Council on Equal Opportunities as a disastrous national trend (National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, 1981).
The loss of jobs and services such as day care, abortion, family planning, among many other health and social services; the relaxation of anti-discrimination and affirmative action programs; and the shrinking of the public sector, for women, means more poverty, fewer jobs and greater household responsibility (Abramovitz,
1982).
Reaganomics strikes deeply at the institutions that support the economic security and independence of women.
It is "sending women from the paid labor market back
to unpaid labor in the home" and attacking the women's movement which has challenged
the patriarchial values and institutions designed to keep women "in their place"
(Abramovitz, 1982).
Likewise, Reaganomics is lowering the standard of living for minorities.
The
recipients of programs spared by Reagan's first
round of budget cuts were predominantly white. Only 8 percent of Americans receiving Social Security, 9 percent of those
on Medicare and 9 percent receiving Veterans Benefits are black. In contrast, blacks
who comprise 12 percent of all Americans, make up one-third of those on Food-Stamps,
Medicaid and living in public housing and almost one half of all AFDC recipients.
These programs were not considered part of the "safety net" and all were cut sharply
in the fiscal 1982 budget and the one proposed for fiscal 1983 (Rosenbaum, 1981b).
This assault on the already low standard of living of minorities combined with
relaxed enforcement of civil rights laws, and affirmative action programs, not only
reverses gains won during the Civil Rights movement, but places civil rights groups
on the defensive where they are less able to protect their constituencies.
Reaganomics also undermines the power of organized labor, With their standard
of living threatened by repeated recessions and record unemployment rates, workers
today are especially vulnerable to the threat of unemployment.
Their economic insecurity is only increased by social welfare cuts, the loss of extended Unemployment
Compensation and the Trade Re-adjustment Allowance, restricted eligibility to Food
Stamps and its denial to families on strike. Greater unemployment and fewer social
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welfare benefits makes joblessness a more effective mechanism of employer control
over labor and weakens the bargaining strength of unions (Weisskopf, 1981; Saffire,
1982).
Reagan's hard-line approach to the air traffic controllers strike was widely
interpreted as administration support for contract concessions by trade unions
(Serrin, 1981). Since then, contract negotiations in the automobile, rubber, steel,
airline, trucking and printing industries have included unprecedented wage cuts,
freezes and other "takebacks" sometimes exchanged for promises of greater job security
(Raskin, 1982). Some view labor's concessions as a turning point in labor-management cooperation, but others, including the Conference Board, a business research
group, see them as a "fundamental shift in power to employers from unions"(Serrin,
1982).
Weakening the opposition then, is a third way in which Reaganomics increases
the vulnerability of domestic programs, making them more difficult to defend against
future cuts.
REAGANOMICS AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
To fully understand and effectively resist the conservative assault on the
welfare state, it is important to see that it is part of a broader attempt to deal
with the economic crisis facing the United States since the mid-1970's (Weisskopf,
1981; Campen, 1981). As the discussion of supply-side economics shows, the conservative response to this crisis consists of strategies to redirect larger amounts of
capital into the private sector. They include domestic policies that (a) redistribute income from the poor and middle classes to wealthy individuals and large corporations, and (b) curb the political strength of organized labor, minorities and women.
As has been shown Reagan's tax and spending policies redistribute income upward
and reduce the share of the national product going to the poor and working class.
Combined they promise to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. Commenting on
Reaganomics, James Tobin recently wrote:
Here as in other democracies, governments have sought to
arrest the momentum of inequality by free public education,
social insurance, 'War on poverty' measures, and progressive taxation. The U.S. tax and budget legislation of 1981
is an historical reversal of this direction. The message
is clear enough: Inequality of opportunity is no longer a
concern of the federal government (Tobin, 1981).
Since the administration is asking organized labor, minorities and women to
bear the brunt of its economic recovery program, it must try to forestall resistance
and to delegitimize their demand for an improved standard of living. This helps explain the Administration's hard line toward these groups.
So does the need for public acceptance of austerity (such as wage concessions,
small raises, and a generally lower standard of living). Recommending austerity as

a way to cope with the wider economic crisis is not unique to Reaganomics.
It is implied in the"small is beautiful" and "planned shrinkage" arguments heard a few years
ago and explicitly called for by Felix Rohatyn, a financier whom Stockman described
as a "Democrat with a program that could make the loyal opposition seem thoughtful"
(Newsweek, 1981a). Still head of New York City's Municipal Assistance Corporation,
Rohatyn recommends that the austerity measures used to contain New York City's fiscal
crisis (e.g., payroll cuts, wage restraints, and searches for new capital) be applied
to the economic crisis of the nation (Rohatyn, 1978, 1982). To implement this program, it becomes necessary to curb the political power of those most likely to suffer its consequences and resist.
Especially since a basis for resistance exists. Despite the damage Reaganomics
is producing in the welfare state and despite the increased vulnerability of domestic
programs to future assaults, social benefits are widely viewed as an "entitlement,"
if not a true right. The tension between the conservative assault on the welfare
state and popular expectations regarding entitlements can result in opposition to
Reaganomics as well as to the next attempt to resolve the continuing economic crisis
which may be less overtly conservative than Reaganomics but not necessarily less
austere.
The implications of Reaganomics for social service workers should be clear. Our
fate, like it or not, is still intimately tied to what happens to the poor and working
classes. Like our clients, we are vulnerable to isolation and attack in a period of
reaction such as this. Like our clients we are faced with hard choices ahead. For to
cooperate with Reaganomics is to subscribe to an upward redistribution of income and
to discourage the empowerment of our clients and ourselves.
Since this violates our
professions' commitment to self-determination and social justice, the most effective
professional response to Reaganomics is to organize against it, as many have begun to
do.
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ABSTRACT
The
degree
to
which benefit reduction and voluntary
approaches to encouraging later retirement maximize four different
and often conflicting policy objectives is assessed as are costs
and benefits of these approaches to healthy and unhealthy older
workers, minorities and wonen.
While both approaches encourage
later retirement, there are clear differences in the approaches in
terms of meeting the goal of financing Social Security versus
adequacy and social equity.

Economic problems between 1977 and 1983 resulted in a
significant short-term financing problem in Social Security's Old
Age Survivors Insurance Trust Fund.
These economic problems
combined with a projected long-term deficit also helped create the
conditions under which consideration of proposals to raise the
normal age of retirement became politically feasible.
Several
years of political debate over alternative retirement age policy
proposals culminated with the enactment of the 1983 Amendments to
the Social Security Act. These Amendments include a provision
which will encourage later retirement through benefit reductions
resulting from gradually raising the age of eligibility for full
* This article was initially prepared as a paper for the National
Policy
Center
on Employment and Retirement at the Andrus
Gerontology Center of the University of Southern California.
The
paper was supported by AoA grant 90AP0002/01. The conclusions
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author
acknowledges
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appreciation the useful comments of the staff of the National
Policy Center and outside reviewers.
Needless to say, any
problems that might remain in the paper
are
solely
the
responsibility of the author.
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retirement,
spouse and widow(er)s benefits to 67 over a 27 year
perioa, beginning in
2000.
The Amendments also contain two
provisions providing voluntary incentives to later retirement
through changes beginning in 1990 which will liberalize the Social
Security earnings test and increase the value of
delaying
retirement past the normal retirement age.
hen this paper was initially written in 1981, proposals that
would encourage later retirement had been put forth by the
President, Congressman Pickle and Congressman Pepper.
Those based
on a benefit reduction approach (the Reagan and Pickle proposals)
would
have provided incentive for continued employment by,
reducing Social Security protections or benefits. Those based on
voluntary approach
(the Pepper proposals) would encourage later
retirement by use of incentives that increase the value of Social
Security
and
other pensions for later retirement,
and by
emphasizing the goal of expanding employment opportunities for
older workers.
Proposals consonant with the benefit reduction approach were
given the greatest attention because they produce large savings
for Social Security.
They were also most controversial because
many argue that they compromise other equally essential retirement
policy goals-adequacy and social equity; and also would produce
disproportionate savings from the more economically vunerable.
This paper analyzes the Reagan, Pickle and Pepper proposals
of 1981.
While these proposals are outdated, the analysis remains
relevant for two reasons.
First, elements of each of these
proposals are similar to the retirement age policy changes enacted
under the 1983 amendments.
Second, the phasing in of the new
normal retirement age does not begin until 2000. It seems quite
possible that the debate over whether and how to raise the
retirement age could be re-opened before 2000.

ORGANIZATION AND SUMMARY OF PAPER

This paper has two objectives.
First, it assesses the degree
to which benefit reduction and voluntary approaches maximize four
different and often conflicting retirement policy objectives: 1)
providing work incentive for older workers, 2) income adequacy, 3)
social equity-the similar treatment of persons in
similar
circumstances,
and 4) meeting the financial commitments of the
Social Security system. Particular attention is paid to the work
incentive objective.
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Second, this paper identifies the costs and benefits of these
approaches to four groups of older persons: 1) healthy older
workers, 2) unhealthy older workers,* 3) women and 4) minorities.
within the context of the analysis
This
is
accomplished
identifying trade-offs among the approaches in terms of meeting
policy objectives.
Before analyzing the three retirement age proposals advanced
in 1981, several points need to be made about their categorization
as part of either the "benefit reduction" approach or "voluntary"
Wihile, as the reader will discern, the author has a
approach.
preference for proposals that encourage work without also reducing
benefits scheduled under current law, the terminology is simply a
means
of
categorizing two fundamentally different ways of
in
is
Second, not everyone
encouraging later retirement.
agreement over what they consider a benefit reduction to be. For
example, some would argue that raising the normal retirement age
under Social Security is not a benefit reduction, but merely an
adjustment for increases in longevity that have occurred since
1940; or similarly, that small reductions in benefits promised
under current law are not benefit reductions, but merely slow the
Wile these are not entirely unarguable
growth of benefits.
points of view, the facts are that either type of change would
reduce benefits relative to what is scheduled under current law;
are most appropriately
and therefore-in the author's opinionclassified under the benefit reduction approach. Third, it is
clear that in many policy areas-including retirement policy-the
use of the "stick" ("benefit reduction" approach) to meet policy
objectives is often more appropriate than the "carrot" ( the
"voluntary" approach).
In fact, the 1983 Amendments include
changes in retirement age policy that draw from both these
approaches-the phased-in gradual increase in retirement age to 69
representative of the benefit reduction approach and eventual
liberalization the in earnings test and delayed retirement credit
representative of the voluntary approach.
Two of the proposals (Pickle and Reagan) can be classified
Enactment of the
primarily under the benefit reduction approach.
* The term "unhealthy older workers" refers to workers with health
problems who do not meet Social Security or SSI eligibility
standards, yet whose health problems are sufficiently severe as to
The
constrain their ability to continue or find employment.
severity of these health conditions ranges from those, that by
themselves, would have a modest impact on the ability to work to
those that virtually preclude work.
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Pickle Bill of 1981 would have encouraged later retirement by
gradually increasing the normal age of retirement to 68 -in the
Social Security program.
Enactment of the proposal advanced in
1981 but later withdrawn by the Reagan Administration would have
encouraged later retirement by reducing the value of Social
Security benefits, expecially for persons retiring before age 65.
The third proposal-the Pepper Older Worker Employment Incentives
Act-is consistent with the volmtary approach.
Enactment would
have encouraged later retirement by increasing the value (relative
to current law)*
of Social Security benefits for postponed
retirement and by the elimination of age discrimination and other
barriers to the employment of older workers.
The paper begins with a brief review of the factors that have
converged to make retirement age policy a national issue. Then,
the three proposals are described. The major portion of the paper
analyzes the impact of benefit reduction and voluntary approaches
on the four policy objectives.
The analysis is restricted
primarily to non-private pension provisions and policies.
The basic argument developed in this paper is that later
retirement can be encouraged quite adequately by either voluntary
or "benefit reduction" approaches.
The choice of approaches
ultimately reflects the importance placed on the goal of reducing
financial deficits in the Social Security system versus the goals
of the adequate and socially equitable treatment of program
participants. The benefit reduction approach does produce much
more Social Security savings, but at the cost of significant
reductions in benefits for groups that often experience limited
employment
opportunities-older
women, minorities and older
workers with health problems.
The voluntary
approach
can
encourage later retirement, but to create significant shifts in
labor market activity through the use of voluntary incentives
would probably require large increases in Social Security and
general revenue expenditures at a time in which Social Security's
financing was the central concern, it was not surprising that
retirement age policy changes reflected the primacy of the
financing goals.
* It should be noted that the proposed increase in the delayed
retirement credit in the Pepper Bill is not sufficient to make the
value of retirement between ages of 65 and 70 actuarially
neutral.
So while increasing the value of retirement after 65,
the disincentive to work after 65 would still exist, though it
would be smaller.
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE RETIREMENT AGE ISSUE
Since the end of World War Two,
increased early retirement
has been
one of the dominant trends in the economy.
As reduced
early
retirement benefits
became available
under
the Social
Security program for workers retiring between the ages 62 and 64,
growing numbers of men and women have accepted these benefits.
In
1977 for example, 68 percent
of retiring male workers and
78
percent
of
retiring
female workers accepted
reduced
early
retirement benefits. Labor force participation rates of men also
reflect
this
trend.
Between 1947 and 1980, labor force
participation among men aged 55 to 64 dropped by about 19 percent,
from 89.6 to 72.3 percent.
The growing separation from the labor
force of men aged 65 and over is even more dramatic.
Labor force
participation of this
group is less than half of what
it
was
in
1947--having
declined
from
45.8 percent
to 19.1 percent.
Reflecting the trend of married women entering
the labor
force,
the labor force participation of women aged 55 to 64 has increased
between
1947
and 1980 from 24.3 to 41.5 percent.
This increase,
while dramatic, is slightly
sualler than the increased involvement
of younger female cohorts, suggesting
the possibility that the
trend toward increased labor force participation among women may
be somewhat offset in the older cohorts by the early retirement
trend.
In
fact,
among women
aged 65 and over, labor force
participation has remained fairly
stable during
these
years,
at
about nine percent.
What explains the trend toward early retirement? There are
two somewhat conflicting answers
to this question.
The first
explanation suggests that the growing
availability of early
retirement benefits in Social Security and private pensions has
encouraged workers to leave work before age 65.
This is presently
the
dominant explanation and one of the implicit assumptions of
approaches that would encourage later
retirement
through benefit
reductions.
The
second
perspective
suggests that chronic
unemployment
in
the American
economy is
a more
fundamental
explanation.
This line of reasoning
suggests
that the early
retirement option has been made widely available to older American
workers as a means both of encouraging
the
retirement of older
workers capable of continued
employment
and to ameliorate the
unemployment
of
others.
This
perspective
suggests
that
encouragement
of
later
retirement cannot be accomplished simply
through the use of employment incentives.
As will be discussed in
the conclusion, the ultimate outcome
of current retirement
age
debate will
be greatly influenced by the extent to which one of
these perspectives predominates.
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The emergence of current concern over retirement age policy
is clearly linked to issues of cost. At a time in which the older
population is growing and living longer,
serious questions have
been asked about whether the Country can afford to have retirement
policies setting the normal retirement age at 65 and allowing-and
in some cases-encouraging retirement well before 65.
In fact,
Congress has recently given its answer by changing the Social
Security law to gradually phase in a new normal retirement age of
67 between 2000 and 2027.
Another issue concerns whether the
economy can afford the loss of capable and productive workers
through early retirement.
Presently, 11.2 percent of the population is aged 65 and
over.
As the post-World War II babies reach retirement age, the
aged are expected to grow as a percent of population to as much as
18.3 percent of the population by 2030 (Special Committee on
Aging,
1980).
The growth of the aged population is somewhat
offset by decline in the under 18 population.
Still Social
Security seems likely to place a larger burden on the future
working population. Also, assuming the continuance of present
retirement patterns,
labor shortages may materialize, especially
during the period in which the war babies retire-though such
shortages are far from certain.
The older population is also living longer. When the Social
Security system paid out its first benefits-1940-life expectancy
at age 65 was about 13 years.
Today, it
is
16.3 years,
an
increase of over 3 years. An Actuarial Note published by the
Social Security Administration presents measures of the ratio of
retirement
expectancy
to
total
work
experience for the
population.
using this ratio as a standard, the findings suggest
that "retirement age in 1980 equivalent to age 65 retirement in
1940 is more that 69 years." By 2000, the equivalent age would be
more
that 71 and by 2025, more than 72 (Social Security
Administration, June 1981).
Assuming that age 65 continues as the
normal retirement age, this lenghtening of retirement relative to
work results in an added burden on the future working population,
which some argue will be substantially offset by the assumed
growth of the economy. Others would also point out that as the
economy grows (as it has since 1940), it is quite appropriate to
choose-as the United States has-to increase the average number
of years in retirement relative to the average number of years
worked.
The combined trends of early retirement, a growing aged
population, a shrinking working-age population and increasing life
expectancies are the primary forces that drove the long-term
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financial deficits of the Social Security system, that were
projected prior to the enactment of the 1983 Amendments to the
Social Security Act.
The short-run problems projected before
enactment of these amendments were primarily the result of the
failure of the economy to operate as expected. Generally, between
1977 and 1983, inflation has been considerably higher than
expected and wage increases (relative to inflation) lower.
This
resulted in higher than expected costs (because benefits increase
to adjust for inflation) and smaller revenues (because payroll tax
revenues increase with the growth of wages).
The situation was
aggravated by high rates of unemployment which also reduce the
system's revenues. Fortunately, with the enactment of the 1983
Amendments,

Social

Security's cash programs are now in actuarial

balance.
The retirement age issue emerged in a conservative political
context.
Congress
having felt that it disposed with the
distasteful issue of Social Security financing in 1977, was not
pleased by the need to deal with it again. A major thrust of
Congress since 1981 and the Reagan Administration has been to
control the growth of social programs, of which Social Security is
by far the largest. Consequently, as budget deficits deepened, it
was increasingly tempting to view Social Security as a source of
both present and future budget reductions.
Approaches
to
encouraging
later retirement through benefit reductions and
voluntary incentives have emerged frcm and were acted upon within
this context.

THREE APPROACHES

As mentioned, the Pickle and Reagan Administration proposals
represented the "benefit reduction" approach to encouraging later
retirement
while the Pepper Bill represented the voluntary
approach. Independent of the fact that they are not presently
under active consideration-they are worthy of analysis. The
analytic issues identified in this
analysis
will-in
all
likelihood-- remain relevant to future retirement age debates.
Also, the analysis is applicable to the retirement age changes
made by the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act. This
analysis begins by identifying the major aspects of
these
proposals that have implications for a retirement age policy.
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THE PICKLE BILL
As a part of a comprehensive legislative package concerned
with Social Security financing (HR 3207), Congressman J. J. Pickle
proposed in 1981 gradually increasing the normal eligibility age
for retirement benefits to age 68, beginning with 1990.
By 2000,
age 68 would be the normal age of retirement within Social
Security.
Age 62 would be maintained as the earliest age of
eligibility for early retirement benefits, but the value of early
retirement benefits would be significantly reduced.
Under present
law,
retirement benefits are reduced 5/9ths of one percent for
each month of retirement before age 65-resulting
in
the
actuarially fair treatment of persons retiring between ages 62 and
65.
Under the Pickle Bill, benefits would be reduced 1/2 of a
percent for each month of retirement before age 68.
At the
earliest age of retirement-62-retirees presently receive 80
percent of the normal retirement benefit (80 percent of the
primary insurance amount - PIA).
Under the Pickle Bill, their
benefits would be reduced to 64 percent. Other sections of the
Pickle Bill proposed the elimination of the earnings test for
persons over 68 and the repeal of the delayed retirement credit as
of 1983.* The bill is not presently before Congress.
The Pickle retirement age proposal is quite similar to those
of several recent national study groups-the 1979 Advisory Council
on Social Security, the President's Comission on Pension Policy,
the 1981 National Comission on Social Security. These proposals
differed slightly in that they tended to suggest a later and
lengthier phase-in period and also suggested a gradual increase in
the early retirement age to 65.
Because of the similarity between
the Pickle Bill and these other proposals, much of the analysis of
the Pickle proposal pertains to these other proposals as well.
The analysis also applies to the change in retirement age recently
enacted by Congress. Under the new law, the normal retirement age
will ultimately be increased to 67 by 2027.
Persons retiring at
age 62 in 2022 and later will receive an early retirement benefit

* If the earnings test is repealed,
there is
little
reason to
maintain the delayed retirement credit since retirement after age
68 would neither be penalized nor rewarded.
If the goal is
actuarial neutrality - to avoid favoring persons retiring after
age 68, the delayed retirement credit would have to be repealed.
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with a 30% actuarial reduction (instead of 20% as is the case
through 1999).
widows and spouse eligibility ages are also
affected. *
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL
The Social Security financing package proposed by
the
President
in May 1981 contained six proposals which would
encourage later retirement primarily through benefit reductions.
First, effective in 1982, the Administration proposed to more than
double
the reduction for early retirement by reducing the
retirement benefits by 1.25 percent for each month of retirement
between the ages of 62 and 65 as a means of producing savings and
discouraging early retirement.
Under this proposal
workers
retiring at age 62 would receive 55 percent of the normal
retirement benefit.** Second, the elimination of dependent's
benefits for the children of early retirees was proposed.
Third, the removal of all non-medical factors from the
disability determination decision in Social Security and SSI for
older workers was proposed. Under present law, age, education and
previous employment are taken into account when determining
disability for older workers.
Fourth, a change in the computation points for the average
inoexed monthly earning (AIME) from age 62 to 65 was proposed.
This would discourage early retirement because it would result in
the calculation of a smaller PIA for workers out of the labor
force before age 65. This would also encourage continued work
beyond age 65 because th would result in a reduction of benefits
for most normal age retirees.
* Congressman Pickle was also
sponsor of the retirement age
provision that was enacted into law in the 1983 Amendments. The
major differences between the 1981 Pickle proposal and the new
are: Under the new law the age of eligibility for full retirement,
spouse and widow(er)s benefits is 67, instead of 68; the phase-in
date begins later and the phase-in is longer; the retirement
proposal in the new law saves less money than the 1981 Pickle
proposal.

** Persons retiring at age 65 receive a benefit equivalent to 100%
of the primary insurance amount (unless their right to a spouse
benefit is larger).
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Fifth, the Administration proposed to reduce Social Security
benefits by approximately 10 percent to be phased in between 1982
and 1987 through a technical revision of the benefit formula.
Rather than increasing the bend points in social security

benefit

formula by I00 percent of wage increases, the Administration
proposed a 50 percent increase between 1982 and 1987.* Again, this
might serve to encourage later retirement. Finally, to encourage
employment beyond age 65, the Administration proposed elimination
of the earnings test by 1985 (Select Camnittee on Aging, 1981a).
Unlike the other five proposals, the elimination of the earnings
test is consistent with the voluntary approach to encouraging
later retirement.
Like the Pickle approach, the Reagan approach to discouraging
early retirement and encouraging later retirement relied primarily
on negative rather than positive incentives. The major thrust of
the proposals was to discourage early retirement by reducing the
benefits of early retirees and to encourage work past age 65 by a
general reduction in the level of benefits for all future
retirees.
THE PEPPER OLDER %DRKER INCENTIVES ACT OF 1981
The Pepper Bill (HR 3397) represents a different approach to
encouraging later retirement. In contrast with the two other
proposals, it relied on positive rather than primarily negative
incentives. A fact sheet developed by the House Select Cammittee
on Aging lists the five major work-encouraging elements of the
Older Worker Employment Incentives Act of 1981 as:
* The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)-perhaps best thought of as
the monthly benefit received by a worker retiring at age 65-for a
covered worker reaching age 62 in 1979 was equal to the sum of 90%
of the first $180 of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, plus
32% of the next $905 of the AIME, plus 15% of the AIME in excess
of $1085.
The bend points refer to the dollar amounts at which
the percentages changes, and are updated each year for changes in
average wages.
By 1981 these bend points were $211 and $1274,
respectively. Indexing of the bend points by yearly changes in
average wages helps assure that Social Security replaces a
relatively constant proportion of prior earnings for successive
cohorts of retirees.
(The AIME is a measure of average monthly
earnings over the worklife of an individual and is wage indexed to
make dollars earned throughout a person' s worklife
roughly
equivalent.)
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1) The graduated increase in the delayed retirement credit.
Workers retiring after 1981 are scheduled to have benefit
increases of three percent per year for each year of delayed
retirement between the ages of 65 to 70.
Under the Pepper
proposal the value of the delayed retirement credit would
increase by one percent per year for each year of post- poned
retirement between ages 65 and 70, averaging five percent a
year for workers choosing to retire at age 70.
2) The liberation, but not elimination of the earnings
tests. Persons earning less than $4000 above the earnings
exemption ceiling would be subject to a smaller marginal tax
on their benefits (25 percent up to the first $2000 and 33
percent for the next $2000).
After that the current marginal
tax of 50 percent would be applied. The earnings limit and
bend points would be wage indexed.
3) Elimination of all forms of age discrimination in employment
by
closing loopholes and exemptions in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
4) The provision of tax credits up to $3000 in the first year
and $1500 in the second to employers hiring low income
workers aged 62 and over.
5) A provision to amend the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) to require continued accrual of pension
benefits
for
older
workers after the normal age of
retirement.
The voluntary approach embedded in the Pepper Bill is
distinguished
from coercive approaches by both the utilization of
measures that increase the availability of employment
for older
workers,
the substitution of positive for negative incentives to
encourage later retirement and the reality that it
would produce
considerably smaller savings for Social Security.
The Social
Security Amendments of 1983 contain voluntary incentives for later
retirement, liberalizing the earnings test (a 33% marginal tax
rate beginning in 1990) and increasing the delayed retirement
credit gradually, beginning in 1990, from 3 to 8 percent.
PROVIDING WORK INCENTIVES
The extent to which the coercive and voluntary approaches are
likely to encourage later retirement are examined in
this
section.
Then, specific impacts on healthy older workers,
unhealthy older workers, wanen and minorities are identified.
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GENERAL IMPACT
Both the Reagan Administration proposal and t ? 1981 Pickle
Bill relied primarily on benefit reductions to _ncourage later
retirement and assumed that older workers are or will in the
future
be willing and able to work longer.
In terms of
encouraging continued employment until age 65, it would seem that
the Reagan proposal offers the strongest motivation. At the time
the proposal was advanced, average benefits of $580.70 a month
were expected for persons retiring at age 62 in 1985.
In
contrast, under the Administration proposal, the average benefit
anticipated
at
age
62
was $348.30.
After age 65,
the
Administration proposal would continue to offer incentives to work
since, on average, there would be an approximately 23 percent
reduction in Social Security benefit levels which would make
retirement more costly. Under the Pickle Bill, persons retiring
at age 62 after the year 2000 would receive a benefit that would
be, on average, about 16 percent less than under current law and
persons retiring at age 65 would receive about 18 percent less.
By reducing the benefits of persons retiring before age 68 by six
percent a year and by eliminating the scheduled increase to three
percent a year in the delayed retirement credit, the Pickle Bill
would, relative to current law, seem to create a strong financial
incentive to work until age 68.
Are benefit reduction approaches to
encouraging
later
retirement likely to work?
Certainly, economic theory would
suggest that both the Pickle and Reagan approaches would encourage
later retirement by altering the work-leisure choices of future
older workers.
Increasing the reduction for early retirement
would mean that the price of leisure relative to work would become
more expensive. Also,
there is an income effect that would
discourage
retirement.
By increasing the cost of leaving
work-that is, by reducing retirement benefits-workers have less
"income" available for the purchase of retirement leisure.
Empirical verification can also be found in the retirement
decision literature.
Robert Clark and David Barker's (1981)
review of this literature finds that all retirement decision
research supports "the hypothesis that pension eligibility and
higher levels of pension wealth lead to earlier retirement"
although the incentive offered by social security pensions is
probably less than that offered by private and special public
employees pensions.
%bile it is generally agreed that
reductions will create an incentive
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Social Security benefit
for continued labor force

participation, the strength of this incentive is difficult to
estimate.
If it is true that most early retirees leave work
voluntarily in response to public and private pension incentives,
then it
can be argued that a reversal of these incentives will
also reverse the early retirement trend.
In testimony supportive
of the Reagan Administration proposal before the Select Camittee
on
Aing,
Rita
Ricardo-Campbell-a
Hoover
Institution

econmist-pointed
out
that
a
recent
Social
Security
Administration study by Julian Abbott shows "conclusively that
more than 80 percent of men aged 62 to 64 years old are healthy
enough to work" (Ricardo-Canpbell, 1981).
She refers to findings
showing that 8 percent of white men and 13 percent of black men
aged 60 to 64 in 1971 stated that health prevented them from
working in 1969.* These data are used to suggest that it is the
presence of the early retirement option, not problems of health or
unemployment that explain the decline in labor force participation
of older workers. Michael Boskin's findings based on a survey of
five-thousand households are also supportive of this position. He
finds the income effect of social security benefits to be the
single most powerful inducement to retirement of workers ages 62
and over, and the best explanation of the declining labor force
participation among men aged 55 and over (Subcommittee on Social
Security, 1981).
There
is,
however, much data that suggests otherwise
(Andrisani, 1977; Bixby, 1978; Kingson, 1981,1981a; Parnes &
Nestel, 1975; Sheppard, 1977). Virginia Reno's analysis of data
from the Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries shows that among
men aged 62 to 64 retiring in 1969, only 22 percent listed reasons
suggesting their retirement was voluntary. In contrast, fully 54
percent listed health and another 20 percent employment problems
as their reason (Reno, 1976).
Analysis of the Social Security
Administration's Retirement History Survey data shows that health
was the main reason given for labor force withdrawal for nearly
two-thirds of men aged 58 to 63 who were out of the labor force in
1969 (Schwab, 1976).
While there is disagreement over the extent
to which health is a cause of early retirement rather than an
excuse, most analysis would agree that it is one of the major
* These findings can be interpreted differently. First, in 1969
these men were age 58 to 62 when health prevented them from
working. The data do not show how many more men were prevented
from working when they reached ages 62-64. Second, other findings
from the study show that among men age 60 to 64 in 1971 health was
reported as affecting the work of 35 percent of the whites and 42
percent of the blacks (Abbott, 1980).

-591-

variables (if not the
retirement decision.

major

one)

which

influences

the

early

In reality, the retirement decisions of an individual is
usually influenced by many factors-though one factor may be
dominant.
The early retirement decision is, therefore, probably
best understood as influenced by health and income as well as
other factors.
A Department of Labor Study mandates by the 1978
Age Discrimination in Euployment Act and recently released by the
House Select Committee on Aging (1981b) suggests that a social
security benefit reduction strategy will not greatly increase the
labor force participation of older workers. Using a retirement
decision model developed for the Department of Labor,
projections
of the impact of reducing Social Security benefits by ten and
twenty percent on labor force participation of persons aged 60 to
7
in 1985, 1990 and 2000 show that the effect of benefit cuts
were "surprisingly snall in size and inconsistent in direction."
The ten percent cut is estimated to result in an expansion of the
labor force by only 64,000 in 2000 (Select Committee 1981b).
These findings may indicate that benefit reductions without
accompanying employment opportunities for older workers create
strong incentives for continued work, but only those persons with
continued employment opportunities are in a position to respond to
these incentives. The rest can simply be expected to leave work
accepting smaller Social Security pensions.
The Pepper Bill took a different approach to encouraging work
until age 65.
By maintaining current benefit levels for early
retirement, the Bill provided relatively little
new monetary
encouragement to continue work until age 65.
However, one unique
aspect of the Bill is its implied recognition of the difficulties
older workers,
especially low income workers, experience finding
employment.
This is accomplished through a tax credit proposal to
encourage employers to hire low income workers age 62 and over.
This
proposal
could
increase
the
supply
of employment
opportunities for older workers.
There
is,
however,
the
possibility that given the availability of this tax credit,
employers will substitute low wage older workers for low wage
younger workers.
After age 65, the bill provided additional
incentives for continued work by a gradual increase in the delayed
retirement credit, requiring continued accrual of pension benefits
for workers over 65, eliminating age discrimination including
mandatory retirement, and liberalizing the earnings test.
The Pepper approach assunes that a considerable number of
older workers want to work longer and will if certain employment
barriers are removed. A recent Harris Survey provides support for
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this assumption
(Louis Harris and Associates, 1979).
The survey
shows that 53 percent of currently retired workers reported that
they would have preferred full- or part-time employment when they
retired and that among workers aged 50 to 64,
51 percent would
prefer not to retire and "only 15 percent plan to retire before
the normal retirement age." However, it should be pointed out that
what people report they would do in surveys, can vary considerably
from what they might actually do given an appropriate employment
opportunity.
Findings from the Department of Labor Age Discrimination in
Employment Study (Select Camittee on Aging, 1981b) also suggest
that the Pepper approach would lead to an increase in labor force
participation among older workers. The study estimates that the
elimination of mandatory retirement "would result in 195,000
additional older men being in the labor force in 2000." Analysis
that assumed a ten percent increase in future employer pension
benefits when the normal age of retirement was below age 65, led
to the conclusion that the labor supply of older workers in 2000
would increase by 49,100 under current age discrimination laws and
by 67,700 if
mandatory retirement is
eliminated.
Mile not
directly testing the impact of increasing the delayed retirement
credit in social security the findings imply that this approach
would result in increased labor force participation among older
persons-though of very modest proportion.
The Pepper proposal
which would liberalize,
but not eliminate the earnings test,
provided less incentive than the Reagan Administration and Pickle
approaches which would eliminate the earnings test altogether.
Clearly, the impact of both benefit reduction and voluntary
approaches to encouraging
the employment of older workers is
highly dependent on the economic context in which they would be
implemented.
If labor shortages materialize,
then the market
place can be expected to encourage continued employment of older
workers by the reversal of private pension early retirement
incentives, by the elimination of employment barriers for older
workers,
by the development of
more
part-time
employment
opportunities and by encouraging the development of flexible
retirement options.
The increase of employment opportunitied
combined with the implementation of either approach would offer a
powerful incentive for continued employment.
Similarly,
high
levels of inflation could affect the retirement decision in a
manner that encourages later retirement.
Again,
the cambination
of inflation and either approach should provide significant
incentives to retire later.
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Either approach could also serve to
legitimate
later
retirement.
For example,
by establishing 68 as the normal
retirement age, the Pickle Bill would most clearly establish a new
publicly sanctioned retirement age.
But, the Reagan and Pepper
bill would also indicate to the public that early retirement is
becoming less acceptable and later retirement a national goal.
The creation of public policy that established a goal of later
retirement would probably modify retirement expectations,
and
employer pensions seem likely to respond by instititionalizing
later retirement ages or encouraging later retirement.
Both approaches to encouraging later retirement are capable
of leading to greater labor force participation among older
workers.
Positive and negative incentives do seem to work, though
the magnitude of effect varies with particular plans.
The
magnitude of the impact of each approach would be largely
conditioned by prevailing economic conditions.
An important question that needs to be examined now concerns
the extent to which these approaches are likely to provide
employment incentives for specific groups of older workers.

IMPACT OF WORK INCENTIVES ON SPECIFIC GROUPS
As has been pointed out, enactment of the Pickle, Reagan or
Pepper proposals would have created some incentives for continued
employment.
The impact of these incentives on particular groups
would vary greatly,
depending upon the health and employment
options available to these groups.
HEALTHY WRKERS:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Healthy older workers* are probably in the best

respond--by postponing

through enactment of any of these proposals.

would

encourage

position

to

retirement-to the incentives established
The Reagan

proposal

healthy workers with employment opportunities to

continue working until at least age 65,
starting
in 1982.
The
approach assumes that there is an adequate supply of jobs in the

economy to meet the employment demands of older workers.

However,

in a high unemployment economy, older workers-like many younger
ones-often lack employment opportunities.
So, in the short-run,
* "Healthy older workers" refers to those older workers in good
health or with health problems that do not
represent
an
appreciable barrier to continuing or finding employment.
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the
Administration's
proposal
might
have intensified
the
unemployment problems of some healthy older workers.
The Pickle
Bill would--like the Reagan proposal--encourage increased labor
force participation in the future.
Raising retirement age to 68
would also intensify the unemployment problems of future older
workers in a below full employment economy.
The development of
early
retirement
and
normal retirement opportunities both
nationally and within particular industries has been partially
motivated
by
high levels of unemployment.
Retirement has
frequently been used to reduce unemployment.
In
the absence of
employment opportunities, even healthy workers willing and able to
work, may be unable to respond to these incentives. A chief
advantage for this group of healthy workers of the voluntary
approach as exemplified by the Pepper Bill is that it expands the
supply of jobs available to older workers. The elimination of age
discrimination and tax credits to employers hiring low income
older workers--as was proposed in the Pepper Bill-would, however,
probably result in only a very modest increase in employment
opportunities.

UNHEALTHY WORKERS:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Currently,
some workers--though not eligible for Social
Security or SSI disability-have health problems that constrain
their ability to find and/or continue employment.
While these
health problems are often not so severe as to prevent them from
working, these problems-often in combination with other factors
such as high unemployment--make them less competitive in the labor
market.
It
is
important,
therefore,
to examine the impact of
retirement proposals on this group--unhealthy older workers.
The problem with the benefit reduction approach for this
group is
that to the extent that these workers are incapable of
working due to health reasons, they simply cannot respond to the
incentives that would be established. Of course, not all among
this group are unable to work; however, on average, they are less
attractive
to employers and so their employment opportunities are
limited.
Since health is the major reason given for early retirement,
the Reagan proposals would have exacerbated the problems of a
large portion of future early retirees.
The proposal in the
Reagan package to eliminate all non-medical factors from the
Social Security disability determination process would
have
aggravated the employment problems of unhealthy early retirees.
Age, vocational and educational factors are presently taken into
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account when determining disability eligibility out of recognition
of the special employment problems experienced by older workers
with partial disabilities.
Raising retirement age to 68 would also have a similar impact
on this group. A significant portion of older workers with health
problems will remain unable to work until age 65, let alone 68,
even if the demand for older workers greatly increases. Enactment
of the Pickle Bill, while creating incentives to which some older
workers with health problems could respond, would also have
resulted in expanding the cost of health induced unemployment for
many workers below age 65. In contrast, enactment of the Pepper
Bill, while not likely to have a significant impact on the
employment opportunities of the unhealthy group, would not have
resulted in benefit reductions.
OLDER WOMEN:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Older women are more dependent on the Social Security system
for income than older men. The majority (52 percent) of older
women over 65 are widows in contrast to 14 percent of men who are
widowers. Older women are less likely to work than older men and,
if they do, their earnings are likely to be less than men.
For
example, median income from earnings in 1976 was $4065 for
couples, $2300 for unmarried men and $2040 for
unmarried women
(women's Study Program, 1980).
Income from Social Security is
similarly distributed and in terms of private and
special
public-employee pensions, where present, their value tends to be
considerably less for single wamen.
Moreover,
60 percent of
umarried women compared to 46 percent of unmarried men and
considerably fewer couples are entirely dependent on Social
Security for their income.
Because of their increased dependence on Social Security
income,
it seems probable that given good health and
the
availability of employment, women are more likely than men to
increase their work effort in response to
the
incentives
established by both benefit reduction and voluntary approaches.
Consequently, in terms of examining the impact of these proposals,
the issue that needs to be addressed concerns the extent to which
women are in a position to respond to these incentives.
In
are more
less, to
Program,
covered

comparison with older male workers, older female workers
likely to hold service industry occupations which pay
work part-time due to job discouragement (Women's Studies
1980), to have less seniority and job security, to not be
by an employer pension, to experience more unemployment
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and to have experienced less consistent paid work histories due
primarily to child-rearing and other homemaking responsibilities.
The inhermittent labor force involvement of older wanen presents
particular problems to newly single wamen facing the necessity of
employment for the first time in many years or perhaps simply for
the first time. Their lack of recent employment experience often
combines with high levels of unemployment as well as age and sex
discrimination to make labor force re-entry difficult.
In addition to increasing personal incame, older women with
employment opportunities may benefit fram both approaches to
encouraging later retirement in another way. As Shirley Campbell
(1980) points out, to advance professionally, wamen are often
required to sustain great work effort during the same time that
they are under the heaviest child rearing responsibilities.
She
suggests that efforts to raise retirement age could result in
"less pressure to become established while young." Also, it would
seem that the gradual legitimization of a later retirement age
might make mid-life labor force re-entry easier since employers
would anticipate more years of post-training employment. These
points are, of course, highly speculative and debatable.
In spite of these positives, benefit reduction approaches to
later retirement do present many of the same problems for wamen as
for health and unemployed older workers. Data from the Survey of
New Beneficiaries (Reno, 1975) show 67 percent of non-married
wanen and 52 percent of married wamen stating that either health,
compulsory retirement or job discontinuance was the reason they
left their last job within three years of becaning entitled to
social security benefits in 1969.
Among non-married
wanen
entitled at age 62, 41 percent report health reasons and 17
percent job discontinuance. Given the limited employment options
for many women,
it would seem that many wanen would not be in a
position to respond to the incentives that would be created by
either the benefit reduction or voluntary approaches, especially
for the poorest and those with the most limited labor force
histories.

MINORITIES:

WORK INCEWTIVE IMPACTS

Assuming the past and present are good predictors of the
future, disadvantaged
minorities--Blacks,
Hispanics,
Native
Americans and Pacific Asiansare also less likely to be in a
position to continue employment in response to incentives to later
retirement.
Minority workers are more likely than whites to

experience

disabling

health
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conditions

(often

occupationally-related) during late middle age. For example, in
1976, while about 10 percent of social security (OASDI) recipients
were black, about 15 percent of the disabled worker benefits went
to blacks. Similarly, a 1977 survey of Spanish surnamed persons
in five western states shows proportionately greater participation
in
the disability program among Hispanics (Social Security
Administration Advisory Council Reports, 1979).
Data fram the
National Longitudinal Survey of Men show that black men who have
withdrawn from the labor force before age 65 are more subject to
work-limiting health conditions than white men (Sheppard, 1977).
In her study of early labor force withdrawl of men aged 58 to 63,
Karen Schwab (1975) observes:
For black men, as for manual workers, health-imposed
work limitations explain the disproportionate number
out of the labor force.
While
accurate
data are not available on the health
conditions of disadvantaged minorities and sub-groups within these
classifications, as Fernando Torres-Gil points out
"it
is
generally accepted that minorities fall far behind in the level of
health care needed to sustain their work careers up to normal
retirement age" (1980).
The combination of health problems and
the interaction of these conditions with greater occupational
requirement for physical extertion reduces the probability for
continued employment of older minority workers.
Life
expectancies of minorities are generally shorter.
However, the life expectancy gap at age 65 between whites and
groups defined as disadvantaged minorities is slowly closing and
has closed for some groups. For example, 1978 data show that at
age 65 whites can expect to live 16.3 years and "others" 16.1
years (Brottman, 1981).
Still, the proportion of
minority
populations reaching age 65 is considerably smaller than white.
Whereas about 11.5 percent of the white population is 65 and over,
about 7.8 percent of the black population and 3.8 percent of
Hispanics are over 65.
Life expectance at birth are also
considerably shorter-74 for whites and 69.2 for "others."
Minority workers are also more likely to be low-wage workers,
and have careers broken by periods of unemployment.
They are
likely to approach their later working years with considerably
less employment security and pension protection. Assuming a labor
market where jobs are scarce, the probability of their extending
work in response to changing retirement age incentives is greatly
constricted. Because of the shorter life expectancies, fewer
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minorities reach the age at which these proposals would encourage
later retirement. (This situation may change in the future).
More importantly, once reaching these ages, the health status of
disadvantaged minorities seems likely to limit their ability to
continue working.
SUMMARY:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

As has been discussed in this section, for various reasons
the choice to continue working past age 62 or 65 is constricted
for unhealthy older workers, wamen and minorities.
On the other
hand, healthy older workers with employment opportunities are in a
position to respond positively to later retirement incentives.
The chief differences between the two basic approaches in terms of
encouraging work are 1) the benefit reduction approach (Pickle and
Reagan) do not distinguish between workers who are capable of
working and those that are not, whereas the voluntary approach
does; 2) not only does the voluntary approach seek to encourage
later retirement, but is also directed at expanding employment
opportunities; and 3) the benefit reduction approach does not
require substantial federal expenditures to encourage
later
retirement,
whereas
the
voluntary
approach
does.
Other
differences can be seen when examining the impact of these
approaches in terms of the goal of adequacy and social equity.

ADEQUACY AND SOCIAL EQUITY*
Benefit reduction approaches to encourage later retirement
compromise the goals of adequacy and social equity. As previously
mentioned the Pickle approach represents, on average, a 20 percent
cut in Social Security benefits (over what is promised under the
law when it was proposed) by 2000 when the new retirement age of
68 would be fully phased-in. Similarly, the Reagan proposal would
have resulted in reductions beginning with 1982.
The impact on
persons claiming benefits at or before age 62 would be a one-third
* "Adequacy" refers to a program's effectiveness in meeting the
needs of its covered population.
"Social equity" refers to the
standard that persons in similar circumstances should be treated
in a similar manner. Social equity (or horizontal equity as it is
also termed) is different from individual (or economic) equity the principle that persons who pay more into a system (like Social
Security) should receive large benefits.
It is also different
from "verticle equity" the principle that persons with a greater
need should receive larger benefits.
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reduction in benefits as compared with a 20 percent reduction
under current law.
For persons retiring after age 64, benefit
reductions resulting from changing the benefit formula would,
on
the average,
be 17 percent (Select Camittee on Aging, 1981a).
The potential cost* of benefit reductions resulting from benefit
reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement for unhealthy
older workers,
wonen and minorities is quite high. Incane data
shows that these groups are more likely to have low incomes in
retirement and are, on a whole, not in a good position to sustain
benefit cuts.
In contrast, the voluntary approach to encouraging
later
retirement supplements rather than compromises the adequacy goal,
though in terms of the goal of adequacy the impact of the Pepper
Bill would have been quite modest.
For example, by encouraging
job development through a tax credit, the Pepper Bill would
increase the earnings possibilities for low income older persons.
Also, the gradual increase in the delayed retirement credit would
increase the adequacy of Social Security for some low and middle
income older workers.
Its focus on removing discriminatory
employment practices complements the goal of adequacy.
In terms of the social equity -the similar treatment of
persons in similar circumstances,-the issue revolves around the
reality that different groups of older workers face dissimilar
work/leisure choices.
Benefit reductions to encourage later
retirement seems most fairly applied when used as a means of
leveraging the continued employment of older
workers
with
employment opportunities.
However, where benefit reductions are
applied to workers with
no
or
very
limited
employment
opportunities
there
are
clear inequities.
The employment
opportunities for unhealthy older workers, minorities and women
are more likely to be limited than those of other groups.
Consequently,
not only do the benefit
reduction
proposals
establish inequities between particular individuals, but certain
social groups are also likely to be systematically disadvantaged
by this approach.
To a lesser extent, it
can be argued that the voluntary
approach also establishes inequities between individuals and
between groups.
Rather that using benefit reductions to encourage
later
retirement,
the voluntary approach relies on benefit
increases.
The same argument made with respect to the use of
* "Cost" as used in this sentence refers to "costs to
rather than to taxpayer.
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recipient,"

benefit
reductions applies then to the voluntary approach.
Certain workers and specific groups are less likely to be in a
position to take advantage of these incentives.
This, too,
represents an inequity although plainly it is not as harsh because
no additional loss of benefits results from not responding to the
incentive.
Further,
the aspect of the voluntary approach that
seeks to create additional employment opportunities (especially
for low income workers in the case of the Pepper Bill) is likely
to be especially useful to minority, female and unhealthy older
workers.
Closer
examination of the Pickle and Reagan proposals
identifies the potential impact of the benefit reduction approach
on the adequacy of Social Security for women.
As the following
table shows under the Pickle Bill,
the benefits of spouses,
divorced and widowed women would eventually be reduced. For
example, presently, the full spouse benefit for spouses who retire
at age 65 is 50 percent of the PIA of the retired worker-that is,
50 percent of the normal retirement benefit for workers retiring
at age 65.
Under the Pickle Bill spouses electing to retire at
age 65 would receive 41 percent of what the working spouse
retiring at age 65 receives under current law.
The Reagan proposal also presents some specific problems for
wamen.
The proposal to change the computation points from age 62
to 65 is especially burdensome to women.
Currently, the Social
Security formula calculates the averaged index monthly earnings
(AIME) of a worker by using an averaging period from age 21 to age
62 or from 1951 to age 62 whichever is shorter. After dropping out
the lowest five years of earnings the average monthly indexed wage
is
computed.
In general, persons with larger AIMES are entitled
to larger benefits. The Reagan proposal would have extended the
averaging period by three years--thereby lowering the AIMEs of
future beneficiaries whose benefits would be based on the new

formula.
This
would
disproportionately disadvantage women.
One
problem presently confronting wamen is that Social Security does
not provide credit for years out of the labor force to perform
homemaking functions. Consequently, women often have many years
of zero earnings. Lengthening the averaging would further depress
Social Security benefits for most women with work histories
(Grossman, 1981).
The Reagan early retirement program would have reduced the
value of Social Security benefits for female workers retiring
early, spouses and divorced spouses. Benefits for women retiring
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at age 62 would be reduced from 80 percent to 55 percent of the
PIA. Wives and divorced wives retiring at age 62 as the dependent
of worker would have received 27.5 percent of the PIA as opposed
to 37.5 percent under current law (Miller, 1981).
The proportion
of PIA received by widows would be unchanged, although formula
changes would, of course, result in benefit reductions affecting
widows and all other workers future retirees.

C=FPARISot! OF THE SPOUSE ADD THE WIDOW(ER)S BMI''IS AS A PERCE1IT OF THE PRIEARY
INSURANCE AbOUHTUNDERLAW BEFUREAI AFTER TIE 1983 Ar.
ITS.
61;DFR FULLY
PHASED-IN 1981 PICKLE PROPOSAL ARD REAGA.1PROPOSAL.
Spouse Benefits
at age,

68

Widow(er)s Benefits
at age,

65i_ 62

Non-disabled
Widow(er)s Benefits
at aize,

68

65

6o

1001

71.5,.

71.5% 60.8% 50% A

641'

64

5V-

50%

71.5;;

71. 5

60.8;-

50%

1
71.5;

1
%
71.5% 71.9

law Prior to
1993 Amendments'

50A

50)

37.5%

100O,

Fully Fhased-in
Bill
1981 Pickle

50%

41.

32%

100%

821'

198t Reagan
Proposal

501

50%

27.5%

100%

100%

Fully Phased-in
law as Amended
in 1983

5.
50

41.7%

3

2.5,

100'

91.9-

6o

55%1 50

71.5%

Slithone exception, prior to 2000, the PIA levels are the same under the law as
amended in 1983. The exception concerns disabled widow(er)s benefits which will
be increased to 71.51 of the PIA for ages 50 to 59, beginning in 1984.
J This percent of the PIA is reached at age 67 when the retirement age provision
is fully phased-in.

Another major social equity issue concerns the potential
impacts
of the benefit reduction approach on disadvantaged
minorities. As previously discussed, primarily for reasons of
health limitations, more physically demanding work and more
limited employment opportunities, the choice to continue working
past age 62 or 65 is generally more constricted for older
minorities when compared to other older
persons.
Benefit
reduction

approaches

to encouraging later retirement seem likely

to create new social inequities for older minorities.
For
example, a larger proportion of disadvantaged minorities would be
forced to accept greatly reduced early retirement benefits under
the Reagan Administration proposal. Also, the Pickle proposal
which would have raised retirement age to 68 by 2000 would have
had a similar negative impact on minorities.
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MEETING THE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Prior
to enactment of the 1983 Amendments, all
but the most
optimistic projections suggest that the combined Old Age Survivors
Disability Insurance program (OASDI) trust
funds had a long
range
deficit.
Using
the most widely accepted
set of intermediate
assumptions
(Alternatives
IIB) about
the performance of
the
economy and demographic changes,
the 1981 report of the Social
Security Trustees Report projected an average
deficit
over
the
next
75
years
of
1.82 percent of taxable
payroll*-which
represented about a
13% shortfall
(Board of Trustees,
1981).
Projections based on more pessimistic assumptions showed larger
deficits.
Ultimately,
the cast programs were
brought
into
actuarial
balance by a combination
of new revenue and benefit
reductions.
Raising the normal age of retirement
under
Social Security
was given active consideration
(and ultimately included in the
1983 Amendments) primarily because of its
ability
to produce
significant long-run
savings. For example, the Social Security's
Office of the Actuary (1981) estimated
the following
costs and
savings as a
percent of taxable payroll from enactment of the
Pickle Bill retirement age provisions:
Raising retirement age
combined with eliminating
the delayed retirement credit.
Elimination of the earnings test.

1.27 percent savings
.05

percent cost

In the long-run, the Pickle retirement age proposals could be
expected to produce a savings of 1.22 percent of taxable payroll.
There would
of course,
be no short-run savings from the bill
because retirement age would not begin to be raised until 1990 and
then only gradually.
Also, there would be a
slight
increase
in
the cost of the
Disabiliy Insurance Program because recipients
would be carried until
age 68, rather than 65.
The other
example of the benefit
reduction approach
to
encouraging later
retirement that has been used in this
paper-the

* Taxable payroll includes all

earnings subject to Social Security

payroll taxation.
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Reagan Administration approach-would have produced even greater
savings. The Office of the Actuary estimated the following
long-run costs and savings as a percent of taxable payroll from
enactmenh of the Reagan retirement age proposals:

Increased actuarial reduction for
early retirement

.71 percent savings

Elimination of dependents benefits
for children of retired workers
aged 62 to 64

.02 percent savings

Removal of non-medical factors from
the social security disability
determination process

.06 percent savings

Changing the computation points
from 62 to 65

.25 percent savings

Increase the bend points in the
social security benefit formula
by 50 percent instead of 100
percent of wage increases between
1982 and 1987
Eliminate the earnings test

1.29 percent savings

.14 percent cost

The net long-run savings from the Reagan retirement age
proposals would have been 2.19 percent of taxable payroll.
Because some of these proposals would go into effect by 1982,
the
Reagan approach would have produced significant short-run as well
as long-run savings.
(Ultimately, the retirement age proposal
included in the 1983 Amendments saved about 0.7 percent of taxable
payroll).
By
changing
retirement expectations and behavior,
the
voluntary approach to encouraging later retirement can also be
expected to produce long-run savings to the Social Security
system.
The exact amount of savings is
difficult to predict
because it is dependent on the degree to which positive incentives
will change the retirement decision.
If, for example, the Age
Discrimination Employment Study projections are correct and the
elimination of mandatory retirement would add almost 200,000 older
workers to the workforce by 2000, then it is clear that the Pepper
proposal to eliminate mandatory retirement would produce some
small savings to Social Security since fewer would be collecting
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their benefits and more would be paying taxes. Similarly, the
Pepper proposals to encourage later retirement by providing a tax
credit for the employment of low income older workers and
requiring continued accrual of benefits for older workers after
the normal age of retirement would also result in a very modest
savings for Social Security by increasing the older labor force.
(In 1983, a similar proposal to eliminate mandatory retirement was
estimated as saving .03 percent of taxable payroll.) In terms of
the Office of the
the long-run costs as a percent of payroll,
Actuary projected the following changes from the two Pepper
retirement age proposals that would alter the Social Security
law:
Graduated increase in the delayed
retirement credit

.02 percent cost

Liberalized earnings test

.01 percent cost

There is,
however, an additional indirect cost which is not
Liberalizing the earnings test
measured in these cost estimates.
and delayed retirement credit has the distinct disadvantage of
reducing the savings to Social Security in the future that results
from any future increase in labor force participation among
In the long-run the Pepper Bill would have a
persons 60 and over.
direct cost to Social Security of about .03 percent of taxable
payroll.
This would have been offset by savings from eliminating
The tax credit proposal would have
mandatory
retirement.
increased general revenue expenditures by an estimated 31 million
As
(Select Cmmittee on Aging, 1981c).
dollars in fiscal 1982
discussed, long-run savings to Social Security can be anticipated
as a result of workers altering their retirement expectations and
behavior; the magnitude of these savings is, however, difficult to
predict.
Even under the most optimistic projections of the ability of
voluntary incentives to alter the retirement decision, there are
two reasons why it is unrealistic to expect voluntary approaches
to produce nearly as much savings for Social Security as benefit
more
First, voluntary incentives are
reduction approaches.
Instead of eliminating benefits to encourage later
expensive.
retirement, the emphasis is on selective improvement of benefits
Second,
and more importantly, the
to create work incentives.
benefit reduction approach produces clear savings by reducing the
financial camitment of the program to future retirees.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has assessed the degree to which benefit reduction
and voluntary approaches to encouraging later retirement meet four
different and often conflicting retirement policy objectives: 1)
providing work incentives for older workers, 2) income adequacy,
3) social equity and 4) financing social security. It also
identifies the costs and benefits of these aproaches to healthy
older workers,
unhealthy ones, wamen and minorities.
Both of
these approaches are potentially effective means of encouraging
later retirement; however, each is associated with a different set
of priorities in terms of meeting the goals of adequacy, social
equity and containment of the Social Security financing.
Benefit reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement
campramise adequacy and social equity goals for the purpose of
producing savings in Social Security. The reverse seems largely
true of voluntary approaches.
In short, while benefit reduction
approaches to encouraging later retirement would produce greater
savings in the Social Security program, they would do so in part,
at the expense of older persons who experience limited opportunity
for employment.
On the other hand, voluntary approaches would not
impact these persons negatively, nor are they likely to produce
large savings.
The cost savings goal assuned primacy in the retirement age
debate which culminated with the enactment of the 1983 Amendments
to the Social Security Act.
The poor performance of the economy
since 1977 makes it possible to consider social welfare policies
in the 1980s that were politically unacceptable only ten years
ago. Support for raising the normal age of retirement was
justified by projected deficits in Social Security as well as the
belief that the general decline in labor force participation of
older workers during the past 35 years is
a result of the
increased availability of early and normal retirement benefits.
Given this, certain prescriptions follow.
To encourage later
retirement age and reduce Social Security costs, simply raise
retirement and/or reduce benefits for early retirees.
As this paper has suggested, evidence exists to challenge the
belief that the great majority of older workers leave work
voluntarily and in good health. Also, analysis of the development
of early and normal retirement options within specific industries
and
in the Country as a whole suggests that historically
retirement policy has been used as a
means
of
reducing
unemployment by enticing older workers out of the labor force in
exchange for a pension. To the extent that older workers do not
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have control over their retirement (or continued employment)
decision, then reliance on benefit reduction means to encourage
later retirement will result in faulty policy, because significant
portions of the savings produced would come from sane of the most
vulnerable older persons.
In the absence of a general improvement in the employment
opportunities for older workers and in the availability of
disability benefits for older workers with health problems,
the only equitable means of
provide
approaches
voluntary
seem
Such approaches do, however,
encouraging later retirement.
likely to fall quite short in terms of meeting the objective of
Hence, the policy dilema.
financing Social Security.
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THE POLITICS OF MENTAL HEALTH AFTER CARE
by
Steve Rose
School of Social Welfare
Suny at Stony Brook

Essential to the development of a positive practice in mental
health after-care is a precise formulation of clients' needs.
Clarity about a statement of needs provides added information
about anticipated obstacles to meeting those needs, both at the
client and systemic levels.
To accomplish this preliminary task,
it becomes necessary to create what we refer to as a "problem
definitional" level of theory.
Problem defining theory mediates
between more global theory, which establishes a larger context
for understanding the broad policy issues and direct implications,* and the articulation of practice theory.
Problem definitional theory is a prerequisite to practice as
it establishes both a direction and a baseline for evaluation of
practice activities.
At a programmatic level, it is necessary to
recognize that all providers of services operate out of one or
another approach to defining clients' needs (= problems) as well
as a structure for delivering services.
Properly construed, a
service agency or organization is simultaneously a social system
of interlocking roles/functions and the embodiment of an ideology
or identifiable thought structure that frames the way the organization perceives social reality.
These often underlying assumptions contour agencies perceptions of clients' existence, and
establish the parameters of the functions they have to perform
vis-a-vis one another (Warren et. al., 1974; Rose, 1972).
The
thought structure of an agency contains the problem definition or
theoretical formulation that underlies all services and clientworker interactions.
The thought structure also provides the
formal and implied rationality for the infrastructure of the organization and for its location within the interorganizational
network at the community level.
As Warren and his co-authors
state, the institutionalized thought structure constitutes,
a common frame of reference regarding the nature of social reality, of American society, of social problems,
and of efforts at social change and human betterment.
(Warren, et. al., 1974, p. 19)
*For an elaboration of this approach, see Vicente Navarro,
"Health and the Corporate Societies," Social Policy, Jan/Feb.
1975.
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The thought structure or set of operating assumptions wrn±Ll
typically characterize the commonly found health and social service agencies in most American communities is widespread: its
hidden, but practiced beliefs assert the basic soundness and
equity of U.S. society, its institutions, and patterns of behavior.
The concealed social validation for our political economy and social structure is found in the overwhelming commonality
in the way agencies define the needs/problems of their clients.
Whether the client's assumed
defect was in intellect, personality, discipline, values, family structure or neighborhood, one or
more of these factors were taken to be the determinants of the
client's social position in society.
Agency responses, in the
form of programs and service designs, for example, are often incapable of recognizing poverty as an inherent structural characteristic of our society; incapable of recognizing race, sex, age,
or handicap as structurally and historically determined aspects
or characteristics of American society.
Problem definitional
assumptions, validating inequity and/or discrimination, find
their expression in paradigms of practice which carry with them
practice technologies and assessment methods that turn out to be
self-serving.
They are incapable of critical reflection beyond
the parameters of clients' defects.
Rose's earlier research on
the Community Action Program identified the same phenomena: in
this case, agencies directed to engage in social change defined
services delivered instead a common litany of individual defect
modelled, and residual services (Rose, 1972).
The scope of commonality in problem definition across different types of agencies, operating in different service domains,
in different cities was so typical that Warren et. al. referred
to the pattern as an "institutionalized thought structure."
(Warren et. al., 1974, p. 19).
While agencies as different in
their areas of special interest as the public schools, the urban
renewal agency, the antipoverty program, the major mental health
planning agency, and the health and welfare council were present
in most communities, and had allocated various functions and
tasks among them that differed widely, their locus of common
understanding was in their operational paradigms of practice, all
founded upon a set of basic assumptions invalidating their
clients and validating the social system.
(Warren et. al.,
1974).
Upon closer examination, these agencies appeared to have established "legitimate" domains of domination locally, dividing
the turf according to functions and prerogatives, claimed expertise, and professional leadership. What was found to exist was
an informal, yet pooled hegemony over community activity and
decision-making related to service design and delivery, a rather
loosely orchestrated collaboration determined to protect individual agency turf from infringement or criticism.
Agreement among servie providers at the level of basic assumptions about clients, and ultimate responsibility for problems, allows agencies to attribute program failure either to clilent defects ("blaming the victim," as it has become known)
(Ryan, 1971), or to a form of quantitative rationality.
This
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latter dimension manifests itself in continuous demands for more
funds, more staff, more local control over program decisions,
etc.
Funding agencies, from the vertical system or extracommunity (Warren, 1963, Chapter. 8) at the state or federal
levels, most often share the institutionalized thought structure.
In the unfolding of federal and/or state programs, vertical input
rarely relates to problem definitions, especially so long as
During these periods, the nature of critifunding is available.
cism, such as it was, assumed the problems that existed were related to lack of adequate coordination, insufficent comprehensiveness, and/or inappropriate representation on advisory boards,
all examples of what we have referred to as administrative or
management rationality. As fiscal constraint gradually increases, the demand for more effective coordination is joined by
a growing interest in greater program monitoring and improving
accountability mechanisms, introducing some strain between vertical system funding agencies and horizontal or local system providers of service.
When fiscal crisis continues unabated, however, the vertical
system becomes more determined to locate measures of program effectiveness tied to cost containment. This trend has accelerated
Its pronounced mainfestation is
in public mental health care.
reflected in the increase of people whose training is in disciplines and/or professions outside the typical mental health-social
As a result, incoming policy planservice preparatory schools.
ners, program developers and managers, decision-makers have little commitment to the various particular forms of individual defect explanatory paradigms of the prevailing institutionalized
Corresponding to basic values espoused by
thought structure.
State Bureaus of the Budget, or the Office of Management and Budget at the federal level, their focus has been on management by
objectives, fiscal accountability mechanisms, cost containment
and system development.
The "New Breed" of mental health policy makers, however, are
not consciously predisposed against prevailing individual defect
models, since their systems training and management outlook contains no ideological or substantive critique of the structure of
Instead, their professional set of responsibilities
society.
initially leads them to accept local system institutionalized
thought, and, later, to begin to question it on the basis of
Recidivism
cost-effectiveness measures of program outcomes.
rates probably stand as the most critical evidence available,
with lesser variables including average length of stay on inpatient services, altering discharge planning to avoid nursing
home placements, etc.
Because all socially legitimated professional training accepts prevailing ideology uncritically (Berger and Luckmann,
1967), and extends it by posing the functions of the professions
as technical problem solving (Marcuse: 1964 and O'Connor: 1973),
the "new breed" simultaneously struggles to improve services that
are cost-efficient while having no substantively new criteria for
determining what services will either be of value to clients or
This phenomenon - of increasing technical and
cost efficient.
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management systems without precise theoretical focus - creates
the opening for a problem definitional level of theory, a conceptual articulation of needs that offers a new paradigm for service
design, implications for practice and bases for evaluation and
training.
Basic Statement of Needs
A large number of studies have been done over the years which
describe the process of becoming a mental patient in a state psychiatric hospital.
Perhaps the most detailed account, Asylums,
by Erving Goffman (1963), demonstrated the connection between
defining a problem in a particular fashion, in this case, seeing
dysfunctional behavior as a medical entity, and fashioning an
entire social system whose ultimate function is to confirm that
definition and rule out all possible alternatives. An absolute
prerequisite to the smooth operation of any institution is the
process through which its incarcerated participants learn the new
parameters and intestines of the social reality they must accept
in order to survive.
In the mental hospital, patients must come to accept their
situation or "problem" as mental illness, as a disease which they
had somehow acquired which, from that point forward, dictates the
realm of possibilities for them, as interpreted by hospital
staff.
Staff, in turn, must produce mental patients out of people in order for their own professional identities to make sense.
Once the activity of production of the mental patient has occurred, thus validating staff and invalidating patients (by turning them into adaptive, objectified response units), the drama of
ongoing social interaction simply reproduces the inequality,
domination, and manipulation inherently built into practice of
the medical model.
At the center of the process of becoming a mental patient is
"decontextualization," the severing of the patient's subjectivity
from the objective historical context that frames and contours
human social life. Another way of looking at decontextualization
is to see it as removal from social reality.
The reduction to
isolated, asocial existence is bounded not by history, but by a
belief system committed to psychopathology, medical hegemony, and
somatic interventions such as shock treatment, drugs, and pseudomedical examinations.
Decontextualized experiences of daily life
also become saturated with new language, the language of mental
illness, which contains such concepts as symptoms, regression,
decompensation, "acting out," etc.
These are all terms used to
reduce social reality to intrapsychic distortion.
In place of
living one's life, however painfully, one now "functions" more or
less well, and according to a set of rules and standards which
have no bearing on rehabilitation or return to community living,
but rather reflect management priorities decided by staff to be
in patients' best interests.
When examined closely, the behaviors necessary to becoming a
good patient, especially years ago, are behaviors exactly opposite to those needed by a person to survive in the social world

-613-

The good patient is docile, acquiescent,
of community life.
She/he is overwhelmadaptive to commands both overt and subtle.
ingly dependent upon staff, socially naive regarding rights and/
or entitlements, and demoralized or frightened to be him/herself.
After a time, the externally imposed new social order becomes
incorporated subjectively - the problem definition coercively
But in the process, the patient
held out is tacitly accepted.
undergoes an experience of anomie - of an abrupt withdrawal of
norms and forms (universe of meaning) that communicated the exigencies of daily social life as she/he knew it before entering
The experience of such extraction of one's known
the hospital.
Even conventional common sense
universe of meaning is profound.
communicates this to us when an significant threat of social
change is raised in the common assumption that any departure from
Rather than chaos,
the routine represents absolute chaos.
however, the hospital institutes systematic order, and the patient's experience of heightened anomie together with the hospital's rigid definition of reality combine to produce the mental
patient. Any conscious or non-conscious effect at resistance,
whether expressed behaviorally, emotionally or conceptually is
understood to be part of the patient's symptom pattern, and thus
brings about increased treatment responses designed to attain
manageablity or control.
So as one gains the knowledge and skills necessary to survive
in and adapt to the world of the hospital, one loses those same
Seeing oneself as sick,
capabilities for life in the community.
having lost the ability to link subjective experience to objective circumstances, and seeing the necessity to quickly perceive
the expectations of power holders, the mental patient's potential
for independent or interdependent social life in the community is
thoroughly compromised. Patients' social being, or personhood,
is overwhelmed by their patienthood; their active participation
in the consciousness of historical/social reality is overwhelmed
by their passive acquiescence to and acknowledgement of their own
They have been disconnected from ongoing social
invalid state.
existence, almost as if their capacity to engage in the process
of struggling to live meaningfully had been surgically severed.
It is exactly this objective aspect of utter oppression, behaviorally and conceptually, that constitutes what is called
It is a
"chronic disability," or "institutionalization."
prerequisite to understanding practice to comprehend the experience to which people have been subjected, and to see their
histories in the hospitals as a central ingredient in designing
practice activities with them.
The other aspect of daily life that converges to form the
matrix of understanding how to define the problem properly is
It requires that we remember that the
much easier to elaborate.
mental patient, before entering the hospital, during their stay,
a human,
and after their release, is essentially like us In this capacity, so
and,therefore, social historical being.
estranged from them because of hospitalization, they have needs/
Simply put, those needs include:
interests exactly as we do.
adequate, safe, supportive housing; nutritious food; adequate
clothing; varying knowledge of their rights and entitlements to
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benefits and programs; legal protection; and the choice to participate in socially meaningful interaction with others who treat
them with dignity and respect.
Ex-patients need these resources
socially, as a person living in the community, and not psychiatrically, as a patient residing outside the hospital.
As
such, any effort to deliver social resources in a psychiatric
manner constitutes a situation in which the person's needs may be
met, but in a way which contradicts his/her interests.
At this point, a slight departure is necessary to further
articulate the difference between needs and interests as these
terms were used in the preceding paragraph.
Statements of need
are common enough among mental health and social agencies.
What
such statements rarely take into account is that the way in which
they define needs and/or construct services is entirely confined
by their institutionial thought structures.
Where those thought
systems are premised on some assumption of the inherent defectiveness of their patients or clients, then the orientation towards defining needs will be confined to the parameters of their
thought structure.
In practice, this is commonly reflected in
mental health providers' coupling psychiatric focus to community
resources, or psychiatric determination of generic needs such as
those outlined above: Sheltered housing has as its basis not some
form of care for those unable to live independently, but rather
the assurance that psychotropic medical regimens will be followed; Case management, rather than being built on advocacy and/
or empowerment principles designed to guarantee the essential
dignity and benefits needed, instead focuses on ensuring ongoing
connection to mental health clinics and other treatment outlets.
These psychiatrically oriented services, based on continued attribution of and re-inforcement for mental patienthood as an enduring identity, act against the interests of the former patient
because they continue the pattern of enslaved dependence/
hegemony, they disregard the exploitation inevitably built-in to
profit housing arrangements, and they support passive dependence
upon staff where it is not needed, thus manipulating the former
patient into continued subservience.
The interests of former patients are quite different.
They
need the social resources described above delivered in a way
which recognizes their hospital experiences as oppressive and
debilitating, and works with them to increasingly regain their
human vitality and activity in locating what they require.
The
true needs of the ex-patient are, therefore, complex in nature,
reflecting the experience/existence of the ex-patient understood
as a human being, not as a manufactured commodity/mental patient.
Th use of the term "complex" here is intended: the needs interpreted in a way which recognizes the ex-patients' status as members of a class, are infused with the necessity to begin with
material conditions - housing, food, health care, etc. - as a
basis for understanding subjective responses.
Put more simply,
the ex-patient cannot be understood apart from his/her context,
and that the form of self-expression used in any context is a
crystallization of the social relations contained therein.
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The behavior of the "chronic" ex-patient must be seen in two
ways at the same time: it must be understood as a learned survival strategy, as historical baggage that the person brings with
him/her from the hospital; and it must be seen as recapitulating
and reflecting the self-confidence or self-image experience the
person has as a result of the social relations she/he is and has
been involved in over time.
This latter dimension can be elaborated by seeing in the typical behavior patterns of the expatient-the reciprocal functioning of the typical behavior patterns of the mental health professional; one cannot be understood
apart from the other.
When examining the ideological and organizational bases from and in which mental health theory and
practice emerge, the larger context of social control, oppression
and domination of both workers, confined to mental model
paradigms, and their products - the institutionalized expatients-can be seen.
Because the ideology and organizational
environments are similar across states, the conditions for former
patients discharged into communities across the country are quite
similar.
The ex-patients, then, while existing as individuals,
simultaneously are essentially members of a class.
This issue is both complex an d vital, and must be explained
here at greater length.
This will be done by drawing a distinction between what are referred to as essential aspects of former
patients' lives and existential dimensions.
Following the
theoretical distinctions drawn above, the essential component or
tendency in ex-patients' lives are the political and economic
conditions which all endure in common that aggregate them as members of a common class.
These conditions, in addition to the
common base of long term hospitalization and its impact on selfconfidence and self-image, and its effect on how reality is preceived (i.e., incorporation of the medical model), also has other
constant characteristics: placement in profit-organized long term
care facilities of one kind or another (varying by degree of regulation); dependency on third party payments for medical care;
dependency upon continued eligibility and recertification for SSI
or other forms of public assistance; and, most likely, continuation on psychotropic drugs.
In this complex organization-infused
and dominated existence, ex-patients are subjugated, exploited,
and manipulated in common, as members of a class, and the contours of their daily lives are conditioned by these oppressive,
coerced factors.
Because this is so, and uniform, this dimension
can be viewed as essential or political - it contains the objective parameters for subjective expression, and is the focus of
the advocacy component of an advocacy-empowerment design.
This design is based on the assumption that objective, historical conditions contour the parameters of everyday life, and
establish the bases for individual subjective experience and expression.
The conditions exist, therefore, to create a bond
between ex-patients, even the severely disabled, and ourselves.
The bond is forged by acknowledging the essential human quality
that comes from being part of history, from being socially alive,
and, therefore, actually or potentially a creative participant in
shaping the future.
It is in this socially human crucible that
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the enduring and inherent connection is made between political or
essential life and personal or existential life.
Each of these aspects of every person is inextricably woven
into the other, each a tendency without the capacity to lose its
omni-present life.
While both are present, however, they are not
equally active participants in shaping daily life.
Quite obviously, the historical/political dimension - bringing with it an
ongoing political-economy, culture, ideology and social role
structure - plays a pre-eminent role in determining the personal
exigencies experienced by all of us.
Particular patterns of
self-expression, such as those manifested by ex-patients, reflect
the particular forces which dominate existence: self-expression
and personal experience, therefore, emerge as a social relational/political statement about each of us. Where the patterns of
subjective experience and self-expression fully inculcate the
political environment in its existential forms, our behavior
functions to reproduce that environment and our place within it
(mental patient, husband/wife, parent/child, for example).
Where
our form of self-expression is in conflict with the exigencies of
the political environment, we pose a challenge or threat to it.
Such a position requires some form of response from those political contexts invested in domination and control.
The unwritten
rule is that people must both behave appropriately, or according
to the dictates of the social role structures of such a society,
and must perceive reality in such a way that the behaviors they
embody appear natural or normal.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann describe societal response to abandonment of this latter
element, which they call a "conceptual machinery," similar in the
individual to what we have earlier described in organizations as
an "institutional thought structure":
Therapy entails the application of conceptual machinery
to ensure that actual or potential deviants stay within the institutionalized definitions of reality, or,
in other words, to prevent the "inhabitants of a given
universe from "emigrating."
It does this by applying
the legitimating apparatus to individual "cases".
What interests us here, however, is the conceptual
aspect of therapy.
Since therapy must concern itself
with deviations from the "official" definitions of reality, it must develop a conceptual machinery to account
for such deviations and to maintain the realities thus
challenged.
This requires a body of knowledge that includes a theory of deviance, a diagnostic apparatus, and
a conceptual system for the "cure of souls." (Berger and
Luckmann:
1967, pp. 112-113.)
Sharing in the common universe of meaning, as the background for
our own socialization, creates the basis for shared action.
The
particular experience of the ex-patient, in the process of becoming a "mental patient," is an example of the political role oftherapeutic enterprise in personal life.
Institutionalization, combining coercive physical relocation
and rearrangement of thought to comply with a dictated reality,
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extends the therapeutic mode of social control.
mann address this form of internal domination:

Berger and Luck-

Such a conceptual machinery (therapy) permits its
therapeutic application by the appropriate specialists,
and may also be internalized by the individual afflicted
with the deviant condition.
Internalization itself will
have therapeutic efficacy ....
Successful therapy establishes a symmetry between the conceptual machinery
and its subjective appropriation in the individual's
consciousness; it resocializes the deviant into the
objective reality.
(1967:
p. 114)
The behavior patterns of the institutionalized ex-patient reflect
their resocialization into acceptable patterns of thought and
action.
Severed from the knowledge of the objective conditions
of reality, and medicated beyond its emotional impact, the expatient serves the State successfully by assisting to decrease
State budgets; by serving as the conduit for transferring public
funds to the private profit sector; and by being the
"beneficiary" of federal-state funding programs which transfer
power to the federal level.
These characteristics, coupled with the more commonly
acknowledged matters of material need and program responses in
the forms of profit housing and therapeutic activities, become
the objective universe that extends the worst aspects of hospital
life into the community. The pervasive influence of these objective factors reinforces the demoralized self expressed existentially by the ex-patient.
It is exactly this demoralized self,
communicated as mental patient self-expression, that becomes the
focus of treatment by most after-care provider systems.
In the
implementation of programs which, either overtly or subtly, are
founded upon a medical/therapeutic definition of reality, providers reinforce the decontextualization of hospital life.
Taking the mental patient to be the same as the person disassociates mental health and other social service workers from their
responsibility for their own activity. Accountable to both a
profession and to an agency which employs people socialized into
professional roles and thought structures, the workers become as
disconnected from their real activities - consciously understood
and chosen - as are their products, the ex-patients. Where the
absolute confrontation with the material or objective circumstances of daily life is not seen as the basis for subjective
expression, the essential and the existential components of
living are transposed.
In this process of turning reality on its
head, the expressions of self of the ex-patients are presumed to
be the determinants of their objective situation.
The "treatment" strategy accompanying this outlook thus asserts that the
subjectivity of ex-patients, as manifest in their selfexpression, becomes the target for intervention.
Therapy, drugs,
and all rehabilitation programs are premised on this peculiar,
but all too understandable belief. This effort is directed to
reshaping the subjectivity of former patients by improving their
functioning within their existing social roles, thus reaffirming
the very aspects of the person they find most abhorrent.
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The alternative position follows another road entirely.
It
asserts the primacy of reconnection to objective circumstances as
the central problem to be addressed, as an ever-present theme to
be interwoven in every aspect of practice. Rather than conceal
its nature in subjectivism, it demands that ex-patients be understood as social, historical beings.
Validation, a central value
of this position, derives its meaning from the concept of reconnection.
People, not mental patients, exist in history as actual
or potential producers or paticipants in their own lives.
Validation is communicated through the processes of reconnecting
people to their sociality, disconnecting them from their objectstatus as mental patients.
Idiosyncratic or existential differences, while rot denied, are relegated to secondary importance, as commonalities rise to the position of primacy, and essential aspects of daily life that bond people together become
the data base for creating support networks among people.
The task of engaging people as producer/participants in comprehending and acting on their contextual environment differs
dramatically from working to improve individual patient's
functioning, even though both may claim to improve the quality of
life and self-image of the former patient. One way to view the
scope and depth of the difference is to examine the meaning of
being a producer/participant as compared to being a consumer/
attender.
The producer/participant must come to know the active
ingredients which compose her/his social world of immediate influence.
The framework for development of such a view is openended, confined by limits in our practice and by the interaction
of resources available and decisions to act.
It implies a conscious strategy for action, not an acquiescence to dictates.
Since each of us is immersed in social role behaviors and ideology, in varying degrees, we all actively and perhaps consciously
engage in a process of becoming.
It is important to see that we
are not moving either toward some predetermined model of what a
proper adult might be, and thus subject to manipulation, nor are
we posing some rhetorical infinity such as "the liberated person."
In contrast, each of us can come to increase our knowledge
of our historical and immediate context, and with active support,
strategically intercede into it as participants/producers of what
the outcome might be.
While a group of ex-mental patients can
not transform their condition of poverty, knowing that poverty
has much to do with their present situation can produce different
outcomes from seeing their condition as the result of an incurable disease.
More conventionally, service providers would like their
clientele to become more adroit consumers of services.
Consuming
mental health or social services, however adeptly, communicates
an entirely different outcome than engagement in a process of
participation as a producer.
There is a striking parallel
between consumers of services and consumers of commodities: both
are out of control of what they consume; both stand outside the
determinants of the process of production; both act in response
to a definition of their needs outside their conscious control;
and both are passive recipients of the interaction.
Navarro
describes the effect of consumption on identity in the following
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way: consumption, whether of goods or services, is the residue
allocated to workers and non-workers by capitalist production,
from which the workers are removed as a source of power and control.
Being coerced into consumption creates feelings of helplessness, malaise and pessimism.
(Navarro:
1976, p. 114).
Consuming services is a process through which the consumer must take
on the problem definition of the provider, much like the situation described above in relation to in-patient care.
The process
of consuming the service consumes the person: the likelihood of
the consumer transcending the given universe of meaning established by the provider is very little, indeed.
Marcuse captures this activity of service provision and consumption in a
manner which aptly describes the mental health clinic - former
patient relationship:
To the degree to which they correspond to the given reality, thought and behavior express a false consciousness, responding to and contributing to the preservation
of a false order of facts.
(Marcuse:
1964, p. 145).
Marcuse's concern is with the diminishing capacity to develop
critical analyses of society and its impact on peoples' thought
and behavior, a concern which can be applied to mental health
after-care.
In programs where people have been reduced to mental patients, where presentation of self and the essence of a person
are presumed to be the same, both the person involved and the
workers become flattened out.
There is little to no room for
creativity, for development, for change.
The world of the possible becomes reduced to the situation at hand; stasis,
paralysis, and demoralization occur.
In a program which medicalizes poverty, exploitation, domination and abuse, the contrast
between the given and the possible is collapsed or crushed.
When
the range of needs is defined in terms of medicalized interests,
those needs which can be satisfied by this model are merged with
those which cannot, creating a false universe of satisfaction or
a defective or resistant patient.
In this typical pattern, the
concepts of patients and needs are "reduced," according to Marcuse, and these reduced concepts come to govern the analysis of
human reality.
The result is that these ideas convey
a false consciousness - a concreteness isolated from the
conditions which constitute its reality.
In this context, the operational treatment of the concept assumes a
political function.
The individual and his (sic) behavior are analyzed in a therapeutic sense - adjustment
to his (sic) society.
Thought and expression, theory
and practice are to be brought in line with the facts of
his (sic) existence without leaving room for the conceptual critique of these facts.
(Marcuse: 19 64, p. 107).
Consuming mental health after-care services free from a conceptual critique of the objective reality of hospitalization and
of post-hospital conditions is to consume a false reality.
Living that false reality reaffirms the mental patient role, the
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mental health worker role, and the set of institutions which created them. When we ask the question - who benefits? - we can see
that the primary recipients are outside the equation.
They include the profit accumulated by landlords and pharmaceutical industries; the savings sustained by the state governments; and the
comforts extended to the professional hierarchies dominated by
psychiatry.
What, then, is to be done?
What is necessary is a practice
paradigm which combines some a priori understanding of former
patients' hospitalization experience together with a clear formulation of their needs - real, material needs - as residents of
a community.
It must seek to accept what former patients communicate about their lives as statements about their selfexpression and their view of the perception of them held by
powerful others in their past and present environments.
It must
devise ways of reflecting this shared communication back to the
former patients in a critical manner, so that the interaction
neither reinforces the oppressive reality nor reproduces it.
To
formulate such a practice requires a theory of practice consonant
with the broader theory and problem definitional theory presented
above, a practice, for example, based on the work of Paulo Freire
(Freire:
1971).
By applying Freire's "pedagogy" to former mental patients, we can more easily recognize the class nature of
their oppression and develop strategies for change which do not
replace one pattern of hegemony with another.
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Seven Voices From One Organization:

What Does It Mean?

by
Janice Perlman

It would be trite to say that citizen action means different
things for different people; a cliche to say that it means different things simultaneously for the same person: yet both are
overwhelmingly true.
Listening carefully to the members of
citizen action groups -- not the organizers, staff, or wellknown leaders -- but simply the members, reveals the entire
gamut of understanding and confusions; gratifications and
frustrations; of hopes and fears.
The mini-portraits presented below represent a crosssection, members of a single citizen action organization at a
single point in time.
Exploratory interviews with members of
similar groups in the citizen action tradition do not seem to
contradict any of the patterns that emerge from this group, although there are certainly differences in degree and emphasis.
Rather than using interviews randomly across organizations, it
seemed stronger to present diverse views from within the same
one so as to highlight the similarities and differences that
emerged.
The rough ordering from enthusiasm to disenchantment
should not mask the strong presence of both in each interview,
and the complex interaction between individual needs, personalities and political awareness.
VIEWS
1.

Born Angry

Betty Washburn* is a 61 year old Black woman who first came
to the city in 1944 and has lived in her neighborhood for thirty
years.
She joined the NAACP at 21, the youngest age admissible,
and later the National Council of Negro women.
She has worked
all her life as a cook and caterer; her husband was a "union
man."
She is a longtime member of "Citizen Action."
"Oh Lord, I think I was born angry.
My mother said when I was a
little girl in Texas, she didn't know what to do because we used
to have to sit on the back of the bus and I used to say 'my money's just as good as theirs, why do I have to do this? ... When
she sent me to the store to get things, they'd sit up there and
talk and wouldn't wait on me.
Some Caucasian could come in and

*In order to preserve confidentiality, the name of the organization and all of the members are fictitious; and the names of the
neighborhoods, city and state capital are used generically.
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they'd wait on 'em and I'd go back home and say
back to the ol' store even again.'

'I'm not goin'

"I've had a lot of fun in "Citizen Action"; I've changed a
People always say 'You can't fight them,
lot of people's minds.
they're too big', but we did a lot of things. We went up
against them (banks, oil companies, big business) on property
taxes and found eleven buildings underassessed.
It was so much
fun when we went on this downtown tour of the business section,
we were pointing out this building right here, and how much tax
they do pay and should pay and who gets stuck with it...
We
learned that we have some power if you can get enough people
together, you can get 'people power.'
If you get enough folks
working together you can go from the neighborhood to City Hall
to the State Capital, and they said 'Oh, I didn't think it could
be done.'
It had a good effect on me.
I like people.
I have no chilit was just a pleasure workin' with
dren.
I lost one child.
these people and seein' these new faces and talking to 'em, and
it filled a vacancy in my life, too, after I lost my husband.
It's so encouraging when you can do it, like when we got the big
businesses to pay their fair share of the utilities.
Boy, I was
I said, 'this one I did.' "
the happiest person in the world.
(Laughs.)

2.

Cold Waffles

Vera Gomez joined Citizen Action in 1976.
She was from Denver originally and had been in Local 2 (Restaurant and Hotel
Workers) since 1936.
She is now retired and raising her
grandchildren in her home of twenty years, but will have to sell
it and move into an apartment.
"One day he (organizer) asked me, 'Vera, where did you learn
to organize, was it in the union?'
I said 'Nope, only thing I
ever did was pay my dues; I learned to listen and then use plain
old common sense, horse sense...
You can win if you believe in
what you're doing and I believe our government is going down
hill unless we get some pretty strong people to fight it...
You
know people don't pay attention to the radicals, but they will
listen if you give them a straight answer .... I
"When we went to the State Capital we had 14 buses and 3000
people from all over the state; it was so moving that day.
We
were fighting for lifeline utility rates... the gal, Chair of
the Ways and Means Committee, got real nasty when we went to
talk to her.
She never gives us a direct answer, you know, one
time it's yes and one time it's no, and then it's something
else.
So, we went in there and said 'you've been waffling
around long enough, we have something for you' -- we handed her
a bag of cold waffles.
They printed it in all the papers .... I
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'What keeps me going is the caring and the accomplishment.
I'm not sitting here decaying like a lot of 'em are.
Keeps my
mind active...
It's so important to me, cause I want to see
change, not to fill somebody's pocket with money they don't
need, but to help those who do, the poor people, those who's
underprivileged...
Those big shots from Washington get all
these special rates and vacations.
Standard Oil -- both oil
companies -- have at least six sets of books.
They just show
the government the ones they want to cause it's such a big enterprise -- they're running the show.'
"Only three or four of us (friends in her neighborhood)
signed up.
It depends on the personality.
I tried to speak to
them but even the ones who are in Citizen Action won't show up
for meetings lots of times.
This really frustrates me when I
know they should be there.
But that's the way people are and I
can't change them. As for me, I always wanted to be active in
an organization.
To me, Citizen Action was my salvation."

3. Cat Got Your Tongue
Maybel Pond, 54, is a janitor, the daughter of Black Oklahoma farmhands who came to the city when she was fourteen years
old.
She is divorced, has raised nine children, takes care of
her sick mother and an elderly man.
She has been active in the
local Baptist Church, and is a confirmed Democrat, though her
parents were Republicans.
She joined Citizen Action only two
years ago and was recently elected area President.
"When I was growing up, there were so many children at the
table, I never said anything.
Sometimes I would whisper.
My
mother would say, 'what's wrong, cat got your tongue?'...
When
I first joined Citizen Action, I never spoke up.
The meetings
and actions were very educational and informing to me so I rarely missed any.
It gave me a sense of accomplishing and doing
something... made me feel I had a little input into what's happening, what can happen.
I started talking out for the first
time...
Working with Citizen Action really brought me out; the
actions made me feel enthused...
(She is now planning to return
to school.)
"I think people pay enough taxes and so forth, there should
be some results right in there around where people live...
(Also) when something affects people directly, they will be more
likely to come out to do something...
(She doesn't trust
politicians to help locally because) I think once a person gets
involved in politics and actually holding an office, they forget
about the issues and things people really need. Why should I
have to worry about my gas and electricity turned off when I
read in the stock pages that such and such a company made $2
billion in profit and they refuse to pay higher utility rates?'
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"Well, just people getting together and really working and
doing something for themselves.., it helps them.
I see this as
the way it's going to have to be done if there's even going to
be a change where poor people will have a chance to get a little
higher up on the ladder or better living conditions, whatever.
We're really going to have to get out and get involved.
I, for
one, want to see it happen -- it seems that as long as you sit
back and let them put it on you, the more they put on you...'
"I didn't know before what strength a group could have -things that could help the neighborhood, the community and the
state and nation, too, if it goes to that."
4.

Something to look forward to

Mr. Weatherford and his wife are retired and live in an outlying residential area of the city, although when they were
first married they lived in the Black ghetto near downtown.
He
is White; she is Black -- both worked as janitors and were in
the union.
He has been in Citizen Action for two or three
years.
Mr. Weatherford:
"We had never heard of Citizen Action before the nice young girl, Suzie, came 'round and rang our door
in a long time...
She was very polite; not often that young
people treat you with respect nowadays...
My wife has
arthritis, so we didn't get out much, but since I joined Citizen
Action, I've been to meetings all over the state.
It is something to look forward to."
Mrs. Weatherford:
"Before he used to be sick, stay home and
complain.
Now, he has something else to think about...
Used to
be every night and every day he was going downtown to some kind
of meeting.
Anytime Suzie called; he'd come just so long as she
promised he'd never have to come back to night alone."
Mr. Weatherford:
"I've learned a lot there.
We went to the
convention (statewide Citizen Action meeting) and to the state
capital to get them to sign some bill -- I can't remember the
number -- about lifeline.
They want to go up on you and you're
paying too much already -- that's lifeline. We go as a group
and split up.
I can't remember the name of the person (Senator)
I went to see... he treated us very nicely, I didn't say nothing, we picked a leader to do the talking.
I didn't understand
most of it...'
"Now we're working on a library campaign.
I've learned a
lot in Citizen Action -- for example, I didn't know this city
has a library commission with twelve members on it."
5. Dry and Dead
The following are excerpts from the more disenchanted members of
the organization.
There was so much repetition that they are
grouped here together.
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"At first I liked it very well.
They was workin' pretty
good and I liked it 'cause they was trying' to clean up the
streets; get stop signs in; visitin' with the police chief; pullin' out the abandoned cars.., at the meetin's the Whip lady
would always explain a lot of deals to us and how things work
and any information we wanted she'd explain it and I got a pretty good kick out of it.
But, now, when I ask a question up
there, they can't even give it to me.
After they changed chairladies, I couldn't seem to get nothin' in my head what they
means about the work of the Citizen Action.
I been thinkin' to
stop going; there ain't no stimulation in it... it's just as dry
and dead as a thing can be."
(Mr. Hamilton, 70 year old Deacon
of the African Methodist Church, retired longshoreman -- worked
and lived in the city since 1943.)

"At first I felt real great about our victories, tryin' to
get the dope pushers off the streets and make 'em safe again, an
all that, but, recently we haven't been doing very much.
It
makes you heartbroken... when there are disagreements at our
meetings, people stay angry with each other, there hasn't been
anything worked out... I haven't been going too much lately."
(Donna Jones, Black, hospital assistant in hospital employees
union, no church affiliation, 19 years in the city, 4 in her
neighborhood.)
"When Lucy came to the door and told about the organization
it really made me feel good.
I wrote her a check and became a
member that same day.
She was so wonderful with us, and we was
wonderful with her.
Whatever she felt was right, she come told
us and we also sat down and talked and we come together on those
things. We was sure that if somethin' went on in our meeting
that Wasn't just right she'd look around and whisper and tell us
that 'I don't think you do it like this, it's such and such a
way... she was a great help to us, we just loved her just like
she was one of us.
Without Lucy we just haven't been doin' too
good.
Like now, we vote on things in the meetin's but if I disagree with something I won't say a word.., there may be ten or
fifteen against it and I go along because seems like there's no
time anymore to talk out our differences... I would never do it
again, all the work I did the past year and then somebody else
gets all the credit."
(Dolores Hawthorne, 66 years old, Black,
Baptist Deaconess, retired cook -- worked in Louisiana and Texas
prior to coming to the city twenty-three years ago.)
Meaning
Clearly "meaning" in this context has all of the uncertainty
and subjectivity of the blind men's proclamations on the nature
of the elephant. Although at one level it could be said that
these people joined Citizen Action because of the "issues" (i.e.
lifeline, dope pushers, on the street, abandoned cars, etc.)
What keeps them in it seems to be some combination of four elements:
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1.

ange,
sense of injustice, idealism
action (redress of grievances)

2. loneliness, anomie, quest for community
belonging (friendship)

3.

drive toward

drive toward

impotence/ignorance, search for understanding,
information and increased control
drive toward
knowledge

4. lack of dignity, of self confidence, need to feel
useful,
drive toward self-esteem
Each of these forces was expressed to some degree by every
person interviewed but the emphasis ranged widely.
For Betty
Wasburn, anger is the major driving force; for Mr. Weatherford
it is loneliness and boredom; for Mr. Hamilton, it is the
insistence on learning or knowledge; for Mrs. Pond, the gaining of
self-confidence. All of them seek a "free space,"* an arena in
which dignity, not humiliation is the norm, in which it is safe
to ask questions and admit doubts, and through which they gain
respect, both internally and in the larger world.
The fact that these drives exist does not necessarily mean
they will be fulfilled within Citizen Action or that other types
of activities do not compete with community organizing as a way
of fulfilling them.
For example, anger can be vented through
vandalism and violence, loneliness abetted through joining the
Moonies, (or belongingness through mass suicide in Jonestown.)
The neighborhood-level groups are merely one form of collection
action.
Theories of collective action (Mancur Olson**) and resource
mobilization (Gamson and Zald***), however, have somewhat missed
the point on most of these issues of needs and motivations.The
"public goods dilemma" or "free-rider problem" as Olson calls
it, is based on the non-divisability of certain benefits.
Since
stopping a freeway or getting lower utility rates benefits the
non-participants in a community group as well as the participants, (and since there is no way to make participation mandatory as with the "closed shop" in labor organizing) there appears, according to this logic, to be no incentive for any one

*c.f. Peter Drier, "The Case for Transitional Reform," Social
Policy, Jan./Feb. 1979, pp. 5-18.
**c.f. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Good and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press; Cambrige, MA, 1965.
***Gamson, William, The Strategy of Social Protest, Dorsey
Press, Homewood, Ill., 1975; and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization" (n.d.)
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desire for

prestige,

competence,
recognition,
mastery,
acceptance,
adequacy,
attention,
achievement,
reputation,
freedom
appreciation
independence
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in family, in group
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desire for security, stability, dependency,
order, protection, freedom from fear and anxiety.
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hunger, thirst, breathing, sleep, sex, shelter
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individual to make the effort.
If that were the case, of
course, there would not be hundreds, even thousands of community
groups organizing around the country -- some of which do not
even provide the individual incentives and rewards of ad books
(membership discounts at local stores who support the organization).
Also, there would not be members discussing the pros and
cons in the terms quoted above.
The "resource-mobilization" reasoning argues that organizing
is a rational approach for low income people to generate more
goods and services and get a better deal, a fairer share.
Since
they did not have money or personal connections, their strength
was in their numbers and in their potential for disruptive behavior.
Emotional needs are not taken into account.
Both notions stem from a very rational view of people maximizing economic benefits, and thinking through alternative
strategies prior to calculating their decisions.
This was, in
part a reaction to the "frustration-aggression" model which social scientists had long postulated as the basis for violence
and revolution stemming from the deprived underclasses.*
It was
certainly a step forward from the "angry masses uprising" theory, but not very helpful in looking at the real complexities of
meaning in citizen action.
What these few interviews suggest is both a more humanistic
and more realistic perspective on the complexities of beliefs
and behaviors. Abraham Maslow's work on the hierarchy of needs
is valuable in this regard.
He hypothesizes a scale of five
types of needs:
1) physiological;
2) safety;
3) love and
belongingness;
4) esteem (self-esteem and social esteem); and
5) self-actualization -- to become everything that one is
capable of becoming.
(See figure 1.)**
The notion is not that motivation for each
stage proceeds
only when the one below is totally fulfilled, but that at least
a partial fulfillment of the more fundamental needs is necessary
before a person's motivation toward the higher ones can be very
strong.
In terms of community organizations such as Citizen Action,
this helps explain two readily observable facts:
first, that
the members are not drawn from the poorest segments of the
population (since they are too busy trying to deal with physiological necessities), and second, that most of the members are
over fifty years old.
Those in their twenties and thirties are
starting careers and have little time for, or interest in, community organizing; then for the next two or three decades they

*c.f. Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality, U.C. Press,
Berkeley, CA., 1976, Ch.4.
**Abraham Maslow, Eu sychian Management, Richard Irwin Inc.,
Homewood, Ill., 1965
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are busy raising families.
Only when they are retired or have
moved on to part-time work can their interest in the fun and
fulfillment of citizen action organizing come to the fore.
As
most members said, they had joined groups before (especially the
church, labor unions, or the Democratic party) but had "never
been active."
Being working class, they generally did not have
the options of child-care and babysitters, or a non-working
parent, which often allow middle-class couples to be active
civic participants as well as raise families.
For a citizen action organization not only to attract, but
hold the membership of low or moderate income people, it is
clear that all four incentives -- anger, community, information,
and self-esteem must be operating. The one-shot, single issue
group disappears as soon as its victory (or defeat) is definitive.
Even a multi-issue organization based solely on actions
and anger will very quickly reach the point of "what-have-youdone-for-me-lately" and disintegrate without some value content
toward binding friendships, cultural roots, and re-creation of
personal dignity.
Dignity is gained, or re-gained, through many aspects of the
citizen action process, but particularly through
1) actions
which de-mystify the authorities, and provide the sweet taste of
power, and 2) internal participatory democracy which gives every member a chance to be heard, a chance to make mistakes (and
to learn from these without humiliation) and to disagree with
others (and to resolve these differences without rancor.)
As Oppenheimer defines it:
Participatory democracy involves two complementary
notions that people are inherently capable of understanding their problems and expressing themselves
about these problems and their solutions, if given
a social context in which freedom of expression
is possible. The second is that real solutions
to problems require the fullest participation of
people in these solutions, with development of
freedom from dependency on authorities and experts.*
There is only one problem: there exists an inherent conflict
between action and participatory democracy. Since both are
necessary to vital community organizing, a real paradox emerges.
If too much participation takes place things take too long, the
group gets bored, meeting attendance may drop off, and people
feel that "not enough is going on" as Mrs. Hawthorne complained.
If too much action and too little participation goes on, people
do not learn the meaning of those actions (as in Mr. Weatherford's case) and are objectified as "troops" to be deployed
*Oppenheimer, Martin, "The Limitations of Socialism: SomeSociological Observations on Participatory Democracy" in G.
Benello (ed.), The Case for Participatory Democracy, Grossman,
N.Y. 1971, p. 227.
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against targets, or they do not get a chance to raise the questions they need answered, and thus are frustrated, angered, and
confused (as Mr. Hamilton expressed.)
Oppenheimer summarizes it
well:
A paradox exists between the democratic content
of a group and the progress of the group towards a
measure of power in the community.
Too much discussion we stop moving; too little and we are no longer
what we were.
To achieve a goal we need unity
but to achieve unity it is sometimes necessary to
compromise, to gloss over some important issues -which shall it be?*
Political awareness requires political discussion, but
political discussion can be divisive. Organizers who lived
through the 1960's saw the left fragment itself into impotence
over "the correct line."
With most of them being middle-class,
white, educated males already committed to progressive politics
it was hard enough to find common cause.
Imagine the difficulties of doing this with a community group of mixed race, class,
age and political experience.
Whereas it is easy to agree on
the negative -stop the bulldozer, end relining, lower utility
rates, etc. -it is much more diffiult to agree on the positive -- start what?
support who?
being where?
The time, effort, and needed sensitivity to carry this out seem overwhelming.
On the other hand, without vision without clarity of purpose, no movement is possible, no organization can sustain itself.**
A movement needs four things: an analysis of how things
are, an explanation of how they got that way, a vision of whow
they could be in the future, and a notion of how to get from
here to there.
If there is no movement, then organizing the
30,000th person will take as much effort as organizing the 30th
person, and electing the 10th citizen action candidate as isolated an effort as electing the first.

*Oppenheimer, pp. 229.
See also Democracy, A Journal of Political Renewal and Radical Change, Sheldon Wolin, (ed.) Ja-. 1981.
**Wilhelm Reich, writing in Germany in 1931-32 observed, "unless
people have class consciousness, they will not stay mobilized,
from 'What is Class Consciousness"
Sex-Pol Essays 1929-34,

Vintage Books, 1972, pp. 257-258."
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Clearly, the Civil Rights and anti-war movements created
such momentum in the 1960's and the "Moral Majority" supposedly
has a similar momentum right now.
If citizen action is to
"catch on" at the national level, there will have to be the
sense of channeled outrage and a collective vision of how to
rectify the injustices which cause it.
The bottom line of direct action organizing then must be growing awareness of the
largest possible number of participants in every single campaign.
Campaigns may fail and organizations may die, but the
learning that people have internalized is for life.
Once they
own their new understanding, they can recreate their struggle,
reform groups, remobilize their friends, etc.
The recent 18-month rent strike and eventual victory of the
tenants in Co-op City provides a timely example of this.
The
residents were so well-organized, clear and militant that their
opponents were stunned.
They organized building captains in
each building; floor captains for each floor; they ran their own
printing press; and they knew the entire gamut of their rights
and how far to push them. Why?
Because these mostly elderly,
Jewish tenants, (who had given up their rent-controlled apartments in the Bronx to find a retirement haven in Co-op City) had
been through it all fifty years ago in the labor struggles, the
communist or socialist political organizing of the 1930's.
Although their skills of struggle had remained dormant all those
years, they came right back as soon as they were needed.
This by no means implies that political education can be
done through community organizations in the 1980's the way it
was done in the labor organizations of the 1930's.
It is almost
a slogan, "you have to start from where people's heads are at,"
but this is brought home with stunning clarity when an organizer
tries to tell the folk what they just did and what they are
saying (about the little guy paying for the profits of the big
corporations or about how the political parties are owned by the
oil companies) is tantamount to socialism.
In general, the folk
do not come back.
The McCarthy era has left its mark clearly
enough, the media, especially television, have done the rest.
Most group spokespersons when asked about ideology will say they
are non-ideological, even anti- ideological.
If anything, some
will say they are populist.*
Going beyond the spokespeople and listening to the members
talk about their view of the world, reveals that they are both
more radical and more conservative than their staff and leadership.
They are filled with inconsistencies and internal contradictions, but feel no need for consistency. Many will talk
about "excess profit," "conflict of interest," "the power of
numbers," "corporate ripoffs," etc.
They often express outrage
at the injustice of companies moving out of town, eliminating
thousands of jobs and a much-needed tax base; or against the
rampant speculation of landlords who buy and sell properties
*c.f. Janice Perlman, "Grassrooting the System,"
Sept/Oct. 1976, p. 4-20.
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for profits, evicting families without recourse.
However, 1n
the same breath they will say they believe in private property
and in the absolute right of owners to do as they please with
their buildings, or companies.
They say "everyone should be
free, this is a free country."
This type of mentality has been characterized by Hobsbawm as
"pre-political thought," as contrasted with "political
conscious-ness."
Consciousness, he says is a "coherent viewpoint provid-ing an interpretive framework for the understanding
of relations between society, culture, and political economy."
He goes on to say it suggests "volition in the development of a
long-range political program and strategy as well as a set of
tactics and immediate demands."
In contrast,
Pre-political thought is less coherent, has little
conception of long-range goals or programs, responds
in a fragmented fashion to immediate grievances, and
frequently sees little relationship between the concrete problem at hand and the larger social system.*
Wikler, in a study of consciousness among Vietnam veterans
found many patterns of "pre-political thinking" similar to those
among community organization members.
She characterizes the
components as
1) diffuse anger and strongly felt grievances, 2).
political fragments rather than a coherent ideology, 3) spontaneous, sometimes anarchic behavior, 4) rudimentary notions of
a system, and 5) disobedience.**
Because of this relatively
amorphous and contradictory political comprehension, some were
extremely radicalized by their Vietnam experience.
Some became
defensive of the war and the U.S. role in the world, and some
remained confused and unclear.
According to Leggett who did a similar study measuring the
class consciousness of Detroit workmen, a 4-stage process can be
traced from pre-political thinking towards class consciousness:
1) class verbalization -- the tendency to discuss topics in
terms of class; 2) skepticism -- the belief that wealth had been
allocated within the community to benefit primarily the middle
class; 3) militancy, the pre-disposition to engage in aggressive
action to advance the interests on one's class; and
4) equali-

*Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Praeger, N.Y.

1963.

**Norma Wikler, "Vietnam and the Veteran's Consciousness: PrePolitical Thinging Among American Soldiers" U.C. Berkeley, Ph.D.
dissertation, Sociology, 1973.
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tarianism -- favoring a redistribution of wealth.*
Al Heskin
has adapted this scale to a study of tenant consciousness and is
presently testing it in Los Angeles finding a much greater
receptivity than expected and more skepticism and militancy.**
The logical question this discussion leads to is whether or
not participation in a community organization affects the
development of political consciousness.
No simple answer is
forthcoming. However, a few things are clear from the interviews conducted.
First, that there is a great deal of preselection in who joins a neighborhood organization.
Not only do
relatively few people know about a given organization in any
community, but even among those who know intimately about it
(through friends, neighbors, or relatives ) many do not have the
time or inclination to join.
Thus, any serious study of this
topic would have to match pairs of members and their most similar non-member acquaintances to begin to sort out the factors
accounting for this first level of difference.
Second, for
those who are members, even most longtime members, it is clear
that their experience in the organization is only a minute part
of their lifetime process of political socialization.
Their
previous experiences -- in their 'families, schools, churches,
labor unions, etc. -- play an overwhelming role in shaping their
view of the world.To use Berger's phrase, one's "social construction of reality"***is already fairly established by the
time that person joins a community organization.
Furthermore,
given that in Citizen Action very few people had succeeded in
bringing their friends, neighbors or family members into the
organization, there is very little support for a new definition
of reality even if the seeds are sown for this within the organization.
One might argue that this can happen among new
friends made within the organization, but the vast majority of
those interviewed said they did not socialize with Citizen Action members outside of the organization, and those who did socialized almost exclusively with the organizers or staff rather
than with other members.
(In fact, both Mrs. Gomez and Mrs.
Hawthorne were rather disdainful of the other members.)
This is
not true for all community organizations, but was revealing in
that it seems more often the case than not.
CONCLUSION
The above caveats notwithstanding, people do, in fact, learn
and re-interpret the world around them all the time as long as
*John Leggett, "The Periodicity of Working-Class Consciousness,"
in Taking State Power, Ch. 5, Harper and Row, N.Y. 1973, p. 111.
**c.f. Al Heskin, "The History of Tenants in the U.S.: Struggle
and Ideology", Dept. of City Planning, UCLA, Los Angeles, The
Tenant Consciousness Study grant is from the NIMH Metro center.
***Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of
Realitz , Doubleday, Garden City, 1966, pp. 45-107,f7--1T9.
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they are alive.
Participating in a community group, while perhaps not decisive, cannot fail to contribute to this reassessment process.
This happens to a greater or lesser degree
depending on three factors: action, interpretation, and
internalization.
By action is meant that if a group does not engage in some
activity or confrontation that challenges the normal course of
things, they generate no new data for re-interpretation. In
most citizen action organizations the fun of it all comes from
the creative planning and execution of these actions -- they are
the "spice" while doorknocking, fundraising, meetings, etc. are
the "meat and potatoes".
Interpretation means two things.
First, how much attention
the organizational style gives to learning from both failures
and victories to open discussion and analysis before and after
actions, and to ongoing leadership development.
Second, how
well the leaders are able to interpret and explain to the membership the connections between what they saw happen and why.
Making the victory is only part of the challenge, giving it
meaning is equally important.
If people perceive only a "black
box" effect where you do "X" and "Y" results, they will never be
able to own their own successes or re-create them in other circumstances.
Finally, internalization refers to the process by which the
lessons learned from action and interpretation are incorporated
into one's daily operating assumptions and reinforced in one's
own home or neighborhood among trusted friends and relatives.
In the absence of this, some members expressed the feeling of
not really believing what they had just experienced; it seemed
like such a different world, almost as if its reality disappeared when they left the group and went home.
In short, it appears that the greatest change in consciousness will occur in active groups which have indigenous leadership with some degree of ideological clarity, and a process of
internal discussion within the organization, and a high degree
of solidarity and friendship with friends, neighbors and relatives also in the organization.
As the citizen action movement has come of age, and as new
insights have been gained regarding the issue of "meaning" and
consciousness, some very interesting approaches have evolved to
focus more attention on what Mike Ansars of Massachusetts Fair
Share calls "value-based" rather than "issue-based" organizing.
People feel concerned about the loss of traditional guidelines,
culture, and values in their lives and are as able to talk about
this as they are to complain abut the garbage on the street or
the needed stopsign on the corner.
Some groups such as the
South Bronx People for Change, and the Mutual Aid Project in
Coney Island and Brooklyn are adapting Paulo Freire's methods of

bottom-up dialogue and consciousness raising* to their own
styles of organizing.
They work more in the Chavez tradition,
whose approach among the farmworkers was to reinforce ties of
culture, trust, and community, within the groups and its institutions, rather than in the Alinsky mode which focuses on the
enemy -- "them" out there to create the sense of "we."**
M.A.P., for example, is setting up a series of cooperatively
owned community "cafeterias" in which people can congregate,
talk, eat good food at reasonable prices, and hold cultural
events for their community.
They are already running a cooperative food buying service, a food services training center, and
an assistance service to groups interested in establishing worker community cooperative food enterprises. They take the Highlander Center in Appalachia as one of their organizing models.
The South Bronx People for Change works through a combination of theological reflection (the "why"); social analysis (the
"what"); and community organizing (the"how").
Before they take
any action each group goes through a lengthy process of discussion (half are in English, half in Spanish) including a needs
assessment, recruitment, training sessions, and follow-up into
action goals.
They are as concerned with asking the right questions, and building a process of popular education as with "winning victories."
They are planting the seeds of a movement in
the South Bronx and are moving slowly and sensitively, turning
negatives into positives along the route.
The problem, as Nelson Rodriques said, "is not apathy but powerlessness."
What
they deliver is a little hope.
It is a matter of common sense,
he says, "if you're going to the top of the mountain don't go
naked and don't go alone."

*C.F. Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Herder &
Herder, N.Y. 1970 and Education for Critical Consciousness, Coninuum Books, Seabury Press, N.Y. 1973.
**For this distinction, I draw upon conversations with William
Friedland, Board Community Studies and Sociology, U.C. Santa
Cruz.
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A NOTE ON VOETHOGENIC HARM: THE POLITICS OF
SCIENCE AND THE PROFESSIONS
by
Warren C. Haggstrom
UCLA School of Social Welfare

Abstract:

"voethogenic":

helper-engendered.

If one wants to check out how good a new dog is in herding
cattle, one has to find some cattle, send the dog after them, and
observe what happens. That works because what the dog does and
its outcome are so striking as to rule out all but one rough
interpretation concerning what has given rise to what.
It is different with the helping of people.
If a physician prescribes a medication for several patients
and they all get better, the getting better may have little or
nothing to do with the medication since most illnesses get better
(or worse) over time regardless of the medication. In other
words, there is an alternative explanation to that of the effectiveness of the medication: the interpretation that the disease
is self-limiting. The most certain way to tell whether the
medication was effective would be if there were two identical
groups of sick people only one of which received the medication.
If, after a period of time, it were to turn out that the members
of the group receiving the medication were more nearly free of the
illness than members of the other groups, the physician could then
reasonably conclude that the medication was effective.
The situation becomes even more dificult when one evaluates
the talk-therapies (counseling, psychoanalysis, dynamic psychiatry, the work of clinical psychologists, caseworkers, marriage
counselors, etc.). The problem of evaluating a medication continues since many psychological problems also get better or worse
over time regardless of therapy. Thus, when the therapist feels
that she or he has been helpful, there is another reasonable
interpretation: that the person in therapy would have been just
as well off without having had it. The talk-therapist, therefore,
almost always needs the experimental-control-random-assignmentgroup approach in order to determine his or her effectiveness.
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However, evaluation of the talk-therapies encounters a further
obstacle that is uncommon among physicians. The obstacle is that
it is very difficult to estimate which of the identical groups is
better or worse off after a period of being helped.*
For one thing, anxiety may have declined in the group being
helped--but a realistic analysis of the situations of those helped
may reveal that they should have remained as anxious as they initially were. A person in great danger is not helped by becoming
complacent. Further, the problems of group members being helped
may simply have been displaced by different problems. If a
therapist helps clients to become less anxious and the anxiety is
succeeded by depression, it is difficult to know whether the helping has left those helped better off or worse off. Finally,
judgements concerning the problems of people who go to talk
therapists are notoriously of doubtful validity.
Consider, for example, the study reported by Robert J. Stoller
and Robert H. Geertsma ("The Consistency of Psychiatrists' Clinical Judgements," The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol.
137, #1, July, 1963, pp. 58-66.)
This study had 27 psychiatrists watch a half hour film of a
third year medical student talking with a patient. They were all
psychiatric faculty in the UCLA School of Medicine and were trying
to create a criterion for use in examinations within the School.
The film was such that they could see the patient from the perspective of the interviewer.
In rating 565 statements concerning the patient on a scale of
0 to 5, their inter-rater agreement (correlation coefficient) was
only 0.37. The authors summed up the results as follows:

*However, physicians are not completely without difficulties in
this area. See e.g., Phillip L. Rossman, "Organic Diseases
Simulating Functional Disorder," in GP (Published by the American
Academy of General Practice), Vol. 28, #2, August, 1963, pp. 7883. Dr. Rossman, (of Los Angeles), reported on 115 patients who
had symptoms common to both organic and psychiatric illnesses and
who were referred for psychiatric treatment although it later
turned out that their diseases were organic.
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"psychiatrist-experts were unable to agree as to a
patient's diagnosis, prognosis, psychodynamics, causes
of her problem, the feeling she was consciously experiencing, or the feelings that were latent (unconscious)." (P. 64)
A number of other studies have produced results consistent
with this outcome.
For example, someone interested may examine Chapman, L. and
Chapman, J., "The Genesis of Popular but Erroneous Psychodiagnostic Observations," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1967, 72, 193204. Perhaps the classical discussion of how this comes about was
published in 1949 by Gustav Icheiser ("Misunderstanding in Human
Relations: A Study in False Social Perception", The Journal of
Sociology, Vol. LV, #2, September, 1949; Part 2,pp. 1-70.) See,
especially, page 25 and 46-47. A more recent summary of research
concerning this criterion problem can be found in Michael J. Lambert, et. al., "Therapist-Induced Deterioration in Psychotherapy,"
pp. 452-481 in Alan S. Gurman and Andrew M. Razun, Effective Psychotherapy, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1977.
In a section entitled "The
Criterion Problem," the authors generalize as follows:
"Except for disorders of organic etiology and the distinction between psychosis and neurosis, the standard
diagnostic classifications have provided low reliability."
(P. 475)
If clinicians cannot agree on all these things, then a great proportion of their judgements must be invalid. How, then, can we
use the judgement of clinicians or of clinically related researchers as to the status of those having been subjected to helping
efforts by talk-therapists? This problem has rendered doubtful
the interpretations of most outcomes of the hundreds of effectiveness studies of talk-therapies.
What, then, is left?
Is there an outcome criterion which is
valid? There remains, most convincingly, the criterion of relative mortality. If the helping helps people to live longer, then
we can conclude (at least for most people, but not counting such
exceptions as George Orwell and George Bernard Shaw) that the help
has been effective.
It is for that reason that I have selected in evaluating talk
therapies only and all random assignment-experimental-control
studies in which the outcome criterion is mortality. Because very
little competent medical research concerning effectiveness falls
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outside mortality studies, except in such areas as the introduction of drugs, I have also used mortality as a criterion in
evaluating medical practice. There are very few such studies.
The following are representative of those few.

First Effectiveness Studies
Beginning in October, 1966, and ending in October, 1969, a
group of English physicians conducted a random-assignmentexperimental-control-experimentation of the outcomes of homes as
compared with hospital intensive care treatment for a group of men
under 70 years of age who experienced acute myocardial infarction
(heart attacks). See H. G. Mather, et al., "Acute Myocardial Infarction: Home and Hosital Treatment," British Medical Journal,
August 7, 1971, pp. 334-338).
During those three years, 343 cases were allocated at random
either to (a) home care with a family, or (b) hospital treatment
initially in an intensive care unit. The patients given hospital
treatment were usually assigned to intensive care units for a
minimum of 48 hours and otherwise cared for in the adjacent medical ward.
Of 169 patients randomly assigned to hospital care, 12 (7.1%)
died within seven days. Of 174 patients randomly assigned to home
care, 5 (2.9%) died within seven days. During the time between
eight and twenty-eight days after treatment began there were no
differences between the two groups in number of deaths.
These figures probably substantially underestimate the advantage of home care since an unknown number of patients who
transferred during the experiment from home to hospital care were
counted as having received home care when the data were analyzed.
Such a category decision presumably related to an assumption by
the researchers that patients were transferred from home to hospital care because they had become disproportionately ill at home.
I have discovered only one empirical analysis which sheds
light on whether that plausible assumption is, in fact, correct.
In a similar experimental-control-group-random-assignment study
comparing (a) only medical treatment with (b) coronary bypass surgery, Murphy, et al. found no survival advantage to the surgery.
(See Marvin L. Murphy, et al., "Treatment of Chronic Stable Angina", New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 297, #12, September 23,
1977, pp. 621-627.)
In the Murphy, et al. study, as in the
Mather, et al., one, there were cross-overs from medical treatment
to the experimental one and initial assumption of the exceptional
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illness of those who crossed-over. The authors, however, when
they examined the cross-overs, were unable to discover that they
differed from those who remained in the medical treatment group.
(P 625) If that were also to hold for the Mather, et al., study,
those who crossed-over to hospital care should not have been classified in data anlaysis as belonging to the home care category.
(The cross-over group resembled the hospital group, not the home
care group, in mortality rate.)
If we take that Mather, et al.,
mistake into account, it becomes clear that, in the Mather, et
al., study, a patient randomly assigned to hospital care was substantially more than twice as likely to die within one week than
would have been the case had he stayed at home.*
The Mather, et al., studyt gave rise to a vigorous discussion
among English physicians of the relative merits of home versus
hospital care. That study had been attacked as unethical at its
inception and was not generally accepted by "the medical community" after being published. The most common criticism was that
only a little over 28 percent of the population of the study was
randomized.
In the remaining cases, it was not possible for both
physician and patient to agree to the randomized treatment.
A follow-up report was published by Mather, et al., in 1976.
(Mather, H.G., et al., "Myocardial Infarction: A-Comparison
between Home and Hospital Care for Patients" British Medical Journal, 1976, 1, 925-929). This paper added that after 300 days 20
percent of those receiving home treatment and 27% of those receiving hospital treatment had died.
In order to get further data, David Hill and associates
received a Department of Health and Social Security support grant
to make a randomized study of home and hospital care. This effort
began in 1973. The outcome was published in Lancet in 1978 (Hill,
J.D., et al., "A Randomized trial of home-versus-hospital
*In 1971, Reuel A. Stallones reported that he and Robert Buechley
"in analyzing mortality statistics from the states of the United
States, found a strong positive correlation between the physicianpopulation ratio and coronary disease." (Environment. Ecology,
and Epidemiology, Pan American Health Organization Scientific
Publication, No. 231, p. 9). Of course, no correlation demonstrates causation, but it may eventually turn out that part of
such a relationship results from the greater prevalence of hospital care where physicians are concentrated.
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management for patients with suspected myocardial infarctions",
Lancet, I, 837).
In this study, 76 percent of the patients were
randomized into the study, thus warding off in it the most common
criticism of the Mather, et al., study.
Hill and his colleagues reported that, after six weeks, the
morality from home care was 20%, that from hospital care, 18%. (I
have not yet re-analyzed these data and do not know what the outcome of such a re-analysis would be.)
There have been no other home-versus-hospital studies done
relating mortality to myocardial infarction which meet my
criteria.
One indication of the orientation of the medical profession in
England was the recommendation in 1975 that the number of coronary
care units in hospitals be rapidly increased. (See Report of
Joint Committee of British Cardiological Society and Royal College
of Physicians, "The Care of the Patient with Coronary Heart Disease," Journal of the Royal College of Physicians, 1975, 10, 5).
The nature of the controversy in England may be reflected in
the fact that many of the older physicians tended to prefer home
care. Young physicians tended not to, perhaps because of possible
recriminations if patients died unexpectedly. (See Aubrey Colling, Coronary Care in the Community, London: Croom Helm, 1977, p.
173).
Although the outcomes of these studies were available to
physicians throughout the world, they appear to have had no other
impact on publication, practice, or research, In the Soviet
Union, organization to ensure early hospitalization was the ideal
and, in the single recent book which has been translated into English, there are no references to home care or to the Mather, et
al., and Hill, et al., studies in spite of a huge bibliography.
(ee E. I. Chazov, Ed., Myocardial Infarction: The Approach to
Prevention, Diagnosis and Treatment in the Soviet Union, Littleton, Mass.: PSG, 1979).
The situation was similar in North America. For example, in a
standard text, Emanual Goldberger wrote, "All patients with an
acute myocardial infarction or suspected myocardial infarction
should be admitted to a coronary care unit (CCU)."
(Treatment of
Cardiac Emergencies, St. Louis: C.W. Mosby, 1977, 2nd Edition)
There is also no mention of home care in the many other similar
recent books which I have consulted. A recent bibliography on
home care supported by the United States Department of Health,
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Education and Welfare (The Franklin Research Center: Home Health
Care Programs: A Selected Bibliography. Hyattsville, MD, U.S.
Department of HEW, 1979) contains no references to heart attacks
or myocardial infarctions--or to the English evaluation studies.
However, a group sponsored by the World Health Organization (A
Working Group for the World Health Organization: Coronary Care
Outside Big Centers, Copenhagen, Regional Office for Europe,
1975), has a short section entitled "Care of the patient at home"
(p. 8) which considers the possible utility of home care, especially for people distant from hospitals.
One could anticipate the reactions to the Mather-Hill studies
In England, where there
by extrapolating from current practice.
is substantial home care, the outcomes reported are nonjudgemental.
Mather, et al., did not make note of differences within the
first week after the attack, but drew conclusions based on a later
time when the differences were less striking. Where there is no
legitimated practice of home care (as in the Soviet Union and the
United States) the evaluation research has been mostly ignored.
The criticisms by cardiologists of the Mather-Hill studies
tend to be ignorant of the nature and uses of evaluative research.
Some go further to mis-report data.
That these failures of solid research to be utilized are not
unprecedented can be illustrated by reference to a famous occurrence from the history of medicine.

Second Effectiveness Study
In the mid-Nineteenth Century, the lying-in department of the
General Hospital in Vienna was one of the greatest of its kind in
Europe. It had been divided into two separate clinics in 1833.
When women in labor came in to deliver their babies, if they came
at one time of the week they were assigned to the first clinic, at
another time they went to the second clinic. Thus, unintentionally, women were randomly assigned to one or another of the two
clinics.
Beginning in 1840, the first clinic was made available for the
instruction of medical students only; the second clinic was available to midwife students only. Thus, different treatments had
been assigned for each of the two roughly identical groups of
women.
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With this arrangement, the mortality rate of the first clinic
suddenly rose to more than double that of the second clinic and
remained far higher in subsequent years. Women became aware of
this difference and many sought, unsuccessfully, to be admitted,
against the rules, to the second clinic.
The deaths were from puerperal fever (childbed fever), a disease which, in 1846, resulted in the deaths of 11.44% of the women
in the first clinic, but only 2.7% of the women in the second
clinic.
Ignac Semmelweis*, a physician and surgeon who was in charge
of the first clinic, realized that the difference in mortality
rates had something to do with the differences between the clinics
and tried to figure out what was the cause.
Semmelweis noted that the doctors, some assistants, and some
medical students in the first clinic dissected the cadavers of
women who had died and then examined the patients who remained
alive. This sequence of events did not occur in the second
clinic. He concluded in 1847 that the difference between the two
clinics in mortality rates was caused by those who first dissected
cadavers and then conducted manual examinations of the women in
labor.
Semmelweis, therefore, put into effect a rule that all who
examined women would first thoroughly clean their hands in a chlorine wash. The death rate in the first clinic promptly dropped to
approximately that in the second. Through analysis of statistical
trends, clinical and anatomical, and even animal, studies, Semmelweis provided adequate evidence for his causal hypothesis and for
the effectiveness of his treatment.
He thereby had become the first person to demonstrate the efficacy of antisepsis in medicine, a discovery which governs surgical practice to this day.
*Semmelweis had taken his medical training in what was then the
leading medical school in the world, in Vienna. Among many
sources, the reader can consult Frank Slaughter's Immortal Maqyar:
Semmelweis, Conqueror of Childbed Fever, New York:
Schuman, 150;
or Gy. Gartvay and I. Zoltan, Semmelweis: His Life and Work,
Budapest: Akademicial Kiado, 1968.
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However, his work was either ignored or attacked. By 1859,
more than a decade after his discovery had been demonstrated, his
reports were largely forgotten or had excited very little interest
in Europe and the United States, all places in which childbed
fever was frequently epidemic.
He could not even get his writings
published in most of the important medical journals of his time.
With few exceptions, all the great obstetrical authorities had
rejected his ideas. When he pubished his major opus on the subject in October, 1861, the resulting reviews were mostly hostile.
About three decades after Semmelweis's discovery, Pasteur announced the identity of the bacteria which caused puerperal fever.
Only following that announcement, with Sermnelweis dead and his
work mostly unknown, dismissed, and distorted, did his method of
averting childbed fever gradually win general acceptance. (He had
also used antisepsis in surgery before its "discovery" by Lister.)
Semmelweis had suffered greatly from the rejection of his
brilliant, tenacious, ingenious, and crucially important research.
He died in 1865, mad.
These illustrations of the reception of effectiveness research
are not generalizable only within the profession of medicine. Our
next illustration is from a different helping profession.

Third Effectiveness Study
With the cooperation of thirteen selected social and health
agencies, 164 older people in need of protective services were
randomly assigned to receive, or not to receive, casework assistance during the year June, 1964, through May, 1965, at the Benjamin Rose Institute in Cleveland. The project director for this
effectiveness study was Dr. Margaret Blenkner, professor and director of the Regional Institute of Social Welfare Research, the
Uiversity of Georgia School of Social Work. Dr. Blenkner was nationally recognized in this area of research, having published
eighteen studies prior to the final report on this one.
Four caseworkers provided help to those in the experimental
group. Their average caseload was about 19 clients each. "All
held master's degrees in social work and one had an additional
third year of graduate social work training: all had more than
fifteen years of experience." (See Blenkner, M.; Bloom, M. and
Nielsen, M., "A Research and Demonstration Project of Protective
Service", Social Casework, Vol. 52, Oct., 1971, pp. 483-499.
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The research team followed up the clients in the two groups
year by year for four years after their original registration in
the project. They accumulated data on comparative survival.
At the end of the first year, they found that, in the experimental group, 19 out of 76 clients had died (25%).
In the
control group, 16 out of 88 had died (18%).
Thus, those who
received intensive casework help were much more likely to have
died than those who did not receive such help. Analysis of the
data demonstrated that caseworkers had tended to institutionalize
their clients and that the difference in institutionalization accounted for the entire difference.
By the end of the fourth year, however, the picture had
changed significantly. By then, 48 out of 76 in the experimental
group had died (63%) and 46 of 88 in the control group (52%).
In
other words, the clients in the experimental group had continued
to die at a greater rate than had the clients who had received no
special intensive help. However, the difference at the end of the
fourth year was maintained entirely by noninstitutionalized
clients. Institutionalization made no difference at the end of
that length of time. (The differences in absolute numbers reflect
the fact that 43 clients had crossed over into institutions during
(For these and other
the final three years of the analysis.)
data, see Margaret Blenkner, Martin Bloom, Margaret Nielson, and
Ruth Weber, Final Report: Protective Services for Older People,
Cleveland: The Benjamin Rose Institute, 1974.)
Although there had been several previous studies relating help
to mortality in casework and allied professions, all consistent
with it in outcome, the Blenkner, et al., study was followed by no
further such research. There was no subsequent publicized discussion except for that aroused by later publications by Joel Fischer, and I have no evidence that this and previous similar
studies affected casework practice.*

*1 anticipate that Margaret Blenkner, who died in 1973, will become the greatest heroine of social workers since Jane Addams.
There are no candidate heroes of social workers.

Discussion
The outcomes of these three studies reflect the limited
population of effectiveness research in the helping professions
which meets my criteria. No study demonstrated that helping increases life span, although a few allowed for the possibility that
life span was unaffected.
The lack of utilization of the research was also typical.
studies have tended to be ignored and distorted.

the

A striking illustration of the latter can be found in
Katherine M. Wood's comforting report, "Casework Effectiveness: a
new look at the research evidence" (Social Work, Vol. 23, #6,
November, 1978, pp. 437-458). Wood entirely ignored the Blenkner,
et al., analysis of noninstitutionalized clients, although it had
been prominently published in two places and reported in publications by Joel Fischer, all sources of which Wood was cognizant.
Fischer is the only person to have published a fair (althoughsuperficial) account of the Blenkner et al., research. Typically,
Fischer's account led to an acrimonious, but unenlightened, set of
reactions from social workers. Wood's distorted discussion in
Social Work was followed by a single published letter applauding
her "definitive" article and maintaining that "we have since moved
past the question of whether or not direct social work is effective. The new and urgent question is how we can make this practice more effective." And, "It is a wonderful thing to be a social worker in this age..." (Social Work, September, 1979, p.
441.)
Given the reception of these studies, we may inquire next
whether these effectiveness studies are significant enough to warrant attention. Let us consider them one by one.
The figures, of course, are small, and may not be widely
generalizable. However, the significance results from the possibility that they are.
If we extrapolate from the Mather, et al., study to the United
States, a change to home care, using the most conservative set of
assumptions, would save more than eleven thousand lives annually
during the first seven days following a heart attack. The saving
in cost would be enormous.
There are no data which can lead us to estimate the number of
lives which could have been saved had Semmelweis found a different
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reception to his work. But the number of women dying during
childbed fever epidemics sometimes reached 100 percent--and this
in major hospitals throughout the western world.
The Blenkner, et a]., study, generalized, would lead us to the
conclusion that, of every 31 clients, five would be unnecessarily
dead at the end of four years. That is, each worker with such a
caseload would have killed, on an average, at least one client a
year. Not even the average Sicilian Mafia member manages to affect mortality that much.
If there were protective service workers adequate for the population in need of it (using Blenkner's
estimate), the resulting loss of life through casework would exceed 40,000 a year. Of course, we do not know the population to
which the Blenkner, et al., research can be extrapolated. Conceivably it could be the entire population of casework clients-there is no evidence to the contrary.
Assuming that these studies and the responses to them are representative and that they are significant, is it possible that
they have not been given attention because they are simpy inexplicable and to be regarded as anomalous phenomena unworthy of
further attention?
Certainly the history of the Semmelweis discovery demonstrates
its explicability and the value of taking it seriously, even
though Semmelweis, himself, had been unable to demonstrate the
underlying mechanisms of infection. Let us, therefore, next consider Mather, et al., and Blenkner, et al.
There has been substantial research supporting the conclusion
that relocation of ill elderly people increases their mortality
soon after relocation. (See, e.g., I. Wittels and J. Bilwinick,
"Survival in Relocation," Journal ofGerontoloqy, 29, 440-443,
1974). This research, contrary to the Blenkner, et al. opinion
(but consistent with their data) demonstrate that it is not being
in institutions, but becoming institutionalized, which results in
higher mortality rates. Further, the patients taken to hospitals
in the Mather, et al., study, were both ill and being relocated,
and it was the older patients who disproportionately died in
hospitals compared to homes.

Second, the studies are similar in that heart attack was the
only cause of death in the one and allegedly the main cause of
death (according to death certificates) in the other.*
Further, deaths in the Blenkner, et al., study occurred
primarily in hospitals (47%) or other institutions (38%) in which
iatrogenic illness is a considerable possibility.
Let me briefly
elaborate.
In 1981, Steel, et al., published the latest in a long series
of studies of iatrogenic illness which have been conducted in many
places by many research groups.
(See "latrogenic Illness on a
General Medical Service at a University Hospital," New England
Journal of Medicine, March 12, 1981, 304:
638-642.)
In this
study, 36 percent of 815 consecutive hospital patients on a
general medical service were conservatively estimated to have an
iatrogenic (hospital-acquired) illness.
In two percent of the 815
patients, the iatrogenic illness was believed to contribute to the
death of the patient.
That great an incidence of iatrogenicrelated death would wipe out about half of the mortality difference in the Mather, et al., study (although one should regard
such comparisons with caution.)
However, it would account for
less of the difference observed in the Blenkner, et al., study
even if caseworker intervention made it more likely that clients
would go to such places (as seems evident from the data).
Further, it is likely that the Steel, et al., study underreported iatrogenic deaths since it apparently did not take into
account the possibility of psychogenic deaths. For example,
Jarvinen ("Can Ward Rounds Be a Danger to Patients with Myocardial
Infarction?", British Medical Journal, February 5, 1955, pp. 318320) reported five people who died during ward rounds in a short
time at a Helsinki University Hospital and an additional patient
who died shortly after an attack which began during ward rounds.
If deaths had occurred at an expected rate, given the time spent

*One must, however, regard such death certificate figures as very
uncertain in view of diagnostic problems.
For example, Marizama,
Danber and Kennel (in National Cancer Institute Monographs, 19:
405, 1966) looked at 1,362 death certificates coded as cardiovascular.
They found that in only 12% of cases was the diagnosis
"well-established," in an additional 40% was the diagnosis "reasonable," and in 48% of the cases the diagnosis was "probably incorrect" or "better replaced by another diagnosis."
The debate
continues in the medical journals.
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on ward rounds, only one, or at most two, deaths would have occurred then. ("Two deaths occurred when the patients were told
that the time for their discharge, so eagerly awaited, had come.")
A recent study indicates that even nonaffective speech, very
likely disproportionately to occur in the experimental groups of
the Mather-Blenkner-et al., studies, might increase the possibility of death from heart attacks.
James J. Lynch, et al., ("The Effects of Talking on the Blood
Pressure of Hypertensive Individuals," Psychomatic Medicine,
Vol.43, #1, February, 1981, pp. 24-33) studied the blood pressure
of 30 hypertensive and 15 normotensive people before, during, and
after they talked for two minutes in response to the suggestion,
"tell me about your work." All subjects showed increased blood
pressure while talking. "The patients with the higher pressure
tended to have the greater increase in blood pressure during talking." One patient went "from a pressure of 157/86 while sitting
quiet up to 200/120 while speaking and immediately down to 174/88
in the first resting quiet minute after talking."
It is certainly likely that more intensive help is accompanied
by more talk.
Possible explanations could be multiplied. For example, it
may be that, in the two studies, experimental treatment resulted
in an imposition of standards and norms on those being helped
which were alien and degrading to them, more so than in Instances
of less intensive help.
But one mystery remains. How is it possible that the
Blenkner, et al., clients began to succumb so greatly in the experimental group years after the experiment was over? Is that not
inconceivable? Not at all. We can suppose that various subsequent helpers became aware of whether those helped had or had not
been in the experimental group and differentially treated them
(possibly with more intensively mobilized help for those who had
been members of the experimental group) on that basis.
Although these are only possible explanations for the outcomes
of the effectiveness studies, they do illustrate the fact that the
study outcomes cannot be considered worth rejection or being ignored as beyond comprehension.
If the studies are representative, significant and comprehensible, how then can we explain the contrast between the studies
and their utilization?
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What May be Going On
A long time period between a discovery or invention and its
adoption is not unknown. The cotton picker was invented in 1889,
yet it was fifty-nine years before it became an innovation in
1948, long after the death of the inventor and during a time of
labor shortage.
(Keith Norris and John Vaizey, The Economics of
Research and Technology, London:
Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1973, p.
77).
In the field of geology, the continental drift theory was
proposed more than fifty years ago and generally accepted just
recently. (See Seymour H. Mauskopf, Ed., The Reception of Unconventional Science, Washington, D.C.:
1979.)
In this instance,
acceptance awaited an adequate explanation for the phenomenon (as
was also the case with Semmelweis).
The literature does not account in any detail for variations
in acceptance, although numerous cases of resistance to discovery
have been published. (Anthony M. Graziano, "Clinical Innovation
and the Mental Health Power Structure: A Social Case History,"
American Psychologist, Vol. 24, #1, January, 1969, pp. 10-18;
Genevieve Miller, The Adoption of Innoculation for Smallpox in
England and France, Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1957; Bernard Barber, "Resistance to Scientific Discovery,"
Science, Vol. 134, No. 3479, September, 1961, pp. 596-602; A.J.
Dessler, "Swedish Iconoclast Recognized After Many Years of Rejection and Obscurity," Science, Vol. 170, #3958, 6 November, 1970,
pp. 604-606); Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979; Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Edition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970; Levine, Why Innovation
Fails, Albany, New York:
State University of New York Press,
1980; and innumerable accounts of the resistance to technological
innovation in traditional societies.)
My impression, based on examining the huge relevant literature, is that its main thrust concerning our question can be indicated by observations of three famous people and one who continues
not to be well known:
1. Walter Bagehot: "One of the greatest
nature is the pain of a new idea."
2. Niccolo Machiavelli:
"The innovator
all those who prospered unde the old
lukewarm support is forthcoming from
prosper under the new."
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pains to human
makes enemies of
order, and only
those who would

3. Oliver Heaviside (when his important contributions to
mathematical physics had been ignored for 25 years):
"Even men who are not Cambridge mathematicians deserve
justice."
4. T.H. Huxley:
"Authorities, 'disciples,' and 'schools'
are the curse of science and do more to interfere with
the work of the scientific spirit than all its enemies."
To generalize, a discovery is more likely to be accepted if it
does not violate basic assumptions and/or interests of those
who become acquainted with it, if they perceive there to be an
advantage for them from accepting or adopting it, and if it is
explainable to those who become acquainted with it.
The effectiveness studies in the population meeting my
criteria can be regarded, therefore, as discoveries which are unlikely quickly to be utilized in spite of their relevance to the
life spans of millions of people and to annual expenditures of
hundreds of billions of dollars.
Can anything be done about this paradox?

Some Things Which Might Be Considered for Eventual Trial
I make two recommendations as follows:
I. One might be able to affect the perceptions, and thereby
eventually the practices, of helpers.
It is characteristic that helpers and those who make helping policy are seldom informed by the perception of other
groups relevant to the helping.
Consider Semmelweis. When he discovered that the death
rate in the first clinic was several times that in the
second, he need not have looked for the cause of childbed
fever. He could instead, have tried to have the hospital
closed down (since he knew that women giving birth in the
gutters were safer than were women giving birth in his
clinic.)
He could have changed the hospital so that the
two clinics were the same--most easily by beginning also to
teach only midwives in the first clinic. This change would
immediately have resolved the problem. He could have deployed midwives and midwife students throughout the neighborhoods, taking into his clinic only women with complications so grave that their chance of living would be greater
in his clinic than outside it.

-652-

He apparently conceived of none of these solutions although
we can suppose that the women patients wanted some such
alternative and that midwives would have been receptive to
it. Truly, every way of seeing is also a way of not
seeing! And professions and disciplines provide ways of
seeing.*
If, today, we wish not to inform the public of the implications of presently known and possible future effectiveness
research concerning the helping professions, an alternative
which may yet become necessary, then we might begin by providing that "outside" perspectives become vividly and interminably available to those who are important in the formation of
helping policy and related research, education, and funding.
For example, it may be possible to ensure that representatives
of organizations of consumers of health and other helping services be included in the decision-making processes of the
helping professions. Others who should be "counted in" include chairpersons of legislative committees which are central
to funding helping enterprises and key members of their
staffs, directors of relevant foundations, leading epidemiologists, public health professionals, public health nurses,
sociologists of the helping professions, philosophers of
science, historians of organized helping, and so forth.
My second and final recommendation is so complex that I will
only sketch it here, leaving a systematic presentation for some
future time.
It is as follows:
The unfortunate fate of effectiveness research concerning
the helping professions is increasingly likely as time goes
on as it is a reflection of broad and accelerating tendencies within U.S. society. We should, therefore, look outside the helping professions if we wish to ensure their
increasing cost-effectiveness.

*A fact abundantly illustrated, but inadequately researched. That
socialization and the resulting perceptions are helped along by
supporting institutional arrangments may be indicated by the fact
that the UCLA Biomedical Library possesses no copy of Ivan
Illich's famous critique of medicine, Medical Nemesis (New York:
Pantheon,
1976) but two copies of David F.Horrobin's Medical
Hubris: A Reply to Ivan Illich (Montreal: Edan, 1977T
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Let me unpack this notion a little.
Especially in this century there has been the gathering
momentum of large bureaucratic organizations and the consequent incorporation of people into them from early years
until the end of life. As David Riesman argued in The
Lonely Crowd (The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing
American Character, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1950; Abridged Edition, 1965), (although with an
explanation different from mine) this has resulted in a
transformation of human nature in the United States. As
compared to now, a higher proportion of Americans in 1900
were value-oriented: directed by fundamental assumptions
of what was right, good, true, and so forth. Now, a higher
proportion of Americans are situation-oriented: not directed primarily by standards arising independently of the
circumstances of their adult lives.
Students in colleges and universities have spent nearly
their entire lives moving from structured situation to different structured situation within a single general context, in each situation changing to meet the expectations
of those around them. After graduation, they usually continue to be situation-oriented for the remainder of their
lives. The structures of science, research, and higher
education have likewise shifted from entrepreneurship alone
or in small groups and organizations in the direction of
large organizations. The general drift of social change,
resulting in a concommitant shift in human nature, is also
reflected in science, research, technology, higher education, and so forth. This change has also shifted the
incentive system for intellectual and scientific work.
Publication in intellectual and scientific sources is almost entirely for advancement in large organizations
(universities included), and not an outgrowth of a search
for truth or understanding. Within the helping professions, publications has also been for career advancement
rather than for most cost-effective help for those in need.
As publication has gone, so has gone the rest of the lives
of researchers and helpers. One needs only to display presumed brilliance to those who can affect one's career, one
need not be brilliant at all.
(Being brilliant would get
embarassing within organizations which tolerate only
mediocrity.) People who may be described as 'fits' move
up; misfits move out and down or remain where they are.
And value-oriented people are always misfits.
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The history of fundamental discoveries and innovations is
instructive in exhibiting the kinds of person who are likely to make such contributions:
1. Persons with an understanding of reasoning (usually
as it occurs in science);
2. Persons in marginal roles;
3. Persons engaged in some kind of practice; and
4. Value-oriented people
The best single introduction to that history has been provided
by Joseph Ben-David ("Roles and Innovations in Medicine," The
American Journal of Socioloqy, Vol. LXIV, #6, May 1960, pp. 557568.)
Considerable marginality. Marginal people tend disproportionately to develop tuberculosis, schizophrenia, alcoholism, to become accident victims, to commit suicide, to
die early, to be poor, but, also, marginal people disproportionately are creative, initiators of new ideas and
practices, become eminent men and women of science and
philosophy, and understand (without necessarily prospering
from) the social world which they inhabit.
The rise of people who are situationally oriented has, in
the arenas of intellect and science, resulted in increasing
numbers of "gesture people"--people who intimate enough to
succeed without ever having to accomplish anything worthwhile. Such people produce ideas or knowledge only when
under surveillance--and the surveillance has to be omnipresent and searching and competent if they are ever to
amount to much. They move from situation to situation
chamelon-like. Lacking continuity of concern with any
basic problem, they lack the promise of such concern and,
hence, cannot accomplish things which require a long time
perspective and tenacity. Despite the enormous increase in
the number of scientists, researchers, academics, and members of related disciplines, professions, and authors of
associated publications, there has emerged what must be
described as pervasive pathological science. (See, for
example, Felix Franks' Polywater, Cambridge, Mass.: The
MIT Press, 1981.)
That the situation in science was not perfect even in Max
Weber's time can be inferred from his Science as a Vocation, addressed to students, in which he wrote: "Do you in
all conscience believe that you can stand seeing mediocrity
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after mediocrity, year after year, climb beyond you, without becoming embittered and without coming to grief?"
(Quoted in Warren 0. Haggstrom, The Scientific Community
N.Y.: Basic Books, 1965). For a contrary contented view
of the state of affairs in science, one might consult "The
Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir" by Robert K.
Merton (pp. 3-141 in Merton and Jerry Gaston, Eds., The
Sociology of Science in Europe, Carbondale, Ill.: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1977.) Merton reports a world
which is belied by the relevant data and which I have never
observed, although if one remembers very selectively and
from the perspective of the science establishment one may
be able to write such a utopian memoir. The appearance of
knowledge races on. Knowledge limps far behind. And virtually no one is engaged in trying to distinguish the two.
Intellectual production has come to mean throwing a few
diamonds into a great pile of paste imitations with no
jeweler available subsequently to sort things out. Since
large organizations are usually stable, the perspectives
attached to them also tend to remain stable. Situationally
oriented people may remain in a single organization-related
assumptive world for all their lives. As Felix Franks suggested in a different context, had such an approach been
taken "in the very early days of technical development, we
would now possess the most superior stone axes but little
else." (Ibid., p. 188).
Thus, situation oriented people change from context to context
within stable limits--they lose both the benefit of continuity in
working on a single set of problems and they also lost the benefits of being likely to acquire original ways of seeing.
Those who move up tend to be situation-oriented people who
have disproportionately acquired interpersonal skills, who proclaim, but shudder at realizing, such values as creativity, since
realizing them would interfere with their plausibility and safety
in the minds of those above them. And these plausible people
themselves end up as gatekeepers to decisions concerning resource
and incentive allocation. Value-oriented people, typically implausible, are ignored or punished. The fits make good entertainers, may tell interesting anecdotes lifted from others, are
skilled at the character assassination of rivals in such a way
that their tactics don't bounce back on them, and are basically
always conforming and conventional except, maybe, in superficial
symbolic matters.
These situation-oriented successful people scorn such valueoriented questions as:
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What do you mean by that?
How do you know that?
Why is that important?
What fundamentally new is to be done?
in favor of such questions as:
Where will that get you?
What's in it for me?
What can I get away with?
Why not be successful?
Within the helping professions, value-oriented people are concerned primarily effectively to meet needs; situation-oriented
people are primarily self-concerned. This difference is reflected
in the history of the helping professions as it has developed
since the beginning of this century.
The preponderance of types today (and the view of that in the
minority) may be indicated by Graham Hughes' cynical statement
that: "One cannot throw off moral obligations by entering a profession," and his observations concerning people whose only talent
is a talent for suffocating talent.
With this brief introduction in mind concerning what I conceive to be the problem, I will now venture some modest specific
recommendations:
1. Develop a marginal discipline for a certain kind of marginal person: selection, education, and support for valueoriented people who want to work on some important problem
over long periods of time and who choose to do so in relating to all available relevant knowledge from all fields,
experiments, and experiences. They would be complete
generalists. They would follow Norbert Wiener's advice:
"If a problem leads us into a new field in which we have no
It is no exknowledge, we should acquire such knowledge.
cuse, when working on a problem, to say 'but that's not my
field'." (Reported in J.C. Barker, Scared to Death, London: Muller, 1968.)
2. Build on the fact that competent researchers and scientists
increasingly circulate papers before publication. Move to
the next step of not publishing until there is some reason
to suppose that important published work can be separated
out from the rest for the use of people who need to base
their intellectual struggles on actual ideas and/or
knowledge. Help "vanity publications" to emerge in which
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people can pay to get their work in print.
tions would become vanity publications.)

(Most publica-

3. Systematically fund efforts to sift out from what has been
published that tiny portion which is important, including
that which can adequately be substantiated by reasons and
evidence. Reward those who originate important work, even
if it remains obscure, controversial, or baffling.
4. Require that university and other teachers label what they
teach as important knowledge or non-knowledge which is
important--and that they be required frequently to defend
their labels.
5. Drastically alter the criteria in accordance with which
research is now evaluated It is rare in the history of
science that any important advance has ben made by way of a
single application of a methodology. The question should
not be one of methodology application in one study, but one
of emerging important knowledge by way of a variety of
studies involving careful thinking and rigorous reasoning
carried out over a long period of time within a research
tradition. Thus, one should pay no attention to whether a
thousand ordinary studies lean in one direction. Ordinary
studies are invalid and unimportant and completely worthless except for career promotion. The recruitment of rigor
should be made both within and among research studies--they
are thinking and reasoning chains, they are never merely
additive.
6. Thomas Kuhn, having examined the history of science, has
concluded that the social sciences are not cumulative. It
is similarly doubtful that the helping professions have
made an overall progress for many decades. Even medicine,
the most prestigious of the lot, has, for more than a decade, given rise to comments from its leaders such as that
of Franz J. Ingelburger, Editor Emeritus of the New England
Journal of Medicine:
"If the whole spectrum of medical care is included,
ranging from a pat on the back to transplantation of
the heart, it is doubtful that the benefit-harm ratio
of personalized medical care has changed appreciably
over the last 100 years."
(Science, Vol. 200, 16 May,

1978, p. 946.)
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But how can there be progress without first paying attention to what that is actually known is important and relevant? Concerning most matters, given where we are, we now
have to legitimate the statement "we don't know," and reward those who frequently use it. With the resulting
release from the heavy pseudo-facticity of pseudoknowledge, the imagination will be unfettered. As people
become drawn into working on important problems, one can
try to design situations which they can enter and which are
I suggest the creation and
likely to advance their work.
institutionalization of carefully designed non-competitive
small discussion groups which meet at least weekly, and in
which all members who honestly try hard to contribute are
carefully respected. Progress, of course, will be messy,
disorderly, will veer back and forth, will leap forward at
some times and lag at others. But the participation of
serious, disciplined value-oriented people in such surroundings will provide the best chance for important progress to emerge. This suggestion indicates the distance we
have now gone from Kurt Lewin's important early study,
"Group Decision and Social Change," in Theodore M. Newcomb
and Eugene L. Hartley, Eds., Readings in Social Psychology,
New York: Henry Holt, 1947.
7. Select for advanced education value-oriented people characterized by wonder, imagination, tenacity, intellectual
courage, a willingness to look carefully at data which violate his or her assumptions, etc. Do not select on the
basis of grades, scores on the Graduate Record or other
examinations, reference letters which do not describe and
illustrate the above mentioned personal characteristics.
Advanced education, as anyone who has recently examined the
works mentioned in Dissertation Abstracts can attest,
should be reduced to a tiny proportion of the students now
involved in it.
8. The review process in journals, by funding sources, in employing organizations, now provides little more than
legitimation for fashionable prejudice. Particularly, initial plausibility unrelated to careful analysis should be
eschewed.
For example, suppose someone were to propose to study and
compare two groups in relation to the intelligence of their
members. One group would be composed of stupied people who
had recently received advanced degrees from Harvard, Yale,
Princeton, Cambridge University and Oxford in England. The
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other group would be composed of brilliant nonliterate peoI anticipate that
ple from England and the United States.
such a study would initially appear implausible enough not
to be well received by funding sources. Yet, since intelligence and formal education are not associated (although
IQ and formal education are), and since formal education is
associated with training people not to see, I imagine that
sustained attention to the possibility of such research
might well improve its chances.
9. Advertise in the public media (including television and
radio) for deviant young people willing to contribute with
hard work and thinking to the future of the people of our
society without the prospect of getting rich and/or famous.
Help promising residents into appropriate courses of
action.
10. Reduce reliance on measurement and counting as major
sources of decisions.
Abraham Maslow commented: "If the only tool you have is a
hanmmer, you tend to see every problem as a nail."
Operationalization has become a ready source of hammers
which get in the way of adequate perception. Counting and
measuring have been driving out thinking, have distracted
attention from significance, and have disadvantaged millions of people who have thereby become unfortunately
labelled.
11. The teaching of research in advanced programs should deemphasize design and methodology. These are trivia which
anyone can learn at any time. Instead, advanced students
should be taught how to become detectives for the resolutions of lacks of understanding and of fuzzynesses and the
evaluation of their significances. At present, students
get tools (tractor, cultivatorp fertilizer, combine, milking machine, etc.)--but they are not being taught how to
farm.
12. Effectiveness research should, for the most part, involve
random assignment. Such studies should be supported at far
higher levels than is now done. It is true that helpers
But conoften suppose that randomization is unethical.
sider. The National Association of Social Workers
published a summary of its Code of Ethics which includes
the statement: "The social worker's primary responsibility
Similar norms have been proclaimed in the
is to clients."
other helping professions. But, human suffering cannot be
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reduced by helping unless we know its outcome. Research
presently available gives poignancy to Thomas' statement
that: "Suffering is only marginally more tolerable when
inflicted with the best intentions." (The Role of
Medicine: Dream, Mirage, or Nemesis?, London: The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1976, p. 158.)
Instead
of a few sporadic ad hoc studies, evaluation research
should be systematic, thoughtful, continuously supported,
with knowledge from outcomes fed into the helping
processes.
13. We should examine certain kinds of nonevents with tenacious
care: things of consequence which reasonably could be expected to happen but didn't.
14. We should take a scientific approach to the evaluation of
these recommendations and assumptions related to them.

Conclusion
The term, 'iatrogenic,' came to be used in medicine by virtue
of the fact that 'iatros' is the Greek word for physician and
Igenesis' means origin. Thus, iatrogenic illness is taken to be
physician-originated illness. (This usage has been expanded somewhat in recent years.)
In this note, we have been concerned with helper-originated
harm. Since the modern Greek transliteration of 'helper' is
'voethos', I suggest that we refer to helper-originated harm as
voethogenic harm (of which iatrogenic disease is one variety).
The notion of voethogenic harm has not here been spelled out,
although it has been illustrated. In particular, the above examples lead to an emphasis of sins of commission, not those of
omission--even though the latter should make up a substantial part
of the whole. We will elsewhere explicate the range of applciations of this term.*
*This note has incorporated some reflections accompanying my study
of the thinking involved in helping.
This note, of course, is very preliminary, and will be extensively
revised at a later time, after my work has further progressed.
The last few pages are especially problematic. The note only reflects where I happened to be on one afternoon of August, 1981.
For contributinq to my research, I wish to express my appreciaton
to my wife, Raquel, who has taught me so much, and to my daughter,
Marni, who has been my sole relentless critic.
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ALIENATION AMONG SOCIAL SERVICE WORKERS
AND
INTEGRATION INTO THE SOCIAL SERVICES
by
John F. Longres
Professor of Social Work and Sociology
Portland State University

This study is concerned with objective alienation experienced
by social service workers. To help understand this phenomenon, a
Marxian sociological perspective will be used.
Marxian theory assumes that humans are self-conscious productive beings. Marxists believe that nothing is more natural than
those activities we call work, for it is only through creative
labor that humans demonstrate their full potential. Marxists also
assert that human productivity is social in nature in that it is
done in coordination with others. Thus, an analysis of the reasons why people might find themselves in dehumanizing work circumstances must begin with understanding the ways in which productive
activity is organized in a society. When work activities separate
people from their creative capacities, when people do not control
production and productive activities, it degrades their humanity.
This organized degradation may be referred to as alienation. Marx
concluded that 19th century capitalist social relations around the
means of production were alienating.
Alienation may be understood along an objective-subjective
continuum. "Objective alienation" refers to those conditions that
inhere in the organization of work that separate people from control over productive activity. "Subjective alienation" refers to
those feelings and attitudes that separation from control over
productive activity may engender in people. The two are related
but may vary independently of each other depending on a number of
social and psychological conditions.
The twentieth century witnessed an increase in occupational
categories whose relationship to production seemingly differed
from nineteenth century working class occupations. Some have concluded from this that "post industrial" society had created a
thriving middle class of unalienated labor (Wilensky, 1966; Bell,
1973). Others have argued that the duties and relationship to
production of many of these "white collar" occupations closely
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resembled that of the working class proletariat of which Marx
spoke (Mills, 1951; Braverman, 1974; Edward, 1979).
Social service occupations are among these new middle class
occupations. Especially among those with professional degrees,
one hears claims of being part of a professional cadre, governed
by collegiality, with a code of ethics and a unique knowledge base
that protects practice from administrative domination (Greenwood,
1958). However, there is little empirical evidence to support
this belief (Epstein and Conrad, 1968; Wagner and Cohen, 1978).
For anyone familiar with the conditions of work that prevail, it
would be difficult to conclude that work in the social services is
free of alienation.
RESEARCH CONCERNS
This study follows the path of a small number of sociologists
who attempted to test Marxian ideas using empirical methods
(Archibald, 1976; Wright and Perrone, 1977; Thompson, 1979). Until recently, the work of Seeman (1959) and Blauner (1964) represented the major attempts to apply a Marxian perspective in this
manner. Both, however, focused on the subjective aspects of
alienation. Blauner also emphasized the division of labor as a
function of technology, rather than social organization around the
means of production. Similarly, a study by Murdia (1979) of social service workers in India emphasized the subjective aspects of
their alienation and did not follow a Marxian approach.
The work of Braverman (1974) has particularly influenced this
study. Using qualitative methods, he focused on the objective
aspects of alienation. Thompson (nd), using data collected from
survey research, tested some of Braverman's ideas and in so doing
demonstrated the utility of such methods.
Thus, this study is concerned with objective alienation among
social service workers. Two types will be operationalized. "Societal alienation" will refer to those degrading work conditions
which derive from the conflict between the ideals of the welfare
state and the ideals of capitalism. Organizational alienation
will refer to those degrading conditions which derive from control
over the organization and delivery of service by capitalist ideals
and interests.
Two general hypotheses guide the study.
It is hypothesized
(1) that the closer social service workers find themselves to
situations which conform to the ideals of a capitalist economy,
the less they will experience societal and organizational alienation; and (2) that objective alienation will vary according to
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class position and to the status one has within the social
services.
METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE
A questionnaire was mailed to social service workers in a
large metropolitan area of the northwest United States. The sample was not random and no claims will be made as to the
generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, the sample is
large and representative of many who work in the social services.
The sample includes the entire membership of NASW in the area. An
accidental sample of MSW's not members of NASW is included. The
sample includes the universe of social service workers in Adult
and Family Services in the area and the universe of social service
workers of various branches within the Children's Services Division. Finally, an accidental sample of workers in the juvenile
court is included.
In all, some 1400 questionnaires were distributed. Of these,
518 usable questionnaires were returned by the date expected.
Some indication of the representativeness of these 518 can be
given. The same proportion of male to female NASW members is reflected in the usable as in the sent questionnaires. There appears to have been a significantly higher return rate among those
with an MSW and within NASW. Since it is being predicted that
those with greater status will experience less alienation, the
sample should underestimate the extent of alienating circumstances
among social service workers as a whole.
NASW members and private practitioners had questionnaires
mailed directly to their homes Questionnaires for public social
service workers were distributed at work. Permission was obtained
from agency heads with the agreement that respondents had the complete right to refuse to respond to any and all items.
The delicacy of many of the items on the questionnaire undoubtedly influenced the response rate, the responses given and
the willingness to respond to particular items. One area especially affected was that on information about the respondent.
Table 1 indicates a rather high no response to items that could
identify the respondent.
Consistent with the hypothesis that objective alienation will
vary as a function of integration into services, three types of
independent variables may be described: class, status and conformity to capitalist ideals. While these are not completely
separable, they are analytically distinct. Type of practice, private practice vs agency practice, may be thought of as a measure
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of social class since private practitioners, according to Marxian
theory, own and control the means of their service while agency
workers sell their labor power in the market. The measure is not
a pure one, however, for it includes those who work full-time and
part-time as private practitioners, with many of the latter also
working in agencies. Nevertheless, since this distinction is so
important in Marxian theory it is important to explore it. Status
or prestige differences may also be noted in the sample. A full
28% of the sample were men, some 55% had graduate degrees, 55%
were affiliated with at least one professional association (usually NASW), and almost 30% were ACSW. Likewise, 23.5% held administrative and supervisory positions, 11.4% were titled
"therapist" or "counselor," 20% held the lower level line worker
position of "social worker" and 30% held titles of "caseworker" or
"worker aide." Thus sex, educational attainment, professional
membership and job title may all be thought of as measures of status within the social services. The third type of independent
variable may be described as conformity with the ideals of
capitalism. Private agencies are more compatible with capitalist
ideals of "charity" than are public services which are more compatibe with socialist ideals of "right." Over 23% of the sample
worked in the private sector. Finally, unions pose a greater
threat to capitalism than do professional associations; 38.4% of
the sample were union members.
FINDINGS
A.

Societal Alienation

The concept of societal alienation derives from Marxian theory on the social services. Social services are seen as an arena
of class struggle with, on the one hand, social service workers
having to regulate and control recipients (Piven and Cloward,
1971) and, on the other, having to represent and respect the demands of recipients (Corrigan, 1977). The conflicts produced by
such a contradiction generate alienating conditions with which
service workers must contend.
To operationalize this concept, respondents were given a
series of descriptive phrases and were asked to indicate on a six
point Likert type scale the degree to which the phrases described
the conditions of their work.
It is important to note that they
were not asked to express sentiments or to express feelings of
alienation which would be more in keeping with an operationlization of subjective alienation. The phrases included such descriptions as "stable funding," "clients who come willingly," "good
community resources" and the like which were then coded in terms
of degree of alienation.

-665-

A factor analysis of the items led to the construction of two
indices as shown in Table 2. Only items with a factor loading
greater than .40 were included. The first factor (hereafter,
variable) incorporates four items and will be referred to as "community support" after the item that loaded most heavily on the
factor and in keeping with the combined sense of the items. The
second factor, incorporating two items, will be referred to as
'market problems" and describes financial support for program and
worker.
Table 2 indicates that social service workers experience a
good amount of societally induced alienation. With the exception
of one item, at least 20% of the social service workers note that
they find themselves in situations that may be described as "high"
and "very high" alienation, and in three of these this rises to
over 30%. Thus, 20.2% describe situations of low community status, 23.2% describe a high lack of community support, 30.6% a high
lack of stable funding, 42.3% very limited resources and 1.6% a
high number of clients with severe economic problems, a problem
intimately related to capitalism and generating much of the tension between welfare and capitalist ideals. Furthermore, on all
but one of these the median response is over three indicating that
the majority of respondents report a significant amount of
alienation.
On only one of the six items making up the two indices is
this pattern broken. On the item of personal job security,
slightly more than 15% admit to high or very high alienation while
the median response is 2.48 indicating that the majority did not
feel particularly threatened by the possible loss of their position. This result is surprising and possible reasons for it will
be explored in the conclusion of the paper.
B.

Organizational Alienation

Organizational alienation refers to those micro-structural
conditions that affect work in the social services and that derive
from the way in which the social services are organized. The idea
of organizational alienation represents the traditional Marxian
concern with alienation from production and productive activity.
Two points of clarification need to be made.
Social service workers cannot be said to produce a product,
rather they give a service. Yet the similarity between those who
produce and those who serve cannot be denied (Braverman, 1974:410423). Thus the problem of alienation from "service activities"
and from the "service" is a legitimate concern. Similarly, some
may contend that social services are not organized on a capitalist
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basis since, in general, their purpose is not profit. Especially
in the public sector, one might conclude that the social services
are organized on a socialist basis. A Marxist perspective on the
function of the state would argue that government run and controlled services in a capitalist society would incorporate the
organizational ideals of capitalism (Harrington, 1976). The
result is that autonomous and creative mental activity is continually separated from dependent, structured and routine activity
in government agencies as well as in private, for profit enterprises. To the extent that social service work lacks autonomy, is
controlled from without and routinized it is alienating.
Once again respondents were given a series of descriptive
phrases and asked to indicate on a six point scale the degree to
which the phrases described the conditions of their work. Table 3
shows twelve items making up an index of organizational alienation. This scale represents the first factor of an unrotated
principle factor solution. As such it delineates the largest pattern of relationship in the data and defines the greatest amount
of variation (Rummel, 1967).
It is presented here in order to
simplify a more complicated rotated factor solution. In addition,
although such a large series of items leads to a significant loss
in numbers, the separate rotated factor do not lead to any different conclusions. Thus, the factor may be thought of as a
general measure of organizational alienation.
The results presented in Table 3 indicate a rather high
amount of objective organizational alienation. On nine of the
twelve items the median response is greater than 3.0 indicating
that the majority of workers possess a substantial level of alienation. In addition, in 11 of the 12 items, at least 20% of the
respondents indicate what might be described as high to very high
alienation; in seven of these items, the percentage rises to over
thirty.
C. Objective Alienation and Integration Into the Social
Services
Table 4 assesses the relationship between the variable market
problems, pertaining to job stability and program funding, and
integration into the social services. No support for a hypothesis
linking class, status or conformity to the ideals of capitalism
with this type of obejctive alienation may be found. Not one of
the eight measures tested reaches statistical significance.
Table 5 shows the relationship between community support and
integration into the social services. No support is found for a
hypothesis linking sexual status to this type of alienation. With
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respect to all other measures, however, clear support for the hypotheses is shown.
Those in private practice report significantly less objective
societal alienation stemming from problems of community support
than those practicing in agencies. Those with graduate degrees
report significantly less alienation than those with less than a
graduate degree. Interestingly, no other variation according to
education is evident. Those in professional associations and
those with ACSW report significantly less alienation than those
not in associations and without the title.
The findings with respect to job title prove somewhat unexpected. A curvilinear function appears evident. Those in adminstrative positions and those on the low level front line positions report significantly more problems of community support than
do social workers and therapist/counselors. Indeed, therapist/
counselors appear to experience significantly less alienation than
any other category.
Those in private agency settings report significantly less
alienation than do those working in public settings. Finally,
those in unions report significantly more alienation than those
not in unions.
Table 6 describes the relationship between objective organizational alienation and the integration of social service
workers into social welfare. By definition, one should not expect
private practitioners to report organizational alienation since
they do not work in organizations. As noted previously, however,
the measure of class position includes some part-time private
practitioners who also work in agencies. Thus, while some private
practitioners report organizational alienation, they report significantly less of it than people who only work in agency
settings.
Those with a graduate degree report significantly less organizational alienation than those with less than a graduate degree. Those reporting membership in professional associations and
those with the title ACSW indicate significantly less organizational alienation than those without these. Those in administrative positions report significantly less alienation than those in
front line caseworker positions. However, those in positions of
social worker and especially those in therapist/counselor positions do not appear to experience significantly more alienation
than do the administrators and supervisors.
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D.

Multivariate Analysis

The results so far indicate that it is possible to talk of
significant statistical relationships between the way in which
social service workers are integrated into service activities and
the experience of objective alienation deriving from problems in
the organization of services and problems of community support.
It remains to explore which among the various categories of integration contributes most to our understanding of these two types
of objective alienation. By using a multi-variate technique, multiple classification analysis (MCA), the cumulative and relative
importance of predictor variables may be assessed.
MCA requires that the dependent or criterion variable be measured on an interval scale (Nie, et. al., 1975). Each of the
items used in creating the indices was measured on a Likert type
instrument which can be said to approximate an equal interval
scale. An examination of the means, standard deviations, peakedness and skewedness of the distributions resulting from each of
the two indices suggest that they are relatively normatively distributed. On this basis MCA will be undertaken.
MCA makes no requirements with respect to level of measurement of independent or predictor variables. Since it is based on
analysis of variance techniques, however, it assumes orthogonality
among the variables. When cell distribution is not equal, as is
often the case in survey research, orthogonality may not be assumed and thus the existence of interaction effects must be carefully examined. While Tables 7 and 8 do not present the analysis
of interaction effects, the reader should note that in no instance
were significant effects uncovered.
MCA accepts up to five predictor variables. After analysing
the cross-tabulations among the seven independent variables that
related significantly, it wd: decided to submit three predictor
variables: type of setting, education of worker, and job title.
The other variables appeared so completely related to these that
further analysis of them seemed unnecessary. For instance, union
membership was, by definition, a function of working in a public
agency; ACSW completely a function of educational attainment; professional association membership highly related to education and
to working in a private agency. Type of practice would have made
an important fourth variable but owing to the small number of exclusively private practitioners in the sample a more in-depth
analysis was not possible.
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I. Community Support and Integration Into Social Services
Table 7 summarizes the results of an MCA analysis and the
analysis of variance on which it is based. The reader should note
that the n is 414 representing a loss of 20% of the sample. In
assessing this loss, it should be realized that the analysis
leaves out the some thirty who work exclusively as private practitioners. The remaining losses derive from no response on either
the predictor or criterion variables. Examining the reduction in
n's suggests a rather equal loss among all categories of predictor
variables with the exception of those with graduate degrees. It
appears that those with graduate degrees were more likely not to
complete all items of the questionnaire. This suggests that the
results will underestimate differences in alienation as a function
of education.
The Multiple R for the relationship between the three predic2
tor variables and the criterion variable is a strong .508. The R
indicates that approximately 26% of the variation in community
support is accounted for by introducing the three predictor variables of education, types of setting and job title.
The Eta (correlation) coefficients of the three variables
before accounting for any of the others is .40, .42, and .35
respectively. That is, initially each variable demonstrates a
moderately strong and relatively equal correlation with community
support. The Beta (partial correlation) coefficients, however,
demonstrate a very different pattern. Clearly, the most important
of the three is type of setting (.32).
Education drops to .22 and
job title to .11.
By examining the analysis of variance, it becomes apparent that while type of setting and education continue
to contribute significantly, once job title is controlled it does
not significantly contribute to our understanding of this form of
societal alienation.
II. Organizational Alienation and Integration Into Social
Services
Table 8 gives the results of a second MCA procedure. The n
in this analysis drops even lower than in the previous analysis.
Besides the reasons already noted, the reader should be aware that
the index on which the criterion variable was based included some
twelve items; missing data on any one drops the respondent from
inclusion in the scale. Once again, there seems to be a disproportionate drop among those with graduate degrees and there also
appears to be a disproportionate drop among those in supervisory
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and administrative positions. Thus, the results should underestimate differences in alienation as a function of education and job
title.
The multiple R is a rather strong .592 with the R2 indicating
that 35% of the variance in organizational alienation is accounted
for by simultaneously examining education, type of setting and job
title.
The first order Eta correlations once again suggest that all
three are moderately strongly and equally related to organizational alienation. The second order Beta coefficients indicate that
each of the three, even after being controlled, equally contributes to our understanding of this form of objective alienation. This is also supported by the analysis of variance which
demonstrates that each predictor, even when controlled, continues
to be significantly related to the criterion variable.
Because job title in the single order analysis frequently
demonstrated a curvilinear function, further examination is instructive. The reader should note that in the adjusted deviations, there is a rather linear function apparent with caseworkers
and aides reporting more organizational alienation than social
workers who, in turn, report more organizational alienation than
therapist/counselors. As before, therapist/counselors are no more
likely to report alienation than administrators/supervisors.
If
one recalls that there is a disproportionate drop in the number of
administrative staff who supplied information, it could be contended that with more data an even stronger linear correlation
might be found.

-671-

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The findings lend support for the utility of using a Marxian
framework for understanding alienation among social service workers. There is reason to believe, like Thompson (1979), that objective alienation may be measured fruitfully using survey techniques. In this study, three types were operationalized, two that
relate to societal alienation and one that relates to organizational alienation. Analysis of responses to items making up these
measures demonstrates that social service workers report a good
amount of objective alienation. On almost all items, most workers
give responses indicating that they must deal with a good amount
of alienating work circumstances. The use of such objective measures appears to lead to the kind of prediction Marxian theorists
have assumed but which frequently has not been found when more
subjective measures have been used (Archibald, 1976).
The real test of theory, however, is its ability to predict.
It was predicted that the experience of structural alienation
would vary as a function of the way social service workers are
integrated around the means of service. While most predictions
held, support for some was not found. No support is found for a
hypothesis linking the sexual status of workers with the experience of any of the three forms of structural alienation
measured.
Perhaps, however, the major contradiction to the Marxian hypothesis is that the integration of social service workers does
not appear to be significantly related to alienation deriving from
market problems, problems relating to job security. This is a
troublesome finding that requires further analysis. Two possible
explanations may be advanced. The first suggests that the results
are spurious and stem from the historical situation surrounding
the mailing of the questionnaire. The survey was distributed immediately after major cutbacks in the public services and it may
be that those who survived the cuts were experiencing a sense of
security that the worse was over and so underestimated the importance of market problems. Similarly, the survey was mailed immediately following President Reagan's election but before any
specific cuts were made. This might have made large sectors of
the private, but federally dependent, services more apprehensive
than they might otherwise have been. It may be that this combination of under and overestimation might have reduced the differences that might otherwise exist.
A second possible explanation is that the results are not
spurious but an artifact of the internalization of market values
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among social service workes. As some have noted (Blauner, 1964;
Seeman, 1967), workers in the twentieth century have become inured
to the market system such that they do not expect job security.
Negative findings aside, strong support for the relationship
between integration into services and the other two forms of
structural alienation was found. Statistically significant
relationships are reported between type of practice, type of setting, educational background, membership in professional associations, ACSW membership, union membership and job title and measures of objective alienation deriving from problems of community
support and problems of autonomy and creativity on the job.
The findings on type of practice suggest that there might be
significant class differences among social service workers in that
private practitioners report significantly less alienation than
those working in agencies. The small number of exclusively private practitioners in the sample did not allow for a full analysis
of this possibility.
Multivariate analysis indicates that type of setting and
educational background contribute in an especially strong way to
our understanding of the dynamics of objective alienation. People
with graduate degrees are more likely to find the kind of position
that insulates them from alienation, thus there is support that
professionalization diminishes alienation. The data also indicate
that in spite of their dependence on federal funding, private
agencies have been able to maintain professional working conditions to a far greater extent than public agencies. A Marxian
explanation would stress that their underlying historical purpose,
that of offering charity, frees them from the kind of public debate and stigmatization that public agencies must endure.
Job title or rank does not contribute significantly to our
understanding of alienation deriving from problems of community
support. When education and practice setting are controlled,
those in administrative positions are as likely as others to perceive a lack of community support. This makes sense since administrators (although not necessarily supervisors) must deal with
the community just as much as line workers, albeit at different
levels.
Job title, on the other hand, does contribute significantly
to our understanding of organizational alienation. Those in high
organizational positions, who administer policy, make decisions
and control line staff, and possibly counselor/therapists, who
represent autonomous line workers within services, will experience
less organizational alienation than lower level line workers.
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These results may only be put forth tentatively. The sample
is not a random one, although it makes up a large number of workers in a particular metropolitan area, and there are losses in
numbers deriving from the delicacy of the subject matter. Nevertheless, if the results hold up to further scrutiny, they help
make sense of a number of seemingly diverse phenomena in the social services: increasing concern over burn-out, continuing
flight of MSW's from the poor and from the public services, continuing concern for professional status, the struggle for licensing among "clinical" social workers, the resilience of private
agencies, and the growth of undergraduate education. Each of
these concerns may be interpreted as attempts to call attention to
the difficulties being faced on jobs and to escape into positions
that give greater promise for community support, autonomy and
creativity.
The question is whether the choices made by social service
workers or by the associations and unions that represent them are
choices which promise an end to alienating work conditions. From
a Marxian perspective, many of the choices being made appear of
doubtful benefit to the worker, the society and the client being
served. They appear to lead to increasing hierarchical relations
among social service workers generating conflict and competition
which can only lead to a weakening of the profession as a whole
and of its moderating influence over the negative aspects of
capitalism.
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Table 1:

Type of Practice

Sample

Pv't Practice
Full Time
Part Time
Agency Practice
NR

3.47
9.84
81.47
5.21

Type of Setting

P'vt Setting
Public Setting
NA (Pv't Practice)
NR

23.4

Sex of Respondent

Male
Female
NR

28.0
63.5

Graduate Degree
Some Grad. Studies
BA, BS, BSW
Some College
No College
NR

55.0
4.4

Professional Assn.
Member

Yes
No
NR

55.6

ACSW

Yes
No
NR

29.7
66.6
3.7

Job Title

Admin/Supervisor
Therapist/Counselor
Social Worker
Caseworker
NR

23.5

No
Yes
NR

57.9

Education

Union Member

63.9
5.8
6.9

8.5

22.4
7.9

3.7
6.2
40.3

3.9

11.4

20.8
30.1
14.1

38.4
3.7
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Table 2:

Items c

Variable Name
COMMUNITY SUPPORT

MARKET PROBLEMS

Societal Alienation Variablesa

Mdn

community support
low community status
limited resources
severe economic
problems

3.40

job stability
stable funding

high
alienation

NR

5.05

28.2
20.2
42.3
61.6

32
17
32
26

2.48
3.55

15.4
30.6

12
27

2.83
4.22

a. N = 518
b. The designation "high alienation" includes those responses,
after recoding to account for direction, of "descriptive" or
"very descriptive" of alienating work circumstances.
c. The items appear as they appeared in the questionnaire. The
reader should note that in scoring each item, the scores were
recoded so that a score of one equalled no alienation while a
score of six equalled very high alienation.

Table 3:

Organizational Alienationa
Items c

ORGANIZATIONAL
ALIENATION

a.
b.

c.

paper work
choice of clients/persons
large work load
frequent changes
participation in policy
time enough to work
flexible procedures
routine work
unclear expectations
access to administration
a rules manual
comfortable work areas

Mdn

% high
alienation

5.34
4.58
4.98
4.48
3.43

68.4

3.64
3.42

31.1
30.7

3.74
3.55

28.9
26.1

2.78
2.21

21.5
20.0

2.58

18.4

NR

65.0
60.8

49.6
35.8

N = 518
The designation of "high alienation" includes those responses,
after recoding to account for direction, of "descriptive" or
"very descriptive" of alienating work circumstances.
The items appear as they appeared in the questionnaire. The
reader should note that in scoring each item, the scores were
recoded so that a score of one equalled no alienation while a
score of six equalled very high alienation.
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Table 4:

Market Problems and Integration Into Social Services

NATURE OF
INTEGRATION

GROUP

nc

x

t/Fa

pb

Type of Practice

Private Practice
Agency Practice

48
413

3.3
3.2

-.85

0.39

Type of Setting

Private Setting
Public Setting

115
327

3.1
3.2

.72

0.47

Education

Graduate Degree
Some Graduate
BA/BS/BSW
Some College
No College

256
23
114
41
18

3.3
3.2
3.1
2.9
3.2

1.13

0.34

Sex

Male
Female

135
309

3.1
3.2

.89

0.38

257
207

3.2
3.2

.40

0.69

Member of
Professional Assn Yes
No
ACSW

Yes
No

143
323

3.2
3.2

.13

0.90

Job Title

Admin/Supervisor 120
Therap./Counselor 57
Social Worker
104
Caseworker
155

3.3

.70

0.55

No
Yes

3.2
3.2

.16

0.55

Union Member

267
199

3.1
3.1
3.1

a.

For readers not familiar with "t" or "F," the "t" has been
computed on variables of more than two groups.

b.

Statistical significance requires a probability of .05 or
less. None of the test statistics presented reach statistical
significance.

c.

Where n's do not sum to 518, the difference is accounted for
by missing cases.
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Table 5:

Community Support and Integration Into Social Services

NATURE OF
INTEGRATION

nc

GROUP

Type of Practice

Private Practice
Agency Practice

Type of Setting

Private Setting
Public Setting

Sex

Male
Female

Education

Graduate Degree
Some graduate
BA/BS/BSW
Some College
No College

49
375

122
288

Member of Professional Assn.
ACSW

Yes
No

Job Title

Admin/Supervisor

x

3.8
3.8

233

3.5

194

4.2

125
304

3.3
4.0

t/Fa

pb

5.26

0.00

9.32

0.00

0.03

0.98

17.37

0.00

8.54

0.00

7.58

0.00

3.28

0.02

9.32

0.00

Therap./Counselor

Social Worker
Caseworker
Union Member

a. The "t" has been computed on variabes with only two groups,
while "F" has been computed on variables of more than two
groups.
b. Statistical significance requires a probability of .05 or less.
c. Where n's do not sum to 518, the difference is accounted for by
missing cases.
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Table 6:

Organizational Alienation and Integration Into Social
Services

NATURE OF
INTEGRATION
Type of Practice

Type of Setting

x

t/Fa

pb

Private Practice
Agency Practice

3.31

4.80

0.00

Private Settng
Public Setting

3.26

10.27

0.00

0.99

0.32

3.50
4.12
4.18
4.17
3.97

23.69

0.00

GROUP

nc

Male
Female
Education

3.86
4.02
115

3.75

276

3.85

Graduate degree
Some graduate
BA/BS/BSW
Some College
No College

Member of Professional Assn.

226
182

3.51
4.17

10.33

0.00

ACSW

117

3.37

8.13

0.00

182

4.17
3.50
3.48
3.73
4.23

32.63

0.00

3.52
4.16

9.91

0.00

Job Title

Admin/Supervisor
Therap./Counselor
Social Worker
Case Worker

229
180

Union Member

a.

The "t" has been computed on variables of only two groups
while the "F" has been computed on variables of more than two
groups.

b.

Statistical significance requires a probability of .05 or
less.

c.

Where n's do not sum to 518 the difference is accounted for by
missing cases.
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Table 7:

Comuunity Support and Integration Into Social Services
(MCA)
Analysis of Variance

Source of
Variance

Sum of

Main Effects
Education
Type of Setting
Job Title

162.399

32.48

17.95
53.61
4.26

17.95
53.61
1.42

Squares

df

x2

F
27.56
15.23

45.49
1.20

p
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.31

Multiple Classification Analysis
Grand Mean

Variables
Education

Group

3.46

n

Grad degree
No Grad "

223
181

Deviation
from
Grand Mean

Eta

adjusted
deviations
-0.25
0.31

-0.44
0.55

0.22

0.40
Type of
Setting

Private
Public

107
297

-0.65
0.24

-0.88
0.32

0.32

0.42
Job Title

Admin/Sup
Therp/Coun
Soc Wkr
Caseworker

-0.04
-0.11
-0.14
0.17

-0.23
-0.27
-0.44
0.58
0.35

N = 414
R = .508
R2 = .258
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BETA

0.11

Table 8:

Organizational Alienation and Integration Into Social
Services (MCA)
Analysis of Variance

Source of
Variance
Main Effects
Education
Setting
Job Title

Sum o1
Squarees

df

69.0(06
6.o 86
14.0332
11.33g0

x2

F

13.80
6.07

39.44
17.34

14.03
3.80

40.10

10.85

p
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Multiple Classification Analysis
Grand Mean

Variables
Education

Group

3.82

n

Grad degree
No Grad "

203
171

Deviation
from
Grand Mean

-0.28
0.34

Eta

adjusted
deviations

BETA

-0.16
0.19
.24

99
175

Setting

Private
Public

Title

Admi n/Sup
Therp/Coun
Soc Wkr
Caseworker

-0.56
0.20

-0.35
0.13

-0.34

-0.23
-0.23

-0.37
-0.10

0.43

N = 374

R = .592
R2 = .351
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-0.08
0.19
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The Social Work Profession and the
Ideoloqy of Professionalization
by

Stanley Wenocur & Michael Reisch
University of Maryland
School of Social Work & Community Planning

The idea of Christian brotherly love.., in a society
founded on serfdom remains an unrealizeable and, in
this sense, ideological idea, even when the intended
meaning is, in good faith, a motive for the conduct of
the individual. To live consistently in the light of
brotherly love, in a society which is not organized on
the same principle is impossible. The individual in
his personal conduct is always compelled--in so far as
he does not resort to breaking up the existing social
structure--to fall short of his own nobler motives.
Karl Mannheim (1936:

195)

Introduction
The phenomenon of professionalization has been an exceptionally powerful force in Western industrialized countries for more
than a century. "The professions are as characteristic of the
modern world as the crafts were of the ancient," said Stephen R.
Graubard in the preface to The Professions in America (1963).
Talcott Parsons (1968) declared that "The development and increasing strategic importance of the professions probably constitute
the most important change that has occurred in the occupational
system of modern countries." Dry statistics alone bear out these
views.
In the United States "professionals" increased in the
population from 859 per 100,000 in 1870 to 3,310 in 1950 (Goode,
1957).
In absolute numbers professional and technical workers
increased from 350,000 in 1870 to 12.5 million in 1974.
In 1900
professional and technical workers represented only 4.3% of the
workforce; by 1970 they were 14.4% (Galper, 1975: 56).
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Professional and Technical Workers in the
United States: 1870-1974 (April)

1870

1910

340,000

1,655,270

1940
3,497,100

1950

1970

4,490,000

11,140,000

1974
12,446,000

These figures are indicative of profound changes in our
political economy, characterized by some observers in the 1970's
as "post-industrial" (Bell, 1973; Heilbroner, 1973; Gartner and
Its central feature is that economic growth has
Riessman, 1974).
shifted from the goods-producing sectors to the information and
service-producing sectors. The dramatic growth of social work in
the last two decades (recent cut-backs notwithstanding) has been
part of this larger shift in the political economy, as the expansion of the welfare state has been a substantial ingredient of
service sector expansion.
The figures on the growth of professional and technical workers mask a considerable amount of conflict about professionalization and its implications for social democracy. Professions are
an integral part of our system of social stratification. In terms
of status and rewards, they lie near the top of the occupational
hierarchy, much higher than technical occupations. The citadels
of professionalism are carefully protected by ideological, politiIn 1970 some 2,200 occupations recal, and economic barriers.
In a study decrying this "profesquired highly skilled workers.
sionalization of everyone," Wilensky (1964), a sociologist, could
only find 18 occupations at best, including social work, that
might make a reasonable claim to professional status.
Social workers have coveted professional status. Their desire
and the course of their struggle for its realization have been
shaped by broader political economic conditions. At the same time
social workers as professionals have also struggled to create a
more egalitarian and a qualitatively richer society. (Other proThese conflicting interests have
fessionals have also done so.)
created a unique tension within social work, a kind of marginal
consciousness about its position in society. Because of it, social workers occasionally have been able to reflect on their role
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in preserving practices and institutions that perpetuate inequities. This kind of self-conscious deliberation requires an attenton to political economic analysis. Naturally it has been
strongest during periods of cataclysmic social upheaval, when the
entire society has been forced to focus on political economic conditions. But it has also appeared at other times as a kind of
persistent counterpoint to social work's main themes. When it
happens, social workers expand their capacity to shape the character of their work.
The ideology surrounding professions has obscured social
work's past and present relationships to political economic
events. Both the schools and the professional associations whose
purpose is to advance professionalization usually fail to examine
social work critically from this perspective. One consequence is
that social workers always seem to be contending with a series of
recurrent professional issues--whether schools should train
generic or specialist practitioners; whether caseworkers should be
involved in social reform and reformers in casework; whether or
not private practice is a "sell-out", etc.--whose relevance and
implications cannot be thoroughly assessed because their political
economic character is washed out. Another consequence is that the
options that social workers might have for working towards social
construction are not fully explored.

Sociological Perspectives on Professionalization
Because "an industrializing society is a professionalizing
society" (Goode, 1960), prevailing ideas about professions and the
quest for professionalization have more than academic significance
for an aspiring occupation. They serve as an ideological screen
through which other societal events are sifted out, either to be
acted on or neglected. To comprehend the effects on social work
of its struggle for professional status, we need to make explicit
the screens through which professionalization has customarily been
viewed, as well as our own position.
The ideology of professions appears in two important forms.
The first, which will not be our focus here, concerns the degree
to which the scientific-technical knowledge base within a particular profession--the sina qua non for claimants to the title--is
riddled with ideology, and the circumstances wherein this
ideological content is most likely to arise. Scientific principles informing practice are seldom complete enough to enable practitioners to explain, control, or predict all the practice situations they encounter.
In order for professions to maintain an
aura of competence, consensually validated ideologies--beliefs,

-686-

normative principles, expectations, and "practice wisdom"--fill
the gaps, also leaving room for competing ideological belief systems to arise. These ideological elements are especially likely
to surface (1) when a professional field experiences social pressures to produce "professional" behavior, (2) where the application of theory to practice requires or allows for a high degree of
subjectivity, intuition, or particularistic values, and (3) where
the content and behavior of professional practice involves many
moral and ethical considerations (Holzner and Marx, 1979: 258,6).
The second form of professional ideology deals with the bits
and pieces of ideology surrounding professionalization. These are
the empirically unproven assumptions, values, and theories attached to the idea of professions and taken as "truths" that offer
an interpretation of their relationship to man, nature, and
society in its parts and as a dynamic whole. Aspiring occupational groups have fallen back on such ideological material to pursue
their claims to professional status; established professions use
it to maintain their privileged position.

The Structural-Functional and Processual Perspectives
The structural-functional perspective has probably been the
most powerful lens through which professions have been studied.
It is rife with ideology. In this view, professions are part of
the natural elaboration of an organic social structure accompanying modernization. The social and technological changes set off
by the industrial revolution created specialized needs that could
no longer be met by traditional institutions like family businesses and small communities.
In the economic sphere, new occupations arose in response to these needs. As they developed a distinctive and "responsible' expertise based on scientific-technical
knowledge and an ethical code, they gained community sanction and
progressed up the occupational ladder to professional rank.
Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958: 286-7) offer a clear illustration of
this perspective in their explanation for why "demand" for a profession of social work arose.
Specialization itself, a prerequisite for professionalism, is the result of the underlying industrialization process. Rising productivity and income not only permit but force the eventual withdrawal
of population from farming and manufacturing. These
people are channeled into the tertiary service
"industries"--service professions and occupations of
all kinds, from physicians and social workers to
beauticians and television repair service men...
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The growth in scale and complexity of social organizations--business corporations, labor unions, professional groups, social agencies, units of government--is
likewise a factor, because it creates a demand for
liaison and contact men of all kinds. We need guides,
so to speak, through a new kind of civilized jungle.
Social work is an example par excellence of the liaison
function...
Also involved in the shift towards professionalization
is the prestige of science... The empirical, critical,
rational spirit of science has found its way into nearly every type of activity in America. And it has become particularly important to social work because the
neighboring, established professions, especially
medicine, to which social work looks for its model of
professionalism, stresses scientific knowledge as the
basis for professional practice.

The functional importance and positive contribution of professions to the larger society is a central assumption of the
structural/functional perspective. Professions are seen as rational, "stabilizing elements in society." "They engender modes of
life, habits of thought, and standards of judgement which render
them centers of resistance to crude forces which threaten steady
and peaceful evolution"... They function "to bring knowledge to
the service of power" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 497,499).
They "dominate the contemporary scene in such a way as to render
obsolescent the primacy of the old issues of authoritarianism and
capitalistic exploitation" (Parsons, 1968: 546). On an international level, professions even help to maintain world order
through the communication among intellectual leaders of different
countries (Lynn, 1965: xiii).
In the sociology of professions, structural-functionalists
have devoted a good deal of energy to investigating the attributes
that distinguish professions from other occupations. A core list
of attributes culled from this work would be as follows (Holzner
and Marx, 1979; Ritzer, 1972: 1) an abstract, theoretical
knowledge base; 2) an esoteric, specialized, technical skill; 3) a
long period of training and socialization; 4) strong professional
subculture and ideology; 5) lifelong commitment to a structured
career; 6) autonomy of action; 7) a formal occupational association; 8) control over training and legal licensing; 9) a code of
ethics and/or a client-centered orientation--the service ideal.
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With the exceptions of the archetypes of law and medicine,
however, sociologists disagree as to which occupations actually
meet the criteria. The solution to this troublesome problem has
been to place occupations on a continuum of professionalization
with the ideal-types of law and medicine demarcating the outer
professional pole and other unskilled occupations, such as
janitoring, the opposite non-professional pole. Then the more of
the "differentia specifica" (Barber, 1965) held by an occupational
group, usually with heavier weighting for scientific knowledge
combined with a formalized service ideal, the higher the rating on
the scale of professionalization (Greenwood, 1957). This approach
has lent support to labeling some occupations as "emergent," or
"marginal" (Wilensky, 1964), or "semi-professional" (Etzioni,
1969), based on possession of these attributes in only moderate
degree.
The structural-functional perspective, as the name implies,
derives from that particular theoretical perspective in sociology.
The processual approach has focused mainly on the question of how
occupations actually achieve the status of professions. This emphasis, more than a particular sociological perspective, is what
distinguishes it from the structural-functional.
Authors who have
studied the process of professionalization draw on functionalism
as well as social exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, and
conflict theory.
Though not incompatible with functional assumptions about the
role of professions in society, in general, examinations of the
process of professionalization have revealed that the elaboration
of social structure is not an inherently orderly process and that
occupational groupings play an active part in engineering their
changes in status. The view is a politically pluralistic, dynamic
one wherein occupational prestige, treated as a scarce resource,
becomes the object of competing interests within a single occupational sphere or in the larger division of labor, or both. Social
changes create conditions necessitating specialization, professionalization, and bureaucratization, but these necessary conditions are not sufficient in and of themselves to account for the
differential rise of occupations in the status hierarchy. If the
conditions are right (a situation to be viewed dynamically rather
than statically), an occupational grouping or sub-segment, much
like a social movement, can organize itself and act strategically
to improve its occupational ranking (Bucher and Strauss, 1961).
Several authors have outlined the steps or stages over time of
the professionalization process (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933;
Caplow, 1954; Hughes, 1958; Wilensky, 1964). They generally agree
on the substance of the steps, if not on the particular sequence.
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For our purposes, Wilensky's summary is illustrative (1964: 145-

46).
In sum, there is a typical process by which the established professions have arrived: men begin doing the
work full time and stake out a jurisdiction; the early
masters of technique or adherents of the movement become
concerned about standards of training and practice and
set up a training school, which if not lodged in universities at the outset makes academic connection within
two or three decades; the teachers and activists then
achieve success in promoting more effective organization, first local, then national--through either the
transformation of an existing occupational association
or the creation of a new one. Toward the end, legal
protection of the monopoly of skill appears; at the end,
a formal code of ethics is adopted.
"Many occupations engage in heroic struggles for professional
identification; few make the grade" (Wilensky, 1964). Therefore,
for the processualists, attributes that the structuralfunctionalists consider as static distinguishing characteristics,
-particularly scientific-technical knowledge and professional
norms- may be used strategically by an occupational group or subsegment to advance their status goals and to debase the competing
claims of other groups, In simplified outline, the knowledgeskill base links the concept of profession in the public mind to
the prestige and positive ideology of science and higher learning;
the service ideal separates professionalized occupations from commercial enterprises. Other traits are derivative of these. To
gain sophisticated technical skill and scientific knowledge, a
lengthy training period is required in a university, which at the
same time provides a thorough socialization-into-the-profession
experience. University sanction also furnishes a valuable stamp
of legitimation to the aspiring group which enables them to claim
the privileges from society of autonomy of action, control over
its training, authority over its clientele in functionally
specific areas, and eventually the legal right to title and domain
through licensing and/or other benefits. The claims of an occupation to these various privileges are further bolstered by promotion of a professional code of ethics and service ideal, which
also serves to reassure the public that the interests of the
client and the community will take precedence over the desire for
2
commercial profit.
In some instances, the processual line of inquiry has challenged functional assumptions about the homogeneity among members
of a profession. Rather than studying individual professions as
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communities of shared values, identification, roles, and interests
and then identifying the mechanisms that help to create this cohesiveness, such as socialization and selectivity processes (Goode,
1957), Bucher and Strauss (1962: 326) argued that professions are
"loose amalgamations of segments pursuing different objectives in
different manners and more or less held together under a common
name at a particular period in history." Within organized
medicine, the prototypical profession, one can find great divergences, for example, according to specializations (radiology vs.
pathology vs. family medicine); sense of mission to support special expertise (within surgery, the struggles between proctology
and urology for separate identities); work activities (the public
health physician vs. the anesthesiologist); methodology and techniques (within psychology the physiologists vs. the therapist);
client rlationships (the pathologists with little patient contact
vs. clinicians). Given these differences, professional associations become "battlegrounds as different emerging segments compete
for control" of the organization and its resources for influencing
the general membership, societal elites, and the public at large.
In sum, the processual perspective takes a developmental view
of professionalization, which ranges, depending upon the author,
from a naturally unfolding, evolutionary process to a highly
3
In
politicized, conflictual one resembling a social movement.
this process, the attributes that separate professions from other
occupations may be used instrumentally to advance a group's interests. Steps in the professionalization process can be identified,
the details of which, in a broader context of modernization, help
to explain the differential status of occupations in the division
of labor.
A Critique
Both the structural-functional and the processual perspectives
accept and build on the values and remnants of an older aristocracy as these were carried forward under a new set of conditions-the industrial revolution. The structural approach is essentially
a-historical (Ritzer, 1975); so really is the processual, despite
the ostensible historicity of developmental stages. Ideologically, both still take established professions, the so-called
"learned professions," as a point of departure, a standard against
which the characteristics and developmental patterns of newer
claimants are measured and found wanting. Furthermore, the standard may be applied unevenly, as when Wilensky (1964) assumed that
only the established professions had followed a "natural history
of professionalism," while new and emerging professions were
"opportunistic."
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From a strictly methodological viewpoint, the use of "established" professions as the basis for formulating criteria to
distinguish professions and their developmental patterns from nonprofessions has serious scientific consequences. Assuming the
existence of commonalities among the established professions, the
approach set off a search for them, while sliding over their differences. At the same time it also tended to limit the investigation of similarities between the established professions and other
occupations in favor of a search for differences. The outcome has
been a state of conceptual/definitional confusion requiring a
series of ad hoc justifications for the differential attributes
that have been identified. Since many phenomena have been excluded, the resulting "theory of professions" has violated the
rule of parsimony in theory construction.
A bit of ideology that has stubbornly clung to the professional concept has been its ethical purity. The view that professions are beneficial for society flows from this a priori definitional relationship between professions and the service ideal as a
distinguishing attribute. In the functionalist approach, it is
not that professionals have typically altruistic motivations as
compared to the alleged "egoism" of businessmen. Rather, the service ideal, which broadly includes such professional norms as dispassionate objectivity, is carried out in professional role behavior because it is useful for providing more efficient service.
Professional roles, in turn, are supported by an institutional
context of "science and liberal learning" which is radically different from the institutional context of commerce (Parsons, 1938:
46-8). This image justifies the proposition that professionals
represent an intellectual status group or class which can guide
the public interest because they somehow operate beyond the bounds
of bourgeois imperatives.
A substantial amount of empirical data suggest that professionals have not quite transcended the pushes and pulls of
capitalistic competition. The alternative proposition that professional organizations and professional morality serve to increase the economic gains of professional practitioners and the
In an early comstatus of their vocations is more defensible.
parative study of professions, Friedman and Kuznets (1945: 391)
found that "professional workers constitute a 'non-competing'
group" in the marketplace, whose average earnings in comparable
communities were from 85% to 180% higher than those of nonprofessional workers. Furthermore, they found that medical societies in the United States contributed to the comparatively higher
salaries of physicians over dentists by their greater monopolistic
control of entry into the profession. The monopolistic practices
of the American Medical Association (AMA) have been analyzed by
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Garceau (1941), Hyde and Wolff (1953-54), Kessel (1958, 1970), and
Rayback (1967) among others. Kessel (1958, 1970) showed how the
power of the AMA has supported profit-maximizing behavior by
physicians as well as the ways in which its activities have circumscribed the choice of contractual arrangements between patients
and physicians and reduced innovation in medical education. Arnould (1972) found that the legal profession also engaged in monopolistic practices through the widespread use of fee schedules
akin to price-fixing, thereby raising the price structure of legal
services. This practice was struck down by the Supreme Court in

the 1970's.
Many authors have considered the detrimental effects for the
public of the licensing of occupations, a primary concern of professional associations, and justified as a means of protecting the
4
public. Pfeffer (197 a) found that governmental regulation and
occupational licensing have operated to restrict entry, increase
price, and protect and economically enhance an industry or occupaIn another study, Pfeffer (1974b) also showed that the more
tion.
professionalized the occupation, the more independent its income
was from local economic conditions. Fech's (1974) review of the
literature on the licensing of health occupations and professions
presents additional support for the allegation that licensure has
not protected the public interest on balance. Benham and Benham
(1975) found similar practices and effects on prices and services
in the optometry profession. Recent studies of the optometric
profession have also dispelled the functionalist notion that
greater technological sophistication has so improved the quality
of services that it offsets such dysfunctional consequences as
higher prices (Begun, 1979). Finally, in a slightly different
vein, Walsh and Elling (1968) found that among the public health
professionals in their study--nurses, sanitarians, and physicians--the greater the striving for professional status of the
occupational group, the more negative their orientations to lower
class clients. These findings led Walsh and Elling to speculate
(1968:27) that:
...the class structure maintains itself in significant
part through the efforts of work groups as a whole to
In this process, the differenestablish themselves.
tial distribution of rewards affected by the class
structure operates not only through the money market
and its salaries and incomes, but through orientations
and behaviors of members of work groups which aid them
in avoiding identification and involvement with
detracting or devalued elements of society. The depth
of this human tragedy is suggested by the fact that
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those most in need of service are least likely to
receive it.
Much of the ideology surrounding professions is grounded in
historical misunderstanding. It is a misinterpretation of history
to equate today's concept of profession with the idea of the
"learned professions" of pre-industrial times. In pre-industrial
England (the most relevant source for the United States), the specialized functions now performed by established professions in a
given field were carried out by a variety of occupational groupings, whose members were both university educated or organized
into guilds with an apprenticeship system of training outside the
university. No profession could claim a unified occupational domain over which it reigned supreme. As Freidson (1970: 5-6)
pointed out with regard to medicine:
Its position is not a long established one; in fact, it
is less than a hundred years old. If medicine was a
'profession' in the past, it was a profession of quite
different characteristics than today's. During most of
recorded time there was not a single occupation identifiable as 'medicine' for there were many kinds of
healers. After the rise of the university in Europe,
medicine became primarily a 'learned profession'. Only
recently has it become a truly consulting profession,
and only recently has it attained the strength and
stability which now characterizes its preeminence.
Around the year 1200, universities grew up out of the guilds
of learning organized by teachers and students and soon came under
domination of the Church. For many years the ecclesiastics performed many of the specialized functions we attribute to professions, but by the 15th century, p~rhaps earlier, secular associations, such as the Inns of Court,' and secular guilds provided the
aegis for carrying them out. "Thus the earliest forms of organization among surgeons, apothecaries, and notaries, and in a
certain sense also among common lawyers, took the shape of training guilds. These professions, therefore, unlike physicians,
5
civil servants, and teachers, did not emerge out of the clerical
order" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 291). Nor did they require university-based education--as did physicians and civil
servants--to carry out their medical and legal functions.
In pre-modern Europe the social stratification system was
quite rigid, so that vocational groups, "learned" and "unlearned,"
came from different segments of society and often served different
In this stratified social system
social strata (Larson, 1977: 3).
the university diploma was not sufficient to assure its learned
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f-_c;pknts control over an area of technical expertise. The
learned professions did not have a monopoly of practice in the
broader community.
On technical grounds the learned professions would have had a
hard time asserting their rights to exclusive occupational control. The scientific/technical knowledge obtainable in the
university was not necessarily more effective than the expertise
gained from practice. Nor was it practically oriented.
In 17th
and 18th century Europe and the United States, university education largely sought to educate gentlemen through a classical,
liberal arts orientation.
It was more a mark of differential social status than it was scientific or utilitarian (Larson, 1977).
In Europe, scientific education did not penetrate medical education until well into the industrial period, mid-19th century, and
in the United States, not until the late 19th century.
Despite differences in the social, political, and physical
features between the United States and Europe, the course of the
learned professions in America was strongly influenced by developments in Great Britain and Europe generally, so that the above
points still apply. For example, medical functions were performed
by diverse vocational groups--surgeons/barbers, physicians,
apothecaries, patent-medicine men, midwives--outside the control
of university based vocations or any other monopolistic healing
group up to the 19th century. And the results of the medical care
of the "non-educated" practitioners were often no worse than those
of the "learned professionals" of the day (Freidson, 1970: 20).
In 1775, some 3,500 practitioners, who were not graduates of any
medical school, gave most of the medical care in the country. Accounts of the profession in the 18th century, which usually
describe it in terms of the activities of some 50, Europeantrained men who played a prominent part in institutional medicine
or public life, distort the picture (Bell, 1970).
In short, the conception of profession as we understand it is
really a modern invention. Its pre-industrial heritage was quite
mixed--common and elite, "learned' and "unlearned." Modern professions, as a sociological phenomenon, actually emerged together
within a relatively short, two-generational span of time, roughly
1825-1880 (Larson, 1977). The historical circumstances that imprinted the first stage of professionalization for our present
professions were similar for all of them, namely the political,
economic, technological and ideological conditions of 'the great
transformation' from a pre-capitalist socio-economic system to
6
industrial capitalism.

Within this context, the "opportunistic" struggles of the established professions for their exalted position would tell us
more about how and why some occupations succeeded than any static,
a priori versions of their creation. Empirical data on the
economics of professionalization support this logic. As CarrSaunders and Wilson realized in their pioneering study of professions with respect to law and medicine (1933: 304):
The evolution of the legal and medical professions was
anything but smooth; and something more than has yet
been said is required to account for so tangled a history. On reflection it appears that what happened in
both cases was the early segregation of practitioners,
advocates, and physicians, whose functon at a later
date was realized to be specialist. But the associations of these specialists, having attained great power
and prestige, attempted to inhibit the development of
general practitioners of law and medicine of whose services the public had need. When they could not prevent
their appearance, they tried to keep them subservient,
and the history of both professions is largely concerned with the problems so brought about.
These considerations taken together point to the need for an
alternative perspective on professions. The structural-functional
perspective and much of the thinking in the processual approach
begin with an a priori set of assumptions about the basis of the
occupational division of labor. Professions are implicitly or
explicitly the yardstick for assigning rank in the occupational
hierarchy; their characteristics are assumed to be beneficial to a
defineable public interest without regard to differential social
group interests, and functionally required for the development of
modern society. Some writers have assigned professionals a unique
status and role in society (Parsons, 1968: 536), "neither
'capitalists' nor 'workers', nor typically government administrators or 'bureaucrats' ... independent peasant proprietors or members of the small urban proprietary groups." Like Mannheim's intellectuals (1936: 155-64), who are largely unattached to any social class and able to transcend their relations to the system of
social stratification because of their diverse origins and academy
training, professionals represent a new form of moral and intellectual leadership for the society, based on the cultural criteria
of legitimacy rather than criteria of political power or economic
success" (Parsons, 1968: 545).
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
The central issue in a "theory of professions" is to account
for the variance in the occupational hierarchy. Why is it that
some occupations have been able to achieve and maintain a special
status that has come to be identified as professional? Professsions as we know them arose in the division of labor during the
industrial era. In advanced industrial societies this division of
labor has become complex and specialized. We do not assume at the
same time that the professional phenomenon is the crowning
achievement of the industrial revolution, or a requirement of industrialization, found in the same form across all industrial societies, and/or certain to continue with little change into the
future. To do so is to accept a restrictive ideology propounded
by professionals themselves that ignores contradictory data so as
to preserve a particular social order. In theory development,
variables must be able to vary, and the concept of profession cannot be both the independent and the dependent variable.
Status is a human artifact.

As Bottomore has written (1966:

10):
...a system of rank does not form part of some natural
and invariable order of things, but is a human contrivance or product, and is subject to historical
changes. More particularly, natural or biological inequalities, on one side, and distinctions of social
rank on the other, belong to two distinct orders of
fact. The differences were pointed out very clearly by
Rousseau in a well-known passage: 'I conceive that
there are two kinds of inequality among the human species; one which I call natural or physical, because it
is established by nature, and consists in a difference
of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of
the mind or of the soul; and another, which may be
called moral or political inequality, because it
depends on a kind of convention, and it is established,
or at least authorized, by the consent of men. This
latter consists of the different privileges, which some
men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of
being more rich, more honoured, more powerful, or even
in a position to exact obedience.
To understand the development and maintenance of occupational inequality, we must, then, come face to face with issues of power
and the distribution of resources, within an occupational sphere
and at the societal level, and in such a way as to attend to
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shifting historical conditions with the passage of time. This
endeavor requires a re-conceptualization of the notion of
profession.
A traditional definition of a profession is (Cogan, 1953: 49),
"a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the
theoretical structure of some department of learning or science,
and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding...applied
to the practical affairs of men."
The definition does not accommodate either all of the occupations usually considered as professions, such as law which is not based upon a scientific body of
knowledge, or exclude other occupations not usually considered to
be professions, such as computer programming. Status variations
in the occupational hierarchy are not adequately explained by this
form of definition or its underlying conceptualization.
The political-economic approach takes a different tack. In
this view the concept of profession is separated from the concept
of occupation. Johnson (1972: 45) succinctly clarifies this point
when he states that "a profession is not an occupation, but a
means of controlling an occupation. Likewise, professionalization
is a historically specific process which some occupations have
undergone at a particular time, rather than a process which certain occupations may always be expected to undergo because of
their essential qualities." The professional phenomenon, then,
may be viewed as an "institutionalized order of control" over a
set of marketplace activities, which could be arranged in a typology of institutionalized orders of control, such as collegial control (professions) or patronage (Johnson, 1972).
More formally, we suggest that a profession is a quasicorporate entity or enterprise whose members have obtained a substantial degree of control over the production, distribution, and
consumption of a needed commodity. This definition is consistent
with Freidson's analysis of the medical profession in the United
States (1970:n 71) that "the most strategic distinction lies in
legitimate, organized autonomy--that a profession is distinct from
other occupations in that it has been given the right to control
its own work."
The degree of control is never complete; its nature and extent vary over time with socio-political, economic,
ideological, and technological developments within the enterprise
and the society. Similarly, the differential status of occupations in a given time period also varies as a function of the degree and form of control which an enterprise can exercise. The
control exercised by the professional enterprise involves to a
greater or lesser extent:
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I) the definition of the commodity which its specialized practitioners produce and distribute;
2)
explanations of the relationship of the production
and distribution of this commodity to the broader needs
of the total political economy;
3) delineation of the organizational parameters in and
through which this commodity will be produced and distributed, including some ability to define the nature
of the workplace with respect to its relation to the
commodity producers, the commodity users, and the concept of commodity itself;
4) definition of what constitutes efficient and effective production and distribution of commodities (i.e.
how its production and distribution is to be
evaluated);
5) control over resources required to produce and distribute the commodity;
6) control over demand (i.e. consumer need) for the
commodity, and over the number (supply) of specialized
practitioners who are sanctioned to meet it--that is, a
quasi-monopoly over production and distribution involving control over education, training, licensing (legal
sanctions), and cultural sanctions (values, beliefs,
customs, etc.).
Structurally, the professional enterprise can be considered to
be a loosely ordered interorganizational system of occupational
control, consisting of:
a) individuals who perform roughly similar specialized functions, primarily as a means of earning a
livelihood; b) associations to advance the interests of these specialized practitioners and promote occupational cohesion through
political, social, and ideological activities; c) educational and
training institutions to produce, reproduce, and legitimate the
practitioners and their knowledge and skill; and d) cultural and
legal devices to protect the established domain of occupational
specialization.
The formation of successful professional enterprises and their
continued hegemony over an occupational domain is not a haphazard
occurrence.
New enterprises are formed purposively by innovative
entrepreneurs who have sufficient incentives, access to the necesMore specifically, people
sary resources, and organizing talent.
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will be motivated to found new enterprises when (Stinchcombe,
1965: 146,7):
(a) they find or learn about alternative better ways of
doing things that are not easily done within existing
social arrangements; (b) they believe that the future
will be such that the organization will continue to be
effective enough to pay for the trouble of building it
and for the resources invested; (c) they or some social
group with which they are strongly identified will
receive some of the benefits of the better way of doing
things; (d) they can lay hold of the resources of
wealth, power, and legitimacy needed to build the organization; and (e) they can defeat, or at least avoid
being defeated by, their opponents, especially those
whose interests are vested in the old regime.
These characteristics of individual motivation are affected by
social structural conditions in a complicated kind of interaction
which accounts for both the rise of various classes of organization In historically specific time periods, such as guilds during
medieval times, and their particular modifications and variations
based on prior organizational history and social technologies
available at the time (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich, 1979).
In accounting for the appearance of a population of organizational systems, ecology has greater explanatory power than psychology.
Thus, to complete Stinchcombe's thought (emphasis added),
Better ways are communicated socially; the future is
partially guaranteed by social arrangements and disrupted by social convulsions; the pattern of identification of individuals with groups which will benefit, and the legal protection of the appropriated benefits, are social phenomena; the patterns of trust and
of mobility of resources which can determine whether
resources can be moved to innovators are socially patterned; and the distribution of power in society is an
aspect of social structure.
The general rise of professions as a form of occupational control in 19th century industrializing societies corresponds to the
rise of other related forms of social organization aimed at regulating production-distribution-consumption activities, most notably business and governmental corporations and trade unions. The
transformation of feudal society to industrial capitalism over
several centuries provided the social structural conditions necessary for the rise of these organizational forms. To summarize
these conditions briefly, they include:
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(1) ECONOMICALLY - the development of a market (or money) economy as a dominant cultural force apart from the
religious, political, and social fabric of life into
which it was indistinguishably interwoven in an earlier
era; the rise of "free laborers", capitalists, and
landlords selling their services on the market for
land, labor, and capital; and the corresponding growth
of a middle class of consumers of commodities with the
appearance eventually of the phenomenon of consumer
"demand" (Heilbroner, 1970: 64);
(2) IDEOLOGICALLY - the principle of economic liberalism aimed at establishing and perpetuating a selfregulating market through laissez-faire and free trade
policies (Polyani, 1957: 132); the doctrine of individualism that justifies laissez-faire, that "the good
of all will be served if each individual pursues his
self-interest with minimal interference" (Wilensky and
Lebeaux, 1965: 34); rationality as applied to the discovery and application of knowledge and its manifestations in social organizations and the allocation of
scarce values;
(3) POLITICALLY - the evoluation of citizenship as an
(initially restricted) institution protected by civic,
political, and social rights,--especially: (civic) individual freedom and freedom of thought, religion, and
the right to own property, to contract, and to justice
or due process; (political) the right to participate in
the exercise of political power as a member of a body
invested with political authority or as an elector of
its members; and (social) the right to a measure of
economic welfare and security according to standards
prevailing in the society, social services, and education (Marshall, 1964: 71-2);
(4) SOCIALLY - a vast increase in urbanization, and in
specialization in the divison of labor involving a decline in unskilled occupations and a growth of semiskilled, technical, and managerial work (Heilbroner,
1970: 102); and the creation of new classes that eventually displaced the old;
(5) TECHNOLOGICALLY - the growth of science and a
myriad of technological inventions and their rapid diffusion throughout society; and a concomitant social
reconstruction of the meaning of time, family, and
work.
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It has been argued that the conditions outlined above can be
found to a greater or lesser degree in all industrializing societies, capitalist or socialist. As Wilensky and Lebeaux have stated
(1965: 44- 5 ),
Much of what is called 'capitalism' turns out to be
features of economic organization common to all highly
industrialized countries, whatever their culture; (2)
the uniqueness of capitalism is often a matter of
degree--for something resembling the doctrines of
economic individualism if not the free market is found
in noncapitalistic societies as well...
...Capital, mechanization, a monetary system of exchange, double-entry bookkeeping, the conversion of
property rights into monetary terms, stable nationstates, the emergence of a working class--these are
universal features of highly developed economies. They
are all present in the more recent development of Germany, Japan, and the Soviety Union, countries which
could hardly be lumped together as capitalist.
While Wilensky and Lebeaux's observations of the objective features of economic development may be true, the "matter of degree"
is not a matter to be passed over lightly, if we hope to understand the more particular forms of social organization within different advanced industrial societies. Despite occupational
specialization and differentiation, the medical profession in
Great Britain obviously has much less control over the productiondistribution-consumption functions of health care than its entrepreneurial counterpart in the United States. Nor does the social work enterprise look quite the same in these countries (Parry, Rustin, and Satyamurti, 1979).
Despite the leavening qualities of industrialization, the shape of the professional phenomenon in the USSR is also a unique product of the country's political economy (Haug, 1975).
Stated differently, then, the relationship of the division of
labor to the hierarchical distribution of resources is a function,
not of industrialization, but of the political, economic, and social structures through which industrialization occurred in a
given society, and the ideology that interpreted and thereby
helped fashion the industrialization process. For the United
States, the culture of capitalism cannot be separated from industrialization; it has been its major defining force. The study
of the professionalization of an area of specialized work, therefore, requires an analysis of a complex set of relationships

-702-

between and among occupational groups and segments therein, powerful elites, and consumers interacting in an encompassing, highly
competitive market economy. The central concern in that investigation is to find out how, within that dynamic political economy, some particular occupational segment succeeded in establishing
control (as a profession) over its sphere of occupational
specialization.

A Political Economic Model of Professionalization
The achievement of professional status by an occupational
group is a complex process. Minimally, for each separate profession it involved a group of organizers who wanted a professional
enterprise and were able to garner the resources to construct it.
Since professionalization is a population phenomenon,--a species
of organization (identified here as the professional enterprise)
emerged during a specific historical time period--it also involved
a nurturant environment, an environment with sufficient resources
and information, of a particular kind, distributed in some usable
fashion, that could be tapped by occupational entrepreneurs. A
political economic model fits this version of professional
development and should help clarify its dynamics.
Political economy, defined descriptively, is "the interrelation between a political system (a structure of rule) and an
economy ( a system for producing and exchanging goods and serPolitical economic analysis
vices)" (Wamsley and Zald, 1973: 17).
entails the study of both systems and their interrelationships
along the following lines (Wamsley and Zald, 1973: 17):
...In general, analysis of political systems has two
major components: (1) ethos or values, and (2) power
system. That is, 'political' encompasses both power
and the values (ends) which power is used to achieve.
...An economy is a system for producing goods and services. A description of an economy consists of two
parts: (1) a statement of the goods and services produced, their quantities, and through which organizational forms they were produced; and (2) a definition
of the mechanisms, rules, and institutions that shape
exchange of goods and services.
Since political power is often used to control the distribution of
resources, and the accumulation of resources is an important
source of political power, political economic phenomena are not
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easily separable into their respective categories.
the model, however, lies in this interaction.

The utility of

The outlines of a political economic model for the development
of the professional enterprise can be constructed around three
sets of relationships and their interaction, --the relationship of
the developing enterprise to: (1) the economic system; (2) societal elites and the class structure; and (3) competitive occupational segments within its specialized domain and the overall occupational hierarchy. We should like to begin our model construction at an abstract level with a brief overview of power relations
in a dynamic environment. We shall then sketch in more detail
some of the concrete tasks and variables that affected the professional project in the United States during the growth of industrial capitalism.

THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND EXCHANGE IN THE PROFESSIONAL PROJECT
Occupational groups with professional aspirations needed an
environment with the right kind and amount of resources to construct a professional enterprise and the capacity to take advantage of the available opportunities. Stated differently, the
environment positively selects out those organizational forms that
fit with or match its complex of opportunities and constraints
(Aldrich, 1979). Variations among and within occupational groups
in a given environment also affect selection, helping to explain
the success and failure of professional endeavors, hence the
stratification of occupations. The strategic role of environmental variables places boundaries on the activities of the founders
and sustainers of any organizational endeavor.
It is axiomatic
that, from their standpoint, the greater their ability to control
relevant environmental variables, the greater their chance for
success.
For any new or continuing organizational endeavor, the elements of the environment that must be available and/or subject to
control in some favorable mix consist of (1) customers (both distributors and users); (2) suppliers of materials, labor, capital,
equipment, and work space; (3) competitors for both markets and
resources; and (4) regulatory groups, including governmental agencies, unions, and interfirm associations. Dill (1958) conceptualized this set as a task environmentp because these are the salient
environmental elements that an organizaton must concern itself
with in order to carry out its mission or achieve its ends. We
would add to this list (5) symbolic information, organized in the
form of political ideologies. Political ideologies are socially
constructed beliefs and ideas which explain and justify the claims
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that groups make for their resource requirements and allocations
(Silver, 1980), as for example, the sanctity of science and technology. They become an important resource themselves for the creation and exercise of power.
The task environment can be conceived of as a political economy or an exchange field within which aspiring occupational groups
operate. The characteristics of the environment or field define
the parameters of constraint and opportunity for such groups, as
well as their contingencies, --that is, the degree to which task
environment elements may be subject to control or predictable.
Control is never complete; it varies with the composition, structure, and dynamics of the field. For example, financial support
in the hands of a benefactor is relatively clear as to its potential size and the conditions under which it might become available. Financial support based upon consumer demand is a much less
determinate resource. Thus, the nature of the task environment
elements--their substance, relative scarcity, distribution, accessibility, exchangeability, and stability all contributed to the
rise of professions and the relative success of individual occupa7
tional efforts.
Applying some of these ideas to the rise of professions, it
might be argued that the pre-industrial occupational environment
was essentially resource-poor, placid or static, and dispersed.
Occupational groups operated within local consumer markets, separated from one another by the rigid boundaries of the social
stratification system. The rules for production-consumptiondistribution were well established by social class, and supported
by legal regulations and tradition. Technology was undeveloped
and its rate of development was slow. Information among the different actors in the exchange field travelled slowly; actual and
potential linkage among these actors, that is, the state of interconnectedness, was low. The prevailing sense of time and distance
affected both the individual and the collective sense of social
change.
By contrast, during the period of industrial capitalism, when
professionalization was taking place in the United States, roughly
1850-1930, the environment was much more complex, competitive,
dynamic, and resource-rich. A labor market and a consumer market
for professional services were being created and expanded through
the growth of a "free middle class," unfettered by social class
privilege and tradition. Coalitions of occupational groups were
forming. Capital was being organized in new ways and new corporate forms were emerging. Regulations and norms governing
economic exchanges were open to strategic manipulation. New technoogy was being rapidly created and diffused alongside the spread
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of literacy and education. Many of these changes were interconnected, signaling a coming significant change in the state of the
field as a whole (Emery and Trist, 1965). The environment, in
short, provided a rich climate for opportunistic planning, as social, technological, and political economic development expanded
the possibilities for linkage and control.
The concept of task environment is useful for understanding
the interplay of power and exchange during the process of professionalization. In order to professionalize, an aspiring occupation group needs to control the resources in its task environent,
and it interacts with others to obtain them. To the degree that
their exchange partners in the task environment (individuals,
groups, organizations) control the needed resources, the occupational group lacks the power to accomplish its ends. Thus, in an
exchange relationship, power is a function of control over
strategic resources, or independence. The greater the control,
the greater the independence, hence power; the less the control,
the lower the power, and the greater the dependency on whomever
does control a strategic resource (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962).
So, for example, the need of an aspiring occupation for money to
staff a professional association may or may not be problematic.
It may lead to dependency on a private foundation which then gives
the foundation a corresponding degree of power to define the professional project; it may obtain these funds from its own members,
retaining more membership power to define the professional project; it may fail to locate resources altogether and either find a
If the strategic resource is
viable substitute, or go without.
critical, the occupational group's efforts may fail.
In sum, in a complex and dynamic exchange field, or political
economy, transactions go on simultaneously among many interrelated
actors. The composition, structure, and dynamics of the field
mediate these transactions. Power is a function of strategic
resource control or the ability to manage environmental contingencies The result of this continuous interplay is a highly politicized climate with both fixed and shifting power arrangements
among the actors. Power shifts among different factions in the
professional enterprise and/or its task environment as conditions
change and competing elements are able to mobilize to take advantage of them. In a context of resource scarcity, "cooperation,
competition, and conflict (are) transitory elements in a process
to accumulate resources and achieve autonomy" (Silver, 1980: 23).
In
Autonomy, of course, is the goal of an aspiring occupation.
market terms, when an aspiring occupation gains enough power in
its task environment to regulate the production-consumptiondistribution processes of its specialized commodity, largely by
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itself, its drive for professional status will have been
accomplished.
Tasks and Strategic Variables
During the last half of the 19th century in the United States,
the growth of industrial capitalism opened potential new markets
for specialized occupations and the possibility for gaining access
to the older segregated markets of the traditional "professions."
These opportunities stimulated various occupational groups to embark on the construction and expansion of professional enterprises
for their economic self-interest. In some instances, these efforts were mutually supportive; in others they competed for
resources and turf. Collectively, however, they shared the same
ideological terrain, founded on the enduring tenets of U.S.
political economic ideology: the sanctity of private property,
the philosophy of economic Individualism, the value of opportunity
(Hofstader, 1960: viii). They also faced similar problems
negotiating a course through the still nascent market economy.
In order for the professionalizing sectors of a growing "middle class" to organize and control these competitive markets, they
Ideologicaly, they had to conhad to accomplish several tasks.
struct a "monopoly of credibility" with the public to secure a
clientele, and they had to conquer "official privilege" so as to
obtain "a set of legally enforced monopolies of practice." The
precondition for successful management of these external ideological tasks was an internal task, "the unification of the corresponding areas of the social division of labor under the direction of a leading group of professional reformers." The heart of
the unification project was the creation of a system of training
which would centralize and standardize the production of the professional commodity, namely, the professionals themselves, who
gained the specialized expertise (Larson, 1977: 16-17).
To fully explicate the political economic model, these tasks
can be refined into a more specific set of economic, political,
and ideological tasks which the founding members of any professionalizing occupation need to carry out to successfully build an
enterprise.
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ECONOMIC TASKS
(1) create.a marketable (needed) commodity;
(2) ensure sufficient production of the commodity by:
a) securing and training a production force,
b) securing production sites,
c) instituting centralized systems of product control to maintain a commodity of standardized
quality;

(3) acquire control of outlets for distribution and
sales;
(4) establish and negotiate an acceptable rate of return for investors;

(5) create a consumer market of clientele for its
commodities.
POLITICAL TASKS
(1) induce individuals and groups of potential providers and other resource holders or managers to invest
labor and capital in developing and producing the commodity, providing work space, distribution outlets,
etc.
(2) define the boundaries of the new enterprise so as
to include and exclude desireable and undesireable
members;
(3) establish the domain of the enterprise by overcoming competitors for resources and markets;
(4) negotiate favorable agreements with regulatory
bodies to protect investments in the enterprise
(preferably a monopoly).
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IDEOLOGICAL TASKS
(1) convince the potential members of the enterprise
that they share a joint mission;
(2) convince legitimating bodies that the enterprise is
worth sanctioning, --including relevant segments of the
ruling class;
(3) convince the public of the superior quality of and
necessity for its commodities.
Though similar to other industrial ventures, some aspects of
this organizing effort are (and were) unique because of the unusual type of commodity to be marketed. Variations in the commodity and in other, less singular but still strategic resources
and their management, account for the differential success of particular professionalizing occupations In the past. They also continue to affect the professional phenomenon in the present. We
shall list three variables and briefly discuss them here in order
to complete a political-economic model. Divided into three groups,
they are:

ECONOMIC VARIABLES
(1) the intangible quality of the commodity;
(2) patterns of consumer demand, consumption, and
distribution;
(3) the ability to attract producers to join the
enterprise.

POLITICAL VARIABLES
(1) the social status of the founders and other members
of the enterprise and the strength of their ties to
members of the ruling class;

IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES
(1) ideological justification and the capacity to communicate it.
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These variables are not Independent of one another. For example,
the social status of the founders affects the ability to attract
selectively other producers as well as the political ideology of
the enterprise. However, they may vary independently of one another.
In addition, the political process in an exchange field is
a function of multiple opportunities, contingencies, and ideological constructions, and the skills which actors bring to the interplay. The analysis of individual professionalizing efforts ultimately involves sorting out these variations and determining the
effects of combinations of multiple interactions on the outcomes.
The Intangible Quality of the Commodity
Professionalizing occupations had, and continue to have, a
unique set of production and distribution problems that derive
from the nature of the commodity they seek to exchange in the
marketplace. For most professions the commodity is an abstract,
intangible service of uncertain worth--"an intellectual
technique"--rather than a tangible good with ultimate utility (use
value) which is immediately visible or apparent to a potential
consumer or investor. In Larson's words (1977:4),
...professional work, like any other form of labor, is
only a fictitious commodity; it 'cannot be detached
from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized', and it
is not produced for sale. Unlike craft or industrial
labor.. .most professions produce intangible goods;
their product, in other words, is only formally alienable and is inextricably bound to the person and the
personality of the producer.
This intangible quality creates several difficulties pursuant to
establishing a degree of market security sufficient to offset high
"investment and production" costs. Mainly they can be considered
under the headings of visibility and cognitive superiority.
For a commodity to be marketable, it must have sufficient
visibility for potential consumers and investors to identify it as
something they value. This visibility, in turn, depends upon both
perceived utility and standardization, or how well the commodity
can be identified in the public's mind with the solution of a
problem, meeting of a need, or resolution of an uncertainty felt
as real and significant. "Professional" commodities vary in their
potential to demonstrate visible benefit. Some are inherently
more "useful" because they can be defined by the producers in
terms of individual, clearly articulated needs for a large group
of potential consumers, such as legal services to obtain a
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favorable contract or judgement regarding disputed life, limb,
property; or medical care to treat conmmon afflictions or specific
maladies. The benefits of other types of "professional" commodities may not be as readily apparent because they are bound up with
conflictual societal values and/or more ambiguous individual
needs, such as psychiatric treatment or social work services.
In the interplay between meeting needs and shaping needs, the
desire of producers to establish the immediate utility of their
commodities may also affect the way they define them for the
public. An example Is the representation of health care as the
treatment of illnesses or individual "curing" rather than "prevention." Furthermore, the utility of some commodities may be easier
to demonstrate because the relationship between the applied technology and a beneficial outcome may be dramatic and direct rather
than indirect, close In time sequence rather than protracted, or
empirically more capable of support, hence less subject to debate
about beneficial effects. Medicine has had many of these advantages in its professionalization efforts. When a commodity
controlled by a professionalizing occupation is also, in fact,
demonstrably superior to its competitors, e.g. sulfa drugs by
physicians, the construction of a professional enterprise may be
greatly advanced.
Standardization of an intangible commodity, as with the more
tangible goods, enhances its visibility for several reasons.
It
allows the commodity to be recognizeable to a wide public; it
facilitates claims to a defineable professional domain; it makes
conmodity production possible in dispersed locations but identifiable with the same occupational group; it facilitates production
of sufficient quantities to meet market needs.
In a situation
where new professional markets had to be developed altogether
during the industrial revolution, standardization was a major
requirement.
But standardization also poses some unique problems. Since
the "professional" commodity is not separable from the producers,
the ability to produce it in sufficient quantity and quality, uniformly, requires that "the producers themselves be reproduced.
In
other words, the professionals must be adequately trained and socialized so as to provide recognizeably distinct services for exchange on the professional market" (Larson, 1977:14).
In industrial terms, in effect, the situation requires quality control
over the mass production of human beings who will attain mastery
over "an intellectual technique" which can be marketed as distinct
and recognizeable services. This degree of control necessitates
highly selective screening of applicants and rigorous education
and socialization in a standardized setting where the producers
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can closely supervise and regulate the training process.
Institutions of higher education, programmatically controlled by producers, lend themselves to these needs better than apprenticeship
arrangements in diverse settings. During the generational period
of the professional project, the development of compulsory education, the growing prominence of science, and the growth of the
modern university all complemented the requirements of the professional market. In the new industrial democracy, higher education
became the convenient arbiter of merit--achieved status over
ascribed status--through the use of purportedly universalistic
criteria for recruitment and performance evaluation. In the process it abetted and legitimated professional monopoly by these
same criteria in the occupational sphere and the ever more subtle
perpetuation of social stratification (Larson, 1977).
The difficulties of securing a professional market are compounded by the intangible quality of the "professional" commodity
in still another way that also supports the thrust towards monopoly.
Ultimately, the intangible quality is a function of the more
abstract "theoretical" principles of the cognitive base that underpins the specialized technology. Internally, while battles
over cognitive superiority may be quite intense (Turner and
Hodges, 1970: 26), colleagues can still make a reasoned, even
scientific, assessment. Externally, since the layman does not
ordinarily share the specialist's universe of discourse, evaluation is more difficult. The professional has difficulty establishing the authority which will make a client seek out professional advice and follow it. Therefore, cognitive superiority
must be partially established through ideological means. Some
commodities have greater potential for ideological exploitation
than others, and some occupations by their nature can make better
use of institutionalized ideological supports to advance their
claims for functional authority. The trappings of educational
credentials, expensive office furnishings, prestigious associations, social status, and legal regulation often substitute as
supportive data for any public evaluation of cognitive superiority
(Freidson, 1970). When a legally protected monopoly of practice
can be established, the professional enterprise gains official
sanction for its expertise which now does not have to be continously proven.

Patterns of Consumer Demand, Consumption, and Distribution
A profession is a form of collegiate control by a group of
practitioners over a set of production-consumption-distribution
activities of a specialized occupation. Other forms of control
are also possible, namely patronage and state mediation. With
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patronage, subdivided into oligarchic and corporate types, consumer control over occupational services becomes institutionalized. "Patronage arises where the dominant effective demand for
occupational services comes from a small, powerful, unitary clientele" (Johnson, 1972:65), either an aristocratic elite or a small
number of large-scale corporations who may become major consumers
of the 'expert' services. With mediative control by the state,
"the state intervenes in the relationship between practitioner and
client in order to define needs and/or the manner In which such
needs are catered for" (p. 77). State mediation can be distinguished from corporate patronage by public agencies in that "the
state attempts to remove from the producer or consumer the authority to determine the content and subjects of practice" (p.
77).
In all of these forms of occupational control, patterns of
consumer demand and consumption represent the major sources of
environmental uncertainty affecting the form of institutional control which develops.
Occupational control in the form of professions appeared in
the latter part of the 19th century with the emergence of an urban
bourgeoisie who provided consumers for specialized services and
the recruits for the body of aspiring practitioners. Successful
professionalization could not occur without "an effective demand
for occupational skills from a large and relatively heterogeneous
In an environment with only a small numconsumer group" (p. 51).
ber of powerful clients, a professionalizing occupation would lack
the broad base of support necessary to secure a sizeable market
investment and/or it would be highly dependent upon meeting the
needs defined by the group paying for its services.
Professionalization efforts benefit as well from an unorganized consumer population because organization can be an effective means to balance power dependency by consumers through collective control over the demand for services. In this respect,
the recent development of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's)
and third party payment systems in the United States have led to
some shifts in the control of professional medical services,
though not yet to a national health service. Services provided to
consumers on a one-to-one, fee-for-service basis through solo or
group partnership arrangements also strengthen professional control, despite the contention of classical liberal economists that
this arrangement maximizes consumer choice. Consumer power is
decreased, rather than maximized, when the consumer population is
large and heterogeneous, and the provider group is carefully restricted, and when large inequalities exist In the ability to pay
for services. Furthermore, the individual approach reduces the
consumers' ability to collectively define problems, needs, and
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roles, and thereby potentially to alter the demand for certain
kinds of benefits or services.
The professionalizing efforts of both law and medicine
benefitted from the type of consumer population which was available in the mid-19th century and their pattern of demand. Both
professionalizing occupations provided services for an expanding,
urban, middle class market, which sought and paid for them on an
individualized basis, whether privately or entrepreneurially.
"Needs which had been restricted to the upper stratum of society
filtered down and outwards so that medicine, law, and architecture, for example, were no longer small, socially prescribed
cliques, but large associations servicing competing status groups
of near equals" (p. 52). Engineering, on the other hand, provided
technical and economic consultation that could be better assessed
by its consumers, and, more to the point, engineers were generally
salaried employees of large-scale economic enterprises rather than
independent consultants or entrepreneurs (Larson, 1977: 27). In
still a different pattern, social work services in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries were neither sought out nor paid for by
the direct users of the services, the urban poor. The real clientele of social workers were the philanthropists, and eventually
the state, who actually paid for the services and thereby restricted the collegiate control that social workers could establish in their sphere of occupational expertise.
As is evident from the above, other consumption patterns also
affect the ability to professionalize. While consumer utilization
of specialized services is usually a voluntary matter, the need
for particular services is affected by socio-cultural patterns and
is distributed differentially according to socio-economic status.
Need itself is, therefore, elastic--subject to custom, economic
capacity, and ideological manipulation. The struggles to build a
profession and a corresponding professional market have involved,
not only the identification of need, but also its creation. With
the pre-eminence of the professional phenomenon in 20th century
industrial capitalism, the role of powerful professions in creating need has come under scrutiny and sharp criticism. The tenor,
if not the substance, of this critique is captured in the
trenchant writing of Ivan Illich (1977: 27).
The disabling of the citizen through professional
dominance Is completed through the power of illusion.
Religion finally becomes displaced, not by the state or
by the waning of faith, but by professional establishments and client confidence. The professions appropriate the special knowledge to define public issues in
terms of problems. The acceptance of this claim

legitimizes the docile recognition of imputed lacks on
the part of the layman; his world turns into a chamber
of needs. This dominance is reflected in the skyline
of the city. Professional buildings look down on the
crowds that shuttle between them in a continual
pilgrimage to the new cathedrals of insurance, health,
education, and welfare. Homes are transformed into
hygienic apartments where one cannot be born, cannot be
sick and cannot die decently...
Consumption patterns and demands also may affect the ability
to control the distribution of a specialized commodity. In
patronage and state mediative arrangements, where definition and
demand for a commodity are much less strictly regulated by the
producers or the marketplace, as for example with public school
education, the distribution of services is also much less subject
to producer control. This lack of autonomy may contribute to
crises of legitimacy for a professionlizing group (Baum, 1978).
Additionally, the nature of the specialized commodity or service itself affects the ability of producers to control its distribution. For example, routine medical examinations can be performed in a private office, but non-routine medical care often
requires other facilities, e.g. the hospital or nursing home, and/
or other specializations. Though education can be provided on an
individual tutorial basis, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and
sometimes pedagogy as well, educational services do not lend themselves well to such individualistic arrangements. Thus the distribution requirements of specialized commodities vary as to:
size and complexity of physical facilities machine implements and
hard technologies (computers, x-rays, etc.), ancillary labor,
interdependencies with other specialized groups (heteronomy), legal sanctions, and legitimacy. All of these distribution requirements represent sources of dependency in its "task environment"
that a professionalizing occupation must deal with successfully to
gain collegiate control. These dependencies may also change for
many reasons, as for example, newly organized demands by consumers
for more control over the commodity, or the need for new and
sophisticated technologies controlled by other specialized groups,
or competitive professionalizing occupations. The relationships
between production and distribution, as well as production and
consumption, then, may become major sources of tension for an
aspiring occupation or an existing profession.
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Ability to Attract Producers
The construction and continuation of a professional enterprise
requires a steady stream of recruits able and willing to pay for
the protracted education (and overhead set-up costs in some cases)
to become its specialized experts. Since investment costs in time
and money are high, potential recruits have to be convinced that
their endeavors will be worth it socially and financially. Once a
professionalizing group has established its monopoly of practice,
the attraction of producers is simplified.
In the absence of such
a monopoly or prior to its attainment recruits must be attracted
on other grounds. Usually these have involved the promise of individual payoffs in the form of social status, high incomet secure
career, autonomy over the conditions and content of one's work,
social class socialization to the value of intellectual of "genteel" vocations, and/or a persuasive mission or ideology.
In general, the ferment of industrial capitalism provided a
rich soil for recruitment. The expanded middle classes formed a
labor pool; individualism as a pervasive value orientation
stressed individual status and financial remuneration as worthy
cultural objectives; the university became the arbiter of merit,
the accepted agency of individual social mobility and legitimator
of social status; the growth of large public and private corporations offered new opportunity markets for occupational specialization; and science and research applied to all manner of human endeavor were optimistically advanced as the avenue to alleviate
social stress. Even so, professionalizing occupations varied in
their ability to attract producers.
Professionalizing occupations with a core of elite producers
trained in already prestigious universities--the older "learned"
professions of medicine and law--had the advantage of prior social
standing and accepted mission to lend to their attractiveness.
Taking medicine as an example, while battles for control among
sub-groups raged during the last half of the 19th century, and
medical societies actually lost their licensing powers for a time
before the Civil War, the field continued to attract large numbers
of prospects. Despite, or perhaps because of the title "doctor,"
at the turn of the century, the United States had one of the highest doctor-to-patient ratios in the world (Larson, 1977). But if
the average yearly income of most doctors was low, in the laissezfaire market system of medical practice, so were the costs of becoming one. When the American Medical Assocaition eventualy succeeded in gaining control of the medical schools in the early decades of the 20th century, and forged the educational reforms that
enabled professionalization (in our terms), the desired effects of
market monopoly were set in motion. The number of medical schools
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and the supply of physicians decreased, the length of education
and training was extended, and access to the profession was greatly restricted, particularly for women, blacks, and working class
persons. At the same time, the status and income of the average
physician was considerably improved (Larson, 1977: 164).
New aspiring professions or those whose status, financial
promise, and autonomy were less certain because of the clientele
they served or the organizational context of their work, relied
more on ideological persuasion to attract recruits. These occupations benefitted from the ideology already attached to the professional concept in general, such as an association with "science"
and education, as well as the substantive ideological potential of
the particular aspiring vocations, such as the nobility of public
service moral reform, or social Justice. These professionalizing
occupations, such as nursing, social work, teaching, already in a
disadvantageous position in the occupational hierarchy, remained
much more open to women, minority group members, and working class
persons who were excluded from the older "professions" by the ostensibly neutral meritocratic criteria that masked sexual, racial,
ethnic, and social class discrimination.

Founder Status and Ties to Power Structure
Occupational groups whose members are connected to societal
elites have a competitive advantage in the political and ideological struggle to establish a monopoly of practice. Wealthy elites
command the resources to define and legitimate knowledge, values,
priorities, social problems and needs and different ways of meeting them. They can sanction a professional enterprise, invest
resources in its development and upkeep, and help it to fashion
and control its consumer market.
Members of the "learned" professions of law, medicine, and
theology brought a pre-industrial inheritance of wealth, aristocratic traditions and ties, political title, and university
education (with little technical expertise) with them into the
competitive 19th century period of professional expansion and
development In medicine, to use an example from the archetypical
profession, this inheritance gave physicians in the United States
a competitive edge over other healing occupations to establish
themselves as the controlling segment(Freidson, 1970a, Larson,
1979).
The nineteenth century United States was a society with a spacious frontier and an egalitarian ethic. As one form of healer on

-718-

the scene, physicians did not have a demonstrably superior technology9 nor could they regulate producer or consumer markets. For
the elite of physicians, connected to the most prestigious medical
schools, urban hospitals, and public offices, this situation was
temporarily worsened by the reform of higher education in the
186 0's which brought technological and professional training and
scientific research into the universities and set off an era of
tremendous expansion (Ben-David, 1964; Bledstein, 1976). The new
middle classes now had access to credentials and legitimacy for a
broad range of healing practices.
As medical specialities developed within the physician group
and outside it, e.g. nurses, midwives, chiropractors, homeopathic
doctors, surgeons, the medical field also became confused and
over-crowded. To oversimplify a complex history for the sake of a
point, ultimately, through its connections to the corporate and
university power structure, the elite specialists from the most
reputable Eastern medical schools prevailed over the medical domain. An enforcement of licensing became more feasible through an
expanding network of county medical societies, the Flexner Report
of 1910, also promoted by the MA and funded by the Carnegie Foundation, spurred the reform of medical education and the consolidation of the medical field under the "scientific doctors." Flexner's recommendation, essentially for "fewer and better doctors"
was not the most significant aspect of this history; high level
commissions commonly make recommendations that are never followed.
Rather, it was that the recommendations were sanctioned and implemented through resources controlled by societal elites. According
to Larson (1977: 164),
Much more than official sanction and punitive measures,
foundation money brought about the implementation of
Flexner's recommendations. The leading foundations
clearly favored the Northeastern medical establishment:
between 1911 and 1936, The Johns Hopkins Medical School
got about $10 million of Rockefeller money and $2 from
the Carnegie Corporation. Between 1910 and 1938, the
nine leading foundations gave more than $154 million to
medical schools, most of it going to the best private
schools. The Rockefeller General Education Board gave
slightly under $66 millon to only nine schools.
Recently, in "The De-professionalization of Everyone?", Haug
(1975: 211) advanced the perceptive proposition that "societal
trends, both technological and ideological, are rendering the concept of profession obsolete," so that the future may bring, not
the end of expertise, but de-professionalization in the sense of a
status-equalizing process. The forces challenging and eroding the
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historic importance of status for professionalization include:
the rise in the general educational level of the public, attacks
on credentialism without the requisite experiential component,
trends towards patient and consumer education in specialized
fields, the availability of technological information stored in
computers and readily retrievable, mistrust of the service ethic
as evidence in malpractice suits, and the stiffer monitoring of
the rights of human subjects in experiments, --in short, a general
weakening of professional autonomy and authority. "The deprofesslonalization of everyone would usher in an age of the
client as consumer, a consumer who Is expected to question, compare and treat all advice with a skeptical ear," and "the moral
and evaluative overtones of the professional model" would decline
(Haug, 1975: 212).
Haug's observations can be accepted without reaching the same
conclusions. There is no evidence that the capitalistic vision of
economic man has been seriously weakened in U.S. culture. We assume that in a competitive capitalistic society prestige will continue to be associated with occupation and income. Therefore,
occupational groups will continue to compete for status, creating
and re-creating an occupational hierarchy. Since expertise alone
is not the basis of occupational prestige, even if expert
knowledge becomes widespread and the consumer more assertive, occupations that already have attained the status of "profession"
and the monopoly that goes with it, and other aspiring occupations, will still value and protect the rubric of "professionalism." This assumption in no way implies professions forever.
It does suggest, though, that our current economic, political, and social institutions would need to be modified. When production and allocation decisions are not so strongly governed by
the political economy of the marketplace, differential status
could eventually be based on criteria other than occupation and
income. In this new context, professions may then lose their social class trappings to disappear entirely or be replaced by a new
occupational hierarchy based upon characteristics consistent with
the new social order.

Ideological Justification and Communication Capacity
As part of their political struggles for monopolistic privileges, professionalizing occupations must engage in several
ideological tasks. These involve convincing relevant segments of
the ruling class and the public of the merits of their demands for
autonomy, and that privileges, once granted, will not be abused,
but on the contrary, will benefit society. Successful exercise of
these ideological tasks in the main requires two kinds of
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ideological resources: (1) the construction of a persuasive
rationale or justification; and (2) an effective capacity to communicate proof of the occupation's merit.
The justification for monopolistic advantage that aspiring
occupations developed in the 19th and 20th centuries fit with the
tenets and values of industrial capitalism; it also helped to
shape its development. Eventually, this justification became an
ideology of professionalism still used by aspiring occupations
today. As discussed in earlier sections, the content of this professional ideology centered around the cognitive superiority of
specialized knowledge/technology based on science as a method, and
the norms of impartiality, objectivity, and non-commercial advantage embodied in a service ideal. This ideology was responsive
to and promoted at the same time such dominant values as individualism, free competition, the application of science (as a
method and a world view) and technology to human endeavors and
social progress, and the rationalization of the economy and community life to secure a stable environment for business and industry (Kolko, 1963; Wiebe, 1967).
It supported and received support, in turn, from such major developments as the reform of the
university to be more compatible with the industrial world and its
rise as a status-transforming and status-conferring institution,
and the growth of large-scale bureaucracies in the public and private sectors of the political economy.
In the eyes of at least
one observer, this professional ideology would have to be placed
as the centerpiece of an entire culture of professionalism that
permeated middle class life in the United States between 1840 and
1915 (Bledstein, 1976).
Ambitious individuals in America were instrumental in
structuring society according to a distinct vision--the
vertical one of career. The most emphatically middleclass man was the professional, improving his worldly
lot as he offered his services to society, expressing
his expanding expectations at ascending stages of an
occupation. Professionalism emerged as more than an
institutional event in American life, more than an outward process by which Americans made life more rational.
It was a culture--a set of learned values and
habitual responses--by which middle-class individuals
shaped their emotional needs and measured their powers
of intelligence...
Professionalizing occupations vary in their capacity to use
the ideology of professionalism strategically, either because they
cannot convey an image sufficiently consistent with the ideology
or because their capacity to communicate the proof of their claims
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is in some way deficient. Ideological resources to communicate
justification include: symbolic resources--the status of the
aspirants as a symbol itself, and the special language and
dramaturgy of their practice; and formal and informal vehicles of
communication--journals, textbooks, conferences, conventions, occupational associations, and the mass media. The symbols associated with an occupation can convey or reinforce persuasively a
belief in the highly unique knowledge and skills of its practitioners. "The more abstract and ambiguous the language, the
more superhuman the practitioners and their challenges are portrayed, the more exclusively the occupational dramaturgy is enacted with clients (who must assume the good faith of the practitioners) rather than customers, the more convincing these symbols are... " (Nilson and Edelman: 1976: 24). A familiar illustration of the power of symbols to justify occupational prestige has
been the successful, long-running, and stereotypic TV portrayal of
the ethical sensitivity, drama, and skill of physicians and
lawyers at work. Similar efforts to portray social workers and
nurses have been unsuccessful.

Conclusion
Each of the perspectives we have presented above regards the
professional phenomenon differently, and as such takes a different
stance towards professonal ideology. The ideology of professionlism has become an accepted part of the dominant ideology of
United States society. "Put forward by established authorities,
the dominant ideology praises traditional arrangements, denies the
existence of conflicts of interest between authorities and subordinates, and opposes political change...Its major significance
lies in its influence over how alternatives are defined" (Karznelson and Kesselman, 1975: 356,7).
In capitalist society, "ideology
conceals the existence of class and the basic structure of exploitation" and "emphasizes individualism and individual solutions" (Larson, 1977: 156).
The structural-functional perspective of professions accepts
and supports the dominant ideology. Professions are viewed as
liberating for society, an integrative force that brings the
wisdom of science to the service of the public interest. Social
class is not an issue. The processual perspective questions prevailing arranagements in the division of labor, viewing these as
the outcome of a pluralistic political process in which occupational groups must engage. It does not question the competition
over status and rewards nor the basic structure of inequality itself. The ideology of professionalism is supported by accepting
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and using its tenets as the measure and means of achieving professional status. The general assumption is still that professions
are beneficial for all groups, and social class is, therefore, not
a concern, except as it may become an issue in individual service
delivery.
The political-economic perspective ties professions squarely
to social class. Professions are an integral part of the social
stratification system in United States society. As Western societies were transformed by the industrial revolution, professions
arose like other corporate ventures to take advantage of newly
forming economic markets.
In a competitive and rapidly expanding
capitalist economy, workers who had information and services to
sell--an intellectual technique--needed to find a means of protecting their labor. Those workers who could garner resources by
virtue of individual talent and the advantages of institutional
ties to the structure of power--through family, education, and
social class positions--were able to consolidate occupational
functions in a given sphere and control them by building a professional enterprise. Professions tie workers into an existing power
structure and serve it through their expertise in order to advance
their own class interests and status aspirations. With the dominant ideology thus exposed to criticism, professions can be examined as potentially detrimental or obstructive to the objective
interests of other groups. The structure of inequality is laid
bare as a fundamental issue.
The issue is not merely academic. The willingness of social
work professionals to examine structural inequality and their part
in preserving it can be a beginning step in the re-definition of
capitalistic institutions to more socialistic patterns. The prerequisite of that re-definition, however, is the development of
class consciousness. Here professional ideology is notably
obstructive.
Among the many changes in post-modern society, the most heralded have been the unprecedented growth in the numbers of professionals, managers, and white-collar workers, and the centrality of
theoretical knowledge for development, planning and policy analysis (Bell, 1973). The questions are whether this potentially
powerful aggregation constitutes a new social class, who belongs
to it, and whether it can become conscious of its objective interests and united around the reduction of structural inequality
(Wenocur, 1975). Professionals clearly belong to a middle or upper-middle economic stratum in the society, but to know that is to
know very little. "There are many intermediate strata, conveniently referred to as the 'middle class,' the boundaries of
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which are difficult to state exactly, and membership in which cannot be determined in any simple fashion" (Bottomore, 1966: 12).
Ehrenreich and Ehrenrelch (1977) among others have argued that a
coherent professional--managerial class Is emerging, whose members
share an overrising common ?culture" or lifestyle, despite some
internal antagonisms. Perhaps. But the ideology of profes9
sionalism within this class is divisive; it inhibits the development of a progressive, shared political consciousness.
The issue of structural inequality is especially pressing for
social workers in post-modern society. For not only does social
work have a unique historical tradition rooted in social reform,
but its mission brings social workers into daily contact with poor
and working class people who suffer most from Inequality. Social
workers (not alone among professionals) are caught between their
class interests as aspiring professionals and their democratic and
humanitarian ideals. If they hope to act on their ideals as they
come to terms with the multitude of issues facing the profession
in post-modern society, they need to explore and understand the
historical development of social work from a political economic
perspective. We believe this will enhance the capacity of social
workers to find socially progressive alternatives, and in concert
with other progressive groups, eventually to create a different
social reality.

-724-

NOTES
1. The figures in this table were compiled from two sources: 1)
The Statistical Abstract of the U.S.; 1975 U.S. Factbook, Table
No. 568, "Employed Persons by Major Group and Sex: 1950-1974", p.
350, U.S. Bureau of Census, Department of Commerece, October 1974;
and 2) a summary of three tables presented by Lewis Corey in "The
Middle Class", contained in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin
Lipset (eds.) Class, Status, and Power: A Reader in Social
Stratification, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953, pp. 371-380. The
three tables which were summed were Tables Nos. 3, 4, and 6, Independent Professionals, Technicians, and Salaried Professionals:
1870-1940. The original source for these tables was the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
2. Wilensky has used the dual attributes of technical/scientific
knowledge and the service ideal to challenge the contention that
the occupational structure as a whole is becoming more professionalized (Foote, 1953). This is a particularly convenient bit
of ideology because it contains a number of unproven assumptions
about the virtues of professions and does not seem measureable in
any reliable fashion. According to Wilensky (1964: 148) neither
specialized technique nor theory is sufficient for the professionlization of labor. There is an optimal base for professional
practice "neither too vague nor too precise, too broad nor too
narrow."
If the technical base of an occupation consists of a
vocabulary that sounds familiar to everyone (social
science and the arts of administration) or if the base
is scientific but so narrow that it can be learned as a
set of rules by most people, then the occupation will
have difficulty claiming a monopoly of skill or even a
roughly exclusive jurisdiction.
By the same token, rules which govern working conditions and production standards may help assure "technically competent, high
quality work," but do not ensure that a service ideal will be followed. Nor can union rules, which are designed to protect employees more than the public, be equated with the "moral norms" of
established professions. An example of the former would be
seniority rules; an example of the latter would be the routine
referrals made by professionals to their colleagues, even if a fee
is lost, when the client's needs fall outside one's own domain of
specialized competence. Nor are either of these attributes alone
sufficient for an occupation to claim professional recognition.
Both must be present.
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3. Professional movements differ from social movements in many
ways. The analogy holds best in terms of the presence of shared
ideology, interest group association, and the passions engendered
in the struggle for professionalization. The analogy breaks down
in the consideration that the ideology Is not a counter-ideology
to an established institutional order, but rather a struggle by
groups with resources for a still greater share and more powerful
position in the existing institutional structure.
4. "In the fifteenth century the Inns of Court were active educational institutions. They were, in effect, the residential colleges of a (purely legal) university, filling the gap left by the
exclusion of the common law from any place among the studies pursued in the recognized seats of learning" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 37).
5. Civil servants were university-trained clerks who studied
civil law to pursue careers in the civil service. With the recession of church influence, both civil lawyers and canon lawyers
declined before the 16th century. Common lawyers, not requiring
training in the university, became prevalent and were involved in
a wide range of legal and semi-legal activities (as they are today), such as politics and various administrative/managerial positions (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 2943).
6. U.S. institutions were influenced by this transformation in
many ways, though a feudal system never existed in the United
States. This historical difference partially accounts for the
differences in the structure of U.S. professions compared to those
in Europe.
7. A number of organizational theorists have described the composition and structure of organizational envrionments. Some of
these include: Levine and White, 1961; Thompson, 1967; Aiken and
Hage, 1968; Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968.
8. This section is based upon the work of Terence Johnson, Professions and Power, 1972, and unless otherwise indicated all
quotations are from this source.
9. The Professional-Managerial Class consists of "salaried mental
workers who do not own the means of production and whose major
function in the social division of labor may be described broadly
as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class
relations" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1977: 45).
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BOOK REVIEWS

THE ASSEMBLY LINE, by ROBERT LINHART. Translated by Margaret Crosland.
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981. 160 pp. $6.95 paper.

MIKE PARKER
Detroit

Recognizing social problems is only the beginning.
the public policies which will provide a real solution.
finding the social power to make the changes.

Harder is identifying
Hardest of all is

For a significant number of intellectuals, the experiences of the late
60's and early 70's led to revolutionary conclusions that the "irrationalities"
of society were actually rationally rooted in the social structure of capitalism.
One radical current rediscovered in Marxism the latent power of the
industrial working class. The pressing question:
How to get this sleeping
giant to use its power?
The first steps seemed obvious. The walls which
protected the intellectual community also isolated it from the working class
and had to be broken down. One way was for the socialist intellectuals to
become part of working class life to learn from it and be a part of organizing
the class struggle.
It happened in every developed capitalist country in the world. Robert
Linhart's story is the French version. Following the 1968 uprising in France,
Linhart left his life as an academic economist and hired on as an unskilled
laborer in a Citroen plant. But what he describes could almost as well be
the experience of the radical who ends up working the assembly line of a
Detroit Chrysler plant.
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From the inside, factory life has little romance. Linhart describes it
well. Workers are individuals and there are as many stories as there are
workers. There are heroes and cowards and traitors. There are small group
dynamics as well as divisions along race, cultural, sexual, age, craft, and
job lines. Yet penetrating through all of this is the experience of class
relations.
As a description of this industrial working class experience the book is
at its best. The central daily objective is nothing more glamorous than
basic survival. But the strategies for survival widely differ. Some workers
play beat the machine. Some get pleasure out of beating the system. Some
live for putting one over on the foreman and some live for getting the
foreman's approval. Some find ways to informally change the situation and
cooperate among themselves. Some survive by trying to make their work interesting. But others cope by trying to reduce their job to a completely
thoughtless rhythm so that the mind is free to wander elsewhere. "The
mechanism of habit brings back a small amount of liberty: I look around...
I escape in my imagination." (So management tinkering with the work process
or paternalistic "job enrichment" programs can actually threaten daily survival.)
A few jobs in auto plants do not require the same kind of daily survival
strategies because they involve a high degree of skill and creativity.
Linhart tells a story of a metal finisher whose skills and experience have
won him considerable respect. "Even the foreman and the section manager
modify their usual tones of voice when they speak to him. Almost courtesy."
But skill means discretion and a measure of power on the shop floor and
therefore a thorn in the side of a system of hierarchical authority. The
skilled metal finisher in this case had created his own workbench with special
features that enabled him to do a quality job efficiently. But in the name of
rationalization and standardization and authority, someone upstairs decides to
replace the workbench. The skilled craftsman who took great pride in the
quality of his work is suddenly confronted with the task of trying to do his
job with a misdesigned workbench. He is surrounded by various levels of
management who cover themselves by blaming him. His old workbench and his
dignity have been dumped on the junk pile.
Long term survival strategies are also varied. Some workers may believe
for 20 years that they are only working "temporarily" in the plant until they
can get the money to do something else (return to the home country, open a
small business). Others hope to escape by climbing into management.
And still others hope to improve their conditions through the unions and
politics. Here Linhart's book is weaker because it covers only a year's
events. While qualitative jumps do take place in the class struggle, the
long term experience is also a summation of many small victories, defeats,
and nonevents. Linhart views the brief period with the impatience that is
typical for most of the radical intellectuals who went into the factories.
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"I didn't join
In Linhart's case it is self conscious. After four months:
Citroen to make cars but 'to organize the working class'. A contribution to
the resistance, to the struggles, to the revolution. . . . And now, here,
it's this very political effectiveness itself which escapes me. Where can I
start?" And therefore his story is also about the radical intellectuals in
the factory.
For a year it was
Linhart stuck it out until he was fired ("dismissed").
a personal challenge just to stay at the job. The difficulties of basic
survival, the frustrations with all of the obstacles to action, and the
impatience with the pace of events as well as management (and in some cases
union) harassment, combined with the attractions of returning to intellectual
lifestyles, drove most of the radical intellectuals like Linhart out of
industry. But some successfully found ways to survive and are a part of the
collective working class history, experience, and future.

*Mike Parker has a graduate degree in political science and is an elecHe has written articles on the "Quality of

trician in a Detroit auto plant.
Worklife" programs in industry.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORIGINS, by CAROLYN L.
THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY:
Duke Press Policy Studies, 1982. 320 pp. $36.75 cloth
WEAVER. Durham, N.C.:

GARY FREEMAN
University of Texas at Austin

This provocative and pathbreaking book is a major contribution to the
political analysis of the American social security system and of the welfare
state more generally. Employing an analytical framework derived from the
theory of collective choice, Carolyn Weaver poses a number of intriguing and
important questions about the founding and growth of the nation's public
retirement system. Like Martha Derthick (Policymaking for Social Security,
Brookings, 1979), the author locates the engine of social security expansion
in governmental actors, especially bureaucrats and key congressional figures,
rather than in public opinion, interest groups, or the political parties. In
at least two respects, however, Weaver moves beyond Derthick. On the one
hand, her book is more self-consciously theoretical and thus develops an
argument that aspires to applicability beyond a single government program. In
this way Weaver generates numerous hypotheses that may be tested in other
contexts and avoids the impression which Derthick leaves that social security
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is an anomaly in American politics. On the other hand, she produces a bold
and original interpretation of the circumstances of the introduction of the
program, a period Derthick mostly ignores. It is with this part of Weaver's
book, where her contribution is potentially most significant but also most
vulnerable to criticism, that I will deal.
Weaver begins by laying out two competing models of the political
process drawn from the public choice literature. Demand-side interpretations
argue that "political outcomes reflect the demands of citizen-voters as
transmitted and aggregated by the political process.. .The demands.. .generally
result from the inefficiencies and inequities created by market failures"
(p. 5). Weaver deduces from this perspective two explanations for the emergence of a compulsory federal old-age insurance program in 1935. One is that
socio-economic transformation increased poverty among the elderly and
"generated demands for an institutional means of enforcing upon the individual
the obligation to ensure against the financial hazards of old age" (p. 6).
The other interpretation suggests that the Great Depression, by undermining
public faith in the market and the viability of private savings and insurance
institutions, demonstrated the necessity of non-market provision of old-age
income security. Supply-side interpretations, on the other hand, focus on
the role of bureaucrats as actors who seek to preserve and enhance their
organizations. The key environmental characteristic of a public bureau as
opposed to a private firm is that it has a type of monopoly power because it
is "generally immunized from the efficiency generating forces of the competitive market process" (p. 7). The hypothesis that this model suggests is that
the monopolistic and compulsory character of the 1935 program were the means
by which program advocates sought to insulate themselves from competition and
evaluation.
Weaver, to her credit, argues that demand and supply-side frameworks need
to be integrated and she develops a complex process-model of the evolution of
public programs. However, her primary purpose is to discredit the demand-side
explanation of the introduction and expansion of social security. Toward this
end she tries to demonstrate that in the pre-Depression era, there was no
broad-based popular support for a program like social security, that the
emergence of a notion of the "elderly" as a distinct class of citizens with
peculiar needs was an artificial and false rhetorical symbol, that the vast
majority of elderly were either self-supporting or cared for by family or
friends and not dependent on private charity or almshouses, that though
poverty among the aged was real it was not clearly linked to age and would be
likely to decline with further industrialization, that aggregate savings
rates remained steady up to the Depression, and that there was rapid growth
and innovation in private life insurance and pensions in the period. Weaver
concludes that the market failure hypotheses of the demand-side model cannot
be sustained. She goes on to assert that "in all probability the basis for
compulsory insurance, as envisioned by early advocates, would have been
weakened over time had it not been for the Great Depression and Franklin
Roosevelt" (p. 56). But the Depression created only a generalized demand for
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some kind of action; bureaucrats and "reformer-zealots" gave the program its
particular character, as she argues in a detailed legislative history of the
Social Security Act.
The forcefulness and clarity with which Weaver argues her case lend it a
not fully justified air of conclusiveness. She persuasively shows that the
social insurance movement had not yielded success on the eve of the
Depression, but she is much less convincing when she tries to argue that
there was no objective evidence of market failure before 1929.
The data she
cites are too skimpy to answer the specific questions about living standards
of the aged that she asks. Moreover, some of her interpretations of
existing evidence are suspect. That the "vast majority" of elderly were not
public or private wards tells us little about the economic strains they
imposed on their "families and friends." Nor can one accept the author's
rosy descriptions of private insurance and pensions as a viable road to
income security, especially when she herself notes that aged poverty was
primarily the result of "low income" during working lives, making adequate
provision beyond the means of the majority. Weaver treats the Depression and
the political transformation it generated as an historical accident that
unfortunately led us to adopt a non-market, redistributive policy from which
we have not yet deviated. The Depression might better be seen as part of the
normal cyclical behavior (in extreme form to be sure) of the unregulated
market. Finally, her attempts to show that life insurance companies and
industrial pensions were able to weather the economic crisis miss the point:
The Depression shattered the faith of Americans in the market. Whether this
was completely justified by the facts, and whether it was good or bad, are
separate issues.
While Weaver's emphasis on bureaucratic supply represents a distinct
improvement over highly simplistic demand-side models, it is appropriate to
consider the utility of the public choice approach more generally. I believe
the tendency to dissolve the government and bureaucrats into nothing more
than rational self-interested actors and to treat the public and private
sectors as conceptually and empirically opposed rather than systematically and
symbiotically linked are serious deficiencies. Nevertheless, Weaver's
impressive study should stimulate lively and fruitful polemic and research.
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JTHE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGING:
by LAURA KATZ OLSON. New York:
$25.00 cloth, $12.50 paper.

THE STATE, PRIVATE POWER AND SOCIAL WELFARE,
Columbia University Press, 1982.
288 pp.

MARTIN B. TRACY
University of Iowa

The general theme of this text on aging policies and programs is the
vulnerability of particular population groups in a capitalistic society. Of
most concern are persons who work for low wages, are irregularly employed, or
who receive no wage compensation for labor (homemakers). The point is made
that economic insecurity during the working years is carried over into old
age.
The source of inadequate income levels for many older persons, according
to the author, stems from inherent inequities characteristic of a capitalistic
economic system. Business manipulation of labor and technological displacement along with sex, race, and age discrimination combine to restrict employment opportunities and earning capacities. As a result many people face old
age with few assets and very limited pension rights.
It is argued that current income maintenance programs tend to increase
the inequalities between capitalists and workers, older and younger generations, and among the elderly. Benefit increases in old age pensions, for
example, disproportionately raise the income levels of workers who earned
good wages during their careers. Those who had low wages or who were unable
to work, on the other hand, are subjected to poverty in old age.
Their
poverty is, in fact, exacerbated as employment possibilities diminish with
advancing age and as increased living costs are incurred by gaps in health
care and housing policies.
This informative and well-written book clearly presents the most important
present and potential issues facing the elderly. The provisions of current
public and private income maintenance programs, housing policies, and human
services legislation are more than adequately covered. Moreover, the reader's
understanding of the forces behind the development of programs for the elderly
is enhanced by a thorough historical view.
This book is set apart from other descriptive texts by the thematic
forces on the root causes of economic and social insecurity in old age. The
author argues that structural contradictions in our advanced capitalistic
society not only contribute to inequities but impede any realistic hope for
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improvement through normal change processes. Particular criticism is aimed at
the false hopes of either free-market mechanisms or liberal reforms.
While many legitimate concerns are raised about the limits of income
redistribution in a capitalistic economy, some questionable conclusions are
drawn relative to program policies and capitalistic manipulation. The Social
Security earnings test, for example, is cited as a tool of capitalists to
In fact, however, earnings tests are used
create a part-time pool of labor.
even more extensively in socialist economies as a mechanism to open up job
opportunities for younger workers. Similarly, such arguments that capitalism
is the primary cause of the absence of physicians in rural areas are quite
spurious, as comparable problems prevail in socialist economies.
The real strength of the book is more in the clarity and thoroughness of
the issues than in the persuasiveness of the critical assessment of capitalism
Perhaps an even more important contribution is the discussion and debate that
its arguments should generate. It is highly recommended as a policy course
text or as a resource book on programs for the aged.

RESOLVING THE PERSONAL DILEMMAS AND POLITICAL
THE OTHER SIDE OF ORGANIZING:
Schenkman
DEMANDS OF DAILY PRACTICE, by STEVE BURGHARDT. Cambridge:
$18.95 cloth, $9.95 paper.
Publishing Company, 1982.

MICHAEL REISCH
University of Maryland at Baltimore

Steve Burghardt's The Other Side of Organizing is a groundbreaking effort
to redefine the nature of community-based practice in the face of the rightward drift of U.S. social policies and the social work profession over the
past decade. Rather than asking whether community organization will be "fact
or fiction" in the 1980s, Burghardt explores the more trenchant question of
how community organizers can make their work both more effective and more
rewarding in an increasingly conservative context. Burghardt's answer is the
that effective practice requires an understanding
major focus of his book:
of the dynamic interaction between the personal and social/political aspects
of work and the development of skills which translate this ongoing reflection
into action. In Burghardt's view, a successful community organizer must
synthesize the analyses of such diverse theorists as Karl Marx and Carl Rogers
Sigmund Freud and Paulo Freire. The Other Side of Organizing is an attempt to
Its purpose and vision are to be
formulate the framework for that synthesis.
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applauded; its accomplishments, while less grand, certainly merit commendation
and, above all, serious analysis.
Burghardt's thesis rests on two interlocking assumptions:
(1) that the
context of practice reflects the tension between the forces of stability and
the forces of change in any given era and (2) that social work methods tend
to reproduce either "dominate-subordinate" or "self-determining" social
relationships. That is, social work serves either to reinforce or to replace
prevailing ideologies and the structural arrangements from which they derive.
His first assumption--with its implication that community organizers must
view the larger context of their practice as dynamic--is a necessary precondition for practice in all social work methods. In fact, Burghardt recognizes
this throughout his book, particularly in chapters 2 and 8, in which he
attempts to develop a dialectical framework for practice that cuts across
traditional methodological divisions. The problem lies in how to translate
this awareness into action. Burghardt struggles throughout the book to
formulate this framework and is only partially successful. Three factors
limit the attainment of what Burghardt identifies as his primary goal.
One factor is a consequence of Burghardt's second underlying assumption.
Despite his efforts to integrate the "personal" and the "social," to find
common ground between caseworkers and community organizers, Burghardt's
formulation of social work cannot fully escape the dichotomization of practice
that has plagued the profession since the 1960s. A dialectical conception of
practice (and of the "collective practice" of the social work profession) must
recognize that the work of individuals and of the profession as a whole often
simultaneously reinforces and challenges existing values and institutions. The
contradictions of society, which Burghardt admirably describes in several
chapters, are reproduced within the work of individuals, the organizations in
which they practice and, all too frequently, in every step of the helping
process. Burghardt emphasizes the need for organizers to examine their work
through a multi-dimensional lens and to engage in an ongoing process of overcoming their personal weaknesses and the external forces of resistance. He
slips into oversimplification at times, however, such as the subsection of
chapter 3 which charts "organizing situations and their dominant personality
demands."
Further work needs to be done to expand upon these categories and
"instructions".
A second obstacle is the book's utilization of theory. Burghardt begins
by citing Corrigan and Leonard who advise social workers to look outside as
well as within their practice for the theoretical insights that will produce
practice breakthroughs. Burghardt heeds their advice by attempting to incorporate within community organization theory material from casework literature,
Freudian and Rogerian psychology, Marxist political-economy and the pedagogical
theories of Paulo Freire. At times, the effort works well and produces important insights. The chapter on leadership development, which applies Freire, is
particularly valuable. Chapters on "The Changing Context of Practice in the

1980s" and "The Class Character of Social Work in the 1980s" use a Marxist
analysis to explicate the relationship between national and international
economic developments to local crises and even the daily dilemmas of practice.
This material should be required reading for all students of social work (and
their professors) to broaden existing perspectives on the environmental
context of practice and the relationships between policy and practice.
Burghardt is less successful in his attempt to synthesize "personal/
psychological" and "social/political" perspectives. Although his critique
of existing practice theory is instructive, his alternative framework is
incomplete for several reasons: (1) Burghardt strives to create "critical
reflection" by linking intellectual/rational with intuitional/emotional (and
unconscious) abilities. Yet he fails to identify what constitutes practice
"intuition" and, especially, how one can cultivate it and incorporate it into
practice. Many of the practice illustrations used throughout the book which
purport to prove certain generalizations derived from theory are, in fact,
subjective interpretations of the personal experiences of Burghardt or his
colleagues. The attempt to demonstrate the application of "tactical selfawareness" to the situations presented often suffers from the self-consciousness of hindsight. There is not convincing evidence that the workers in the
case studies consciously applied the techniques Burghardt presents.
(2) Burghardt relies heavily in his development of a dialectical framework
(chapters 2-4) on his understanding and appreciation of certain concepts from
Freud, Rogers, and Helen Harris Perlman. Inasmuch as the assumptions and
universal applicability of their theories have been effectively challenged by
others, the attempt at integration of these ideas into a model of radical
community organization rests on shaky foundations. As helpful as the
insights derived from Freudian therapy may have been for Burghardt (as he
acknowledges they were), there is no evidence that Freud's view of the
unconscious has the subversive quality that Burghardt attributes to it.
(3) Burghardt calls for a reevaluation of how one experientially combines
theory and practice. Yet, much of his framework for practice rests on a
narrow, highly personal empirical base. There is too much reliance on personal
incidents and "informal surveys" to "prove" key points of analysis. More work
needs to be done not only to spell out in greater detail the practice principles which Burghardt outlines but also to validate their effectiveness in a
broader range of practice situations. Although the book has value as a
personal statement on community organizing, it will have far greater value
when that statement reflects a broader range of experiences.
A final problem stems from Burghardt's implicit definition of community
organization, which, despite his critique of existing practice theory, does
not reflect the full reality of community organization practice. Burghardt's
experience, his illustrations and, by implication, his model largely focus
on community organization within a "grassroots" level organization. Many
social workers who consider themselves organizers and even activists work
within existing social service agencies, governmental or quasi-governmental
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bodies, industry and labor unions. Further work needs to be done to assess
how (and when) the practice principles Burghardt constructs can be applied to
these diverse practice settings.
None of the above criticisms detracts from the importance of Burghardt's
book. Rather, they reveal how new and how significant is the territory he is
attempting to chart. The measure of the success of a work like The Other Side
of Organizing is not only its immediate utility but also the extent to which
it stimulates new lines of inquiry and analysis.
Burghardt raises far more
questions than he answers.
That, in itself, is the mark of an important and
worthwhile book.
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THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM, by ZILLAH EISENSTEIN.
Longman, 1981.
260 pp.
$19.95 cloth, $10.95 paper.

New York:

KATHRYN B. WARD
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Zillah Eisenstein, a feminist and political scientist, has written a
very important book for the future of the women's movement in the 1980s.
This book is important for those of us teaching women's studies, social and
political movements, and social policy and for those of us who, in the sense
of praxis, wish to combine our feminist knowledge with action in the women's
movement.
Her book is divided into two parts. The first considers the origins of
liberal (mainstream) feminist thought in the works of early political philosophers such as Locke and Rousseau and early feminist writings of Wollstonecraft,
Taylor, Mill, and Stanton. The second half reviews the ideas and actions of
reformist feminists through the writings of Friedan and the early statements
of the National Organization for Women (NOW). Finally, Eisenstein examines
the increasingly prominent contradictions among the social relations of
patriarchy (male dominance), liberal or democratic ideology, and liberal feminism. These contradictions become more apparent with the entry of women in
the paid labor force and the efforts of the state to defuse the subversive
and potentially radical nature of the women's movement through limited and
symbolic legal reforms.
The first part of the book is primarily of historical interest.
It
traces the 17th and 18th century use of liberal ideas to break away from the
patriarchal ideology of divine right and feudal authority toward the liberal
notions of individualism, freedom, and autonomy for men under capitalism.
Early feminist writers, however, argued simply that similar liberal rights
and ideas should be extended to women. They stopped short of seeing that the
patriarchal underpinnings and the redefinitions of patriarchy under capitalism
merely benefited men. Only after the second wave of the women's movement were
some feminists able to see that underlying contradictions existed between
patriarchal mechanisms of control of men over women and the full extension of
liberal citizenship rights to women.
This earlier analysis is useful when Eisenstein sets her sights on these
contradictions in Friedan's work and the pursuant politics of liberal or
reformist feminism. In other words, she argues that liberal feminism must
come to grips with the problem of bringing about change within liberal states
that seek to uphold patriarchy and capitalism. For example, the liberal state
allegedly provides equality of opportunity, even though, as a consequence of
patriarchal relations, women and men start from different, unequal places in
society. As Eisenstein notes, "The problem is that the liberal state can
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grant equality of opportunity to women in the legal sense without creating the
equality of conditions for them to participate" (p. 162).
Hence, efforts that focus on incorporating women into political and state
activities or the extension of equal rights for women will not address the
underlying inequality and conflict between women and men generated by patriarchal relations. For example, no law mandates that women must go out and
work in the paid labor force and then return to work a second, unpaid shift
at home. Yet, legal equality only addresses this first form of inequality.
This situation provides the major contradiction between women's lives and the
women are supposedly granted equality of opportunity in the
liberal ideology:
labor force, but at the same time, they confront patriarchal relationships and
inequality within the home and have no support of law to overcome such inequalities. At the same time, if single female parents fail to meet certain 'social
norms' for raising their children, then the law can and does intervene in the
home.
Thus, under this system, the effects of reform, especially legal reforms
to enhance the position of women, are limited when the state grants minimal
reforms that defuse the revolutionary implications of feminist activities and
condones conservative efforts to restrict women's rights. For example, under
the onslaught of the right wing in the 1980s, with its emphasis on controlling
women's reproduction through legislation and constitutional amendments,
Eisenstein notes, "...the struggle to control women's reproductive activities
and the limiting of her choices related to the institution of motherhood,
As a
reflects the centrality of patriarchy to Western society" (p. 224).
consequence, under so-called liberal governments, women's right to control
over their bodies is severely threatened, while a Supreme Court decision
barely protects our 'right to privacy'.
Thus, the major point of Eisenstein's analysis is that although feminist
activities directed toward legal and symbolic reforms such as the ERA are
essential to improve the status of women, feminists should not direct all of
their activities solely toward political reforms and integration within
liberal states. Instead, feminists should incorporate within their analyses
and political activities the contradictions inherent in capitalism between
women's work in the labor force and in the home and between women and men.
This prescription is particularly timely, given the recent setback for the
ERA and the determination of the National Organization for Women to engage
in intensive political activity oriented toward increasing the number of
politicians who are sensitive to feminist issues. Her analysis also raises
the question about the possible outcome of the recent campaign for the ERA,
if feminists had chosen to organize around the issues and realities of women's
work in capitalist patriarchal society. Finally, such analysis raises questions
about the ability of a movement guided by Friedan's liberal yet delimited
ideology as outlined in her recent book, The Second Stage, to bring about
widespread and needed change in the relationships between women and men without
resolving the inherent conflicts noted above.
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At the same time, several important themes of the new research on capitalist patriarchy are missing from Eisenstein's analysis.
For example, Heidi
Hartmann's (1976) pioneering research on the relations among capitalism,
patriarchy, and job segregation is notably missing in Eisenstein's discussion
of the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy as a mechanism of social
control over women in the home and in the market place. Likewise, Natalie
Sokoloff's (1980) research on the dialectics of home and market work is not
cited (although this could be due to the close proximity of publication). As
a consequence, Eisenstein's book draws upon only a limited amount of theory
and data on the economic relationships governing the position of women under
capitalism and patriarchy. Although it is important to consider the ideological dimensions of liberal ideology and their relationship with feminism,
explicit consideration of the economic relationships such as those noted by
Hartmann and others is also necessary. For example, if we are to use
Eisenstein's work to organize women working in the labor force, analyses such
as Hartmann's on men's direct control over women's access to and position
within the labor force and men's indirect control over women through male
dominated unions and occupational segregation should be essential components
of the new feminist analyses of the 1980s. As so many of us finally discovered in the 1960s and 1970s, we can change ideology or sex role attitudes
only minimally without large scale changes in the economic organization of
capitalist society that is based on the continued patriarchal and racist
exploitation of women and persons of color.
Despite these omissions, Eisenstein's book contains the blueprint and the
analyses for a feminist movement in the 1980s that can provide a powerful
counter-offensive to the pressures of the right wing while potentially bringing
about more revolutionary change for women and men. As such, this book should
be required reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on women,
policy analysis, and so forth; radical and socialist feminists will find
their previous analyses confirmed. Finally, I can only hope that the membership and the new leadership of the National Organization for Women and other
major reformist feminist groups read this book.
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STEVE BURGHARDT
Hunter College/CUNY

Public policy analysis, especially when it concerns fiscal budgetary
the large, university-and instimatters, has long fallen into two camps:
tutionally-based Micro and Macro Fiscal School of Facts, Figures, and
Behaviors; and the small, radical, and marginally-based Marxist School of
History, Contradiction, and Struggle. The two books discussed here are fine
representatives of each faction, solid enough in their distinctive ways to
keep the other side from falling asleep often--no mean accomplishment in the
land of fiduciary dialectics.
The 1983 Budget, edited by Joseph Pechman
Setting National Priorities:
of the liberal Brookings think tank, is an exemplar of school number one. For
the reader wishing to understand both the short-term objectives and budgetary
options before the president and the marginal liberal alternatives to Reagan's
supply side ax, the work fully analyzes defense, nondefense (how's that for a
new name for social welfare?), and the New Federalism proposals in great
for example, Henry
detail. Some of this is good enough to interest anyone:
Aaron on "Nondefense Programs" and Edward Gramlich and Deborah Laren on "The
New Federalism" analyze the various forms of block and categorical grants,
tracing their history, the role they have played between the federal and state
systems, and why Reagan's proposals, given the particular economic strength of
certain states, will have such a diverse--and socially negative--impact on so
Similar
many states with once relatively large social welfare programs.
discussions on the largesse in defense expenditures, the draconian cuts and
their implications for education, health, and income maintenance, all give the
work some short-term, descriptive value.
But, gee, what about things like, um, race? Or sex? Or class? Are
there any clear social implications behind any of the proposals, that is, do
the cuts fall disproportionately on one social grouping or another? Why?
You won't learn anything about these issues here--after all, they're not in
the budget.
Likewise, what about the liberal alternatives? Here is where the reader
keeps falling asleep. Charles Schultz, ex-President Carter's fiscal wizard
(and no mean budget slasher himself) begins by agreeing with the need for real
increases in defense, real decreases in social spending, and the need to end
deficits through the closing of some loopholes and a lot of regressive conto
sumer taxes. The language is sweeter, but the pill will still be bitter
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most people. His main reform interest--in the midst of international economic
crisis, 10% unemployment (at least double for Blacks and Hispanics) and
heightened suffering for millions of Americans--is reform of the budgetary
process itself! He wants better, more streamlined relations in Congress and
the Executive. To read all this is to understand why liberalism is dead.
For those wanting to grapple with genuine alternatives and who also wish
to deepen their understanding of the history of the economic and fiscal
crises, URPE's (Union for Radical Political Economics) Crisis in the Public
Sector is much better, livelier reading. Instead of just facts and figures,
the reader seeks to place the fiscal crisis in a larger national and international perspective, analyzing not only the crisis of capital but presenting
a broader analysis of the state, its institutions, and their role in capitalist development. The tax revolt--just assumed by Brookings--is looked at for
its social and political meanings, and various organizing case histories are
presented which detail the longer term behavior of politicians, business
leaders, public sector unions, and rank and file and community groups. Instead
of emphasizing budgetary figures, its emphasis is on the political and economic
actors and what their history of activity means for the future. Above all, the
roles of the public sector unions and workers are analyzed, in part because
they are viewed as important elements in future strategies of social welfare
reform, in part because they have received little attention in the past.
The work isn't perfect. Some of the articles will be perceived as too
parochial and localist to have value on a national scale, and there isn't much
attempt to draw out national and class-wide implications of various strategies;
macro fiscal types' eyelids will droop here. But no one can leave the work
less informed about the seriousness of what is clearly an unresolved political
and economic crisis, nor fail to recognize the key role certain actors must
play if progressive alternatives are to take place. One may not agree with
all the prescriptions here (personally, I did), but there is far more vitality and hope in URPE's pages than in Brookings's.

ALCOHOL AND THE FAMILY, by JIM ORFORD and JUDITH HARWIN.
$29.95 cloth.
Martin's Press, 1982. 200 pp.

New York:

St.

PATRICIA MORGAN
University of California, Berkeley

Alcohol and the Family is everything a good anthology should be. It
offers the reader articles which not only represent the contours of the field,
but articles which also introduce the varied conceptual and theoretical facets
of the problem. The key to the richness of this book also lies in the editors'
ability to weave in both the more traditional methodologies, with historical
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and cultural analyses of alcohol's place in the family. Starting with a
chapter on the historical perspective, the book then follows with one chapter
on alcohol and the family in literature, runs through discussions of social
influences, sex roles, organization, legal aspects, children, systems, services, prevention, and treatment, and closes with an overview chapter by
Harwin and Orford.
The value of Norman Longmate's opening chapter on "Alcohol and the Family
in History" lies in the breadth of his presentation. Alcohol's historical
relationship to the family is historically situated within the culture as
well. Thus, we not only learn about the threat gin posed to the family in
18th century England, but how it entered the culture, the legal ramifications,
and the effects on different social classes. In the same manner we learn how
the concern over drinking in the family in the Victorian era was an integral
part of Victorian culture itself.
Ghinger and Grant's interpretive essay on "Alcohol and the Family in
Literature" analyzes through novels and plays, not only the effects of popular
perception of alcohol in literature, but its significance.
Shaw takes a
different tack in the next chapter to ask what are the social, cultural, historical, and economic influences on the role of alcohol within the family.
The strength here is that Shaw defines "social influences" broadly enough so
that the reader is able to integrate information from the first two chapters.
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8 all discuss various aspects of the problem as it
exists in contemporary society. Davies talks about the transmission of the
problem (here defined mostly as "alcoholism"), weighing genetic, social,
environmental, and contextual factors. Sex roles and family organization are
discussed next by Leland in a concise and comprehensive review of the issues
in this literature. Jacob and Seilhamer, in Chapter 6, take a look at how
spouses cope, locating the literature nicely in an historical context, for
both male and female spouses. In Chapter 8, Wilson discusses the various
theories on the impact of the problem on children.
Chapter 7 takes the problem into the family systems perspective with
Steinglass attempting to focus attention on to the organizational structure
of the family rather than the individual as the actual site of the problem.
John's analysis of family law and alcohol in Chapter 9 provides a major contribution to the book. She shows how the law looks at alcohol problems in the
family in several oblique ways:
domestic violence, divorce, and custody and
welfare maintenance.
Chapters 10, 11 and 12 deal with services, treatment and prevention
respectively. Ritson, in Chapter 10, asks why the family is rarely involved
in services involving alcohol and family problems. He then analyzes various
barriers to family oriented services, from help seeking and recognition to the
In Chapter 11, Harwin analyzes treatment approaches in terms of
structural.
the excessive drinker and the family, locating the various alternatives.
Orford presents a comprehensive overview of prevention issues in Chapter 12,
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arguing that the barriers to prevention lie in an amalgamation of factors
related to the traditional narrow focus of the problem and problem intervention.
The book closes with an overview chapter by Harwin and Orford, who
attempt to integrate the various chapter presentations into a comprehensive
discussion of the problems in establishing a family perspective. It is this
attempt at synthesis, at drawing out the relevant questions and problems, that
mark the unique contribution of this book.
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